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to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

BLONDEL • RAHNER • SCIACCA • REGAMEY
MUNBY • LOEWENTHAL • CHOISY

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THE UNITY OF THE CHRISTIAN SPIRIT

MAURICE BLONDEL

Is it possible to define the Christian spirit by
reduction to a principle of essential unity?

THE objection has frequently been proposed that Christianity, like all historical realities, has been in such constant evolution that its development seems at times to result in a contradiction of its own primitive impetus. Some claim to return to Her pristine purity, while others praise Her indefinite plasticity and Her fidelity to a tradition which perpetuates itself only by adapting itself to ever-changing needs. Still others would wish to find the glory of the Church in Her correction, by means of Her realistic sense, of the dreams of the early ages and the illusions of the *parousia*: a millenarianism appearing anew in every epoch as an expectation of a temporal Kingdom in this world. The difficulty, then, is evident from the outset: If there has been change, can we presuppose with St. Vincent of Lerins, as cited by the Vatican Council, that these renovations have always evolved *in eodem sensu et in eadem sententia*? Such an assertion would force us at the very outset to abandon the idea of an immobility which would fix Christianity in the realm of the abstract, the unreal and the dead past. **There can be no questions of a static unity.** What we must investigate is the possibility of a really dynamic unity, a continuity of orientation, a fixity in movement, according to the ancient formula: *motus fondatur in immobili*.

Maurice Blondel, who died in 1949, is the inspiration in the field of philosophy for much that is most fruitful in the current revival of Christian thought in western Europe. The present article represents Chapters 4 and 5 of his book EXIGENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES DU CHRISTIANISME (Presses Universitaires, Paris).

When we clarify it in this way, the problem becomes more precise but remains embarrassing because of the difficulty there is in understanding how a directive idea can be simultaneously immobile and mobile. A second source of difficulty is immediately added to the first: If there is a question of a living idea which must assimilate foreign data without losing its own originality, what can be this dominant conception in Christianity under which all other conquests of thought, all the riches of history assemble and unite? In the face of such problems, we shall not be surprised to find that actually many divergent responses have been offered and that there has been a remarkable variation in the judgments on what the biologists would call the dominant character of that immense living being which is centuries-old Catholicism.

Throughout the ages attempts have been made to classify the Christian synthesis according to the historical elements which seem to have contributed to its formation. Three principal types of synthesis have been made, embodying three fundamental themes which must be brought into final harmony. Nothing is more

helpful than to determine these notes, which though diverse in origin, have helped to compose the Christian symphony. Let us begin by sounding the themes separately, these melodies which some have tried to harmonize as the most skillful composers employ counterpoint and the richness of musical polyphony.

Various Types of Synthesis.

1) *By reduction to the idea of a God of Power.*—The first theme, which is that of a God of omnipotence, the sovereign Lord and Creator of all things, inaccessible in mystery, the God of Fear and Majesty Whom one could not call by His true Name nor represent by means of any of the attributes which human thought might invent. (See *La philosophie et l'esprit chrétien*, vol. 1.)

2) *By reduction to the idea of a God of Truth.*—Philosophical effort, especially when inspired by Hellenic thought, offers us another theme which has also been diffused within the Christian soul: A God of intelligibility, a transcendent Principle of Truth and Wisdom, a *Logos* by which all has been made with weight, number and measure. Further, this divine Word, the uncreated Light, is the source of all spirits, which participate in His luminousness and must saturate themselves in His Life and return to Him, the only Mediator and Savior. (See *La Pensée*, vol. 1.)

3) *By reduction to the idea of a God of Charity.*—But, together with these two resonant themes, there sounds a strain, more new and more exalted, a theme which more than any other seems to be the Good Tidings. We knew that God is power; we knew that God is truth and intelligence; but did one dare believe that God is charity, not a Good which would remain a neutral factor like a ray of warmth from a burning fire, but an infinitely bountiful Goodness, a Love giving the lie to the cold wisdom of the ancient philosopher for whom the very idea of a God who could love man seemed scandalous? If there is an original contribution on the part of Christianity, is it not here especially that we shall find it? Certainly it has been said with justice that the miracle of the Jewish people was to conserve, in the midst of a deluge of idolatry, an unwavering monotheistic affirmation of divine Omnipotence and of pure Transcendence. In addition, it has certainly been possible to say that the miracle of the Greek mind was to have conceived spirit, pure thought, supreme reason as the divine Intelligence ordering all things, even though philosophy had never been able to rise to the idea of creation and of divine incommensurability. But that which is truly new is the doctrine, nay more, the apparition, of Incarnate Love striving to the very extreme of love in the gift of His Own life for man.

AS A result, shall we find ourselves face to face with three conceptions which are more or less mutually irreducible or can we hope to resolve these three themes into one identical harmony, while none ceases to be heard in an inspiration which surpasses and transforms them? This is the problem which we must solve and which is perhaps not quite so simple as it would at first appear. We are so accustomed to unite these conceptions, diverse in nature and origin, that we would willingly believe in their spontaneous agreement. Let us, however, avoid self-deception. The study of history reveals that each of these fun-

damental themes has, in turn, sought to dominate; that, according to the idea which prevails, the subordinate themes and the harmony of the ensemble assume a different tone; and, consequently, that we really find ourselves faced with tendencies which are difficult to reconcile and which give rise even to discord. Let us, then, examine these variations of the one doctrine and discover the successive appearances of Christianity according as one emphasizes one or another of these themes which we have enumerated. Perhaps this critical analysis will assist us in seeing more clearly the true unity, the incomparable originality of the Christian spirit which must blend within itself all these nuances, must permit all these variations and still remain animated by a life which none of these elements, of which it seems to be composed, can claim to sustain of itself.

From a comparison of talent with genius, it has been said that talent excels in the assembling of scattered ideas into a system where it may employ its deliberate art of ingenious synthesis; thus, we frequently see the rapid success of a work in which contemporaries can recognize themselves and which reveals to them the many facets of the most current truths. Genius, on the contrary, while it assimilates both ancient and current data, contributes a new principle, an inspiration, which, according to the very etymology of the word, animates with a single breath these materials which have previously remained scattered or even unknown. The problem which we must now discuss is that raised by those interpreters who tend to make of Christianity either a *mélange* of traditions and ideas derived from the most diverse points of the Orient and the Occident, from Jewish, Greek or Roman thought—or a theological and philosophical construct, formed from systematically ordered notions, as certain intellectuals claim (one of whom has said recently that the *Summa* dispenses us from having recourse to the Gospel and that the Thirteenth Century marked the *terminus ad quem* of the Catholic synthesis)—or a sediment, formed and augmented by the overflow of life much more than of thought, by Christian morality more than by dogmatic speculation. As different as they are, do not these interpretations misunderstand the Christian genius, that spirit which more than any work of the most creative human art expresses the divine unity of its origin and its total development?

In order better to justify this second alternative, it will be helpful to review those interpretations which consider Christianity, either speculatively or practically, as a juxtaposition or, as the Alexandrians said, a syncretism in which domination is held successively by certain of the associated tendencies and heterogeneous ideas which seem to make of the Catholic religion something of a great river in which one can recognize by their colors the waters from diverse tributaries. Certainly, no one of the three factors previously mentioned could be lacking without the disappearance of Christianity and, in this sense, it is only in the abstract that one can distinguish them. Nevertheless, the role which is attributed to one or another of these components in the synthesis can differ radically and, as a result, we shall see that, according to which of the elements serves as active and dominant principle, we shall find ourselves faced with syntheses which in no way resemble each other. This paradoxical fact occasions the more and more complete and relentless opposition among Catholic groups which has been a source of scandal to so many. Where agreement and cooperation, certainly at least mutual support, ought to seem easy, since they

are obligatory and salutary, contention has been aroused in a most painful, most tenacious and most prejudicial manner. It is not, then, merely a theoretical problem which much be clarified. There is the question of practical coordination of effort, still better of a "unity of spirits in Truth, of a union of hearts in Charity," according to the constant prayer of Père Pernet.

I. *The First Form of Catholic Synthesis Based on the
Fundamental Idea of a God of Power*

FOR certain minds which are filled with zeal, captivated by the rights of God and preoccupied with order and authority, the directive idea, the primitive inspiration and the sovereign purpose must be respect for Omnipotence, for Majesty and the demands of a God who can order things ultimately to nothing but Himself. This takes the form of the sublime adoration which prostrates the nothingness which we are before Infinity and absolute Perfection, and the profound religious sentiment which is actually *initium sapientiae, timor Domini*.

If this idea becomes as primary as it is fundamental, in what guise will the other elements appear in the Christian synthesis? The God of majesty and fear appears also as the God of truth and justice but it is primarily the truth of what has been called absolute theocentrism and divine egoism. From such a point of view, in what concerns the providential plan, one seeks to understand nothing but the fact of the incomprehensibility of the decrees of the Omnipotent. In what God wills and does is found the true, the just and the good. Thus, from the summit of theology to the most minute details of political and religious disciplines, everything finds its single explanation in this Will Which is one with the Knowledge and Wisdom of the Master and Creator.

One can already surmise the nuance which the doctrine of charity assumes here. If the good is what God wills, our love, participating in the divine attitudes and predestinations, attaches itself to and reserves itself for those whom Mercy has drawn from the mass of perdition, while our zeal is so inflamed against those who resist Grace that to compassionate natural miseries and supernatural indigencies is to weaken our resistance to evil, to adopt a spirit of submission and false liberalism and to enter into the camp of the enemy in a semi-betrayal of the holy cause which demands what Tertullian calls the "flame of vengeance."

Doubtlessly, we are exaggerating certain traits in order to highlight the danger of the abyss into which certain spirits fall only too logically when a sincerity which is more ardent than enlightened urges them to call down fire from Heaven upon the enemies of God. Exaggeration, we say, yet are there not numerous cases of that passionate violence which merited for His apostles Christ's words of reproach: "You know not of what spirit you are." Here already we may note the great disadvantage there is in the abstractive isolation of the principles by which one reasons with its risk of contracting the Catholic spirit. In any case, it would seem that it is not on the single idea of such a theocentrism that one must balance Christian thought. We must now see whether we may be more successful when we examine another form of synthesis.

II. *Can the dominant principle of the Catholic synthesis be derived from the idea of the God of Truth and Pure Intellectualism?*

FROM the very name of its divine Founder, Christianity seems to find its unity in this eternal Word, the adequate Image of the Father, the unique and supreme Mediator between God and the created order (see the development of this in *La Philosophie et L'Esprit chrétien*, I), the total Truth whence proceeds the Holy Spirit. In this conception which the gnosis has caricatured, the Hellenic idea of the Logos offered a commentary on and a clarification of the evangelical teaching and especially of the texts of St. John on the Light Whose mystical sense is identified with the very sense of truth, the principle of both life and light. Likewise, borrowing from Aristotle the word and the idea of a pure contemplation which would "eternalize" man by permitting him, as it were by a stroke of lightning, to perceive the immutable, this speculative thesis has been transposed into a mysticism in which the notion of vision remains dominant: In this world the intellectual act is the highest degree to which the spirits of the elect can attain and in the future it is contemplation which will constitute the supreme and beatifying term.

Under such an inspiration, what becomes of the other ideas which have seemed indispensable for the Christian synthesis? Divine power is intimately associated with intelligence which is the essential law of power. God sees Himself and in Himself all the possibles, all the essences and intelligible natures. Will is understood here as the expression of an infinite Wisdom. Truth is not a creature; it is the Creator Himself. The motto which dominates everything and which demands primary consideration is the word: *Veritas*. (Nevertheless, how rich and admirable is that motto of a great religious order which can so magnificently unite contemplation and instruction, speculative research and the apostolate of charity.) From this follows the tendency to subordinate all rule to a discipline founded on science according to the oft-repeated formula: *sapientis est ordinare*. Further, if wisdom incorporates elements which at first do not seem to be of a theoretic nature, little by little a secret dialectic brings about the statement of a thesis and a practice according to which wisdom itself is finally reduced to pure science and pure theory.

Finally, what becomes of the idea of charity in this synthesis which is so deliberately intellectualistic? The divine Essence is considered as naturally diffusive of the good, just as fire is naturally diffusive of heat: *Bonum est diffusivum sui*, says the ancient adage which employs the neuter form as if to emphasize the presence of a factor which is constitutive, intelligible and, one might say, impersonal. Thus, finally, the other formula: *ens, verum, bonum et unum convertuntur*, that is, being, goodness and unity are identified with truth and in truth itself. There results, then, that imperturbable calm of the Christian who, once he has demonstrated the reasons which procure for him a scientific faith, poses his doctrine indifferently, without consideration of persons and without concern for the erring and the ignorant. While discussing a philosopher who was plagued with doubt and for whose misfortune I expressed pity, a person of great sincerity said to me one day: "One ought not be disturbed by individual misfortunes. In our perspective it is truth alone which matters. We never take persons into con-

sideration. Charity is only in the truth; it suffices to show the truth. So much the worse for those who cannot or will not see the truth."—Recently, in a conference given at the Sorbonne before the *Société pour l'étude des idées nouvelles*, someone defended this thesis: "The modern world proceeds on its way, the Church on Hers. So much the better for those upon whom Grace has descended. We have only to allow the others to follow their own paths." It is by such a logic that one justifies the role of those "atheistic catholics", as certain unbelieving defenders of the Faith have been called. One cannot, it is said, be angry with them if they have not received the Grace to believe, and we must rejoice all the more in the services which they have rendered to Truth by discovering the human aspects involved therein or by their procedures—the use of which is authorized by their very incredulity, while religious scruples might constrain the audacity of the faithful. In a celebrated letter to Albert de Mun, Louis Veuillot declared that a well-aimed saber-blow could be the greatest act of charity. Without carrying the paradox so far, many persons have subordinated the degree of their charity to their conception of truth, a truth which they often reduce to their own conception, their own spirit and their own perspective of clan, parish, caste, tradition or personal interest.

However great and necessary it may be, the idea of truth runs the risk of distorting a properly Catholic conception and of forming from the very name of Christianity a partisan cry, while it is of paramount importance to recall the saying: *Deus vult omnes salvos fieri*. Christ died for all and one can love and imitate Him only by embracing all men, even the most unworthy, in an infinitely charitable solicitude. Are we to say, then, that, if there is an *idée maîtresse*, an original principle, a single soul of Christian inspiration, it is this affirmation of St. John: *Deus caritas est*?

III. *Is Charity the dominant and unifying principle of the Christian spirit?*

WE HEAR it frequently repeated that God is love, that it is by love that one may recognize the disciples of Him Who promulgated this new commandment, the greatest of all commandments, as He Himself says: "He who has love for God and for his neighbor has fulfilled the entire law"; all else disappears, charity alone perisheth not but endureth eternally.

Let us, nevertheless, examine the consequences which follow at times upon an abstract and, one might say, a logical consideration of charity in an erroneous application of the counsel: *Ama et fac quod vis*. This beautiful expression of St. Augustine, although it has a most lofty meaning in the perspective in which its author understood it, runs the risk of distorting the Christian spirit. At various times in history we have seen the danger of a doctrine which places a total emphasis on charity alone. Thus, Joachim of Floris in the twelfth century claimed that the liberal spirit of love was going to succeed, and rightfully so, the reign of the Father and the Son, that is, of Power and Intelligence. In this way, many illusions have germinated in the inflamed imaginations of heterodox mystics and in hearts more ardent than enlightened or pure. Perhaps, too, in our own times, we might discover traces of a generous fervor which, under pre-

tense of exalting divine Goodness, fails to realize the salutary rigors of Christian asceticism.

In such cases, what becomes of the idea of divine Power, of Majesty and Transcendence, which constitute the abyss of incommensurability between the Creator and the nothingness which He has called into existence? Of this power is preserved only the notion that there is nothing impossible to the inventiveness and the humiliations of infinite Love. The immediate inference is made from this that God has given us to ourselves in order that we might enjoy the merits and the satisfaction of restoring ourselves to Him Who gives Himself to us in exchange for that very restoration. Thus, all distance disappears in a familiarity which causes certain modern Origenes to lapse finally into the same error as the great thinker of the East: God is so good that He will condemn no one and Hell is but the threat which one proposes to children in order to make them more wise through fear of the bogey-man.

In this synthesis, where the idea of charity becomes the directive or even the exclusive principle, what becomes of the idea of essential truth and of fundamental intelligibility? There is a growing refusal to found the Christian order on a system of necessary truths and a rejection, perhaps not without some reason, of the notion of a God Who is identified with an essence, the source of all other essences, Who remains Himself transcendent to all created nature. Such a theory refuses even to hesitate in the face of this difficulty: How can there be a union of charity where there is incommensurability of nature? There is rather a tendency to relegate that question to the domain of abstractions and of false ontologies which discuss *entia rationis* as if there were question of the most positive existences. Thus, one might condemn *en bloc*, as if they were the remains of idolatry, all assertions relative to the distinction between human nature and the pure Spirit which is God, in Whom essence and existence are one, while there is in creatures an irreducible distinction between nature and concrete existence. And when we attempt to recall this metaphysically ineluctable heterogeneity, we irritate, as if we remained attracted by mere verbalisms, instead of seeing in God only a Father Whom nothing could separate from His children. Grave are the consequences of this superficial optimism which would remove every obstacle and every separation but which, by its very nature, as we shall later see, humbles God instead of elevating man and thus humbles human destiny by failing to realize the supreme exigencies of divine Charity.

Later we shall have to explain at greater length how this pretended charity—which is considered primary and made easier to attain and more extensive in its control—is cruelly deceptive and destructive of divine Goodness, which has infinitely more ambition for us than have these slaves of a human charity measured in terms of our own personality. At this point it is necessary to denounce this misinterpretation in order to clarify the negative conclusion to which we have finally arrived and which prepares us for a more comprehensive understanding of Catholic unity.

This negative conclusion is that the analysis which we have employed in this rapid survey implies that our discursive reflection succeeds only in decomposing or recomposing the Christian spirit, such as it is in the soul where it lives mysteriously. Now, this implies a false presupposition. One may say, then, that to the extent that one has claimed to dissect the Christian sense, dissect its

organism, reconstruct a synthesis by means of explicit knowledge, one has rather killed than vivified. Not that such analysis must be abandoned, but it is useful and salutary only in a perspective different from that in which it has so frequently been placed. It has often been remarked that what touches and enlightens souls is certainly less a long labor of erudition, logic or eloquence than a spiritual contact or the encounter with sanctity. It has even been added at times that the spark which enkindles Faith is produced outside of and above all the materials which have been laboriously accumulated to prepare the light and kindle the spark. We are to conclude, then, that we have not yet found the true terrain where the sacred flame kindles, grows warm and leaps upwards. It remains to make a considerable effort, one which places us on our guard against the insufficiencies and the deceptions of that which Dechamps called the important science of learned demonstrations.

But someone might ask: Is it possible and permissible to penetrate without violation into this domain which is profoundly obscure and sacredly reserved for the encounter of the soul with God? Is not the Catholic spirit a living mystery, inaccessible to the learned, one which reveals itself only to the simple and to the humble, be they the most learned of men? For one becomes a believer only by casting off indiscreet curiosity and by consenting to enter beyond the veil, where Denys the Areopagite said we should find only impenetrable mist and "the great Darkness". This, then, is the question to be discussed, even though we should arrive at the conclusion that actually we can encounter only obscurity. Nevertheless, let us hope that there again we will be able to justify and to practice *rationabile obsequium*.

On the Method which Leads to the Realm where the indissoluble unity of the Christian spirit takes life.

IF IT seems difficult to define the Christian spirit, may the cause of the difficulty not be found in the use of a method which is insufficient and imperfectly adapted to its object? It is possible, even intended, that what precedes should leave the impression of restless ambiguity. Doubtlessly there is a legitimate and providential variety in the Catholic unity,—*in dubiis libertas et multiformes viae Dei diversa quoque dona spiritus*. Nevertheless, that variety need not lead to a basic diversity, still less to internal contrariety: *In necessariis unitas*. Further, if we must add, according to the adage falsely attributed to St. Augustine, *in omnibus caritas*, this charity must not consist in closing one's eyes in order the better to open one's heart. While we give credit generously and grant a humble welcome to all, it is necessary that charity lead ever more firmly to the fundamental and definitive unity of souls in the light, as well as in the love, of Christ. Otherwise, Christianity would be a mere signpost on a meeting place for ideas as has been asserted frequently and erroneously. Let us not blame those who never compromise the demands of dogma. Pascal said: "Truth is not truth without charity"; yet, it is necessary to add in compensation: Charity is not charity without the scrupulous search for and service of Truth.

In order to take into account the hesitations and the conflicts which may at times trouble the Christian conscience or halt many an unbeliever along the

path of return or of approach to the faith, we must attempt to find those factors which constitute the insufficiency of method and which in our former study have not allowed us to attain that unity of perspective in which everything is unraveled in an orderly manner before the soul's eyes upon the confused stage of the world. Three principal causes seem to explain the failure in the frequent attempts to determine, from the philosophical or apologetical point of view, the intimate nature of Catholicism, to Which so often apply the words of the precursor of Christ: "There is one among you whom you know not." One thinks that he knows Catholicism and that he can even judge it, because he has a day-by-day familiarity with it. But these ceaseless encounters fail to reveal its secret and even help to cause an ignorance of it, just as psychologists have pointed out the paradox that those who are accustomed to a house are often less capable of describing it from memory than a visitor with his more recent and more vivid impressions. But let us put aside such secondary details which could be multiplied not only in the psychological order but in the moral order as well. Let us examine the causes which conceal the most essential basis of Christian thought even for the most attentive and most impartial of witnesses or critics.

First of all, some seem only too willing to reason concerning the Catholic spirit as if it were entirely subject to analysis. We have adopted to such an extent the scientific habit of dividing difficulties in the Cartesian manner, of breaking apart brute bodies, of dissecting living bodies and examining the subconscious or the unconscious in their most minute details that our presumption and our ambition is to attain in such a way the end of all ends, the ultimate basis of all things, even the secrets of spirits, of divine operations, of mystic states and of supernatural union. Thus arises that curiosity which in our day entices so many believers or unbelievers, towards investigations from which they hope to draw the key to the mystery.—Now, even in the study of nature, this method which is too exclusively analytical, remains notably inadequate. It allows that spark to escape, without which no synthesis is possible; and to the extent that analysis, which never touches upon this spark nor brings it under its scalpel, prescind from it without hesitating to declare that it is a method exhaustive of total reality, it becomes mutilating, deceptive and murderous. And still more, when it is no more a question of inferior nature but of operations which, by hypothesis, imply divine assistance, such analytic methods are fatally doomed to misrepresent the very object which they seek to grasp in its intimate and indivisible unity.

A second cause, related to the first, explains even more clearly the semi-defeats which we have found. We attempted to reunite the diverse sources from which the Christian spirit was derived both historically and doctrinally. By making analyses concerning the facts, ideas and states of conscience and by transforming these data into notions as distinct as possible, we asked ourselves how such conceptions, formed in isolation and more or less disparate, could have assembled into a living organism. Nothing can be more chimerical than such a claim. Nevertheless, it is so common that we fail to notice that it destroys in advance that which it wishes to explain and justify. If Christianity implied such a method, it would not be a religion, being neither one nor religious. It would be a syncretism of beliefs and speculations mingled with facts; but it would

not proceed from a superior principle to disparate phenomena which are by nature subalternate and mutable.

There is a third cause and a fresh consequence of the two errors of method which we have just noted (and it is on this point that we may best notice the remedy which must be applied to such harmful deficiencies). If Christianity had actually been formed by means of elements furnished by analysis and by a grouping of notions which were elaborated in the abstract, it would result entirely from accommodations and adaptations and it would have arisen *post factum* as a complement of a life already constituted and of a spontaneity to which it would attach itself in an extrinsic manner without deriving anything of its vital force from the natural and rational order. Thus it is that it has often been considered a superadded burden, worse still, as a restraining intrusion, a spoil-sport, a mortification arbitrarily and gratuitously burdensome. Among the objections which restrain cultivated minds, there is none more tenacious nor more noxious than this: Christianity arises as an accident in the normal life of humanity; historically, it was a patch-work construct; philosophically, it is repulsive to principles discovered by science and metaphysics; morally, it molds passive and submissive characters, without real virility, without initiative and without nobility of soul. I found in the notes of a candidate for the baccalaureate this statement which, as was subsequently discovered, actually came from the professor: "The so-called state of sanctity is an immoral state."—One can see from this synoptic picture the serious mass of grievances which a wrong method of exposition may accumulate so unjustly against the Christian spirit. It is precisely our task to discover the antidote for such a conception of Christianity and for a method which is so disastrous.

FROM the point of view which we will assume, we shall show that the objections enumerated thus far will on the contrary be transformed into clear and favorable proofs: those factors which seemed to contradict each other will demand and complete each other. This is true both for the metaphysical order and for the preambles of faith. It will be still more true for those truths which are properly Christian and for the unity of revealed doctrine. In other words, where we seemed to find disparate data and rising conflict, there will appear agreement, still more, implications and aspects of a unity which no analysis could really destroy. How often, in our human modes of thought and speech, we place the divine attributes in opposition one to the other, as if in mutual contradiction or limitation. Nevertheless, reason like faith should elevate our minds above this anthropomorphic mode of speech, so that, though we may not fully comprehend, we may at least catch sight of and affirm the essential simplicity and the perfect unity of God. What is true from the metaphysical point of view we can still more easily recognize in the order of supernatural wisdom where power, knowledge and goodness, whose fictitious opposition we have already seen, are fundamentally but a unique Providence.

But how are we to conceive this perspective which seems to surpass our human mode of knowledge and of instruction? It does not suffice to point out the insufficiencies of our thought and our speech, nor merely to discard the in-

conveniences which result from them: *in divinis, multum deficit omnis cognitio humana*, as the Scholastic adage says. The problem is to know whether, despite these deficiencies, we can in a positive and legitimate manner, place ourselves, if not in the divine center of unity, at least, through a fusion of reason and Revelation, at a point where the discordances and oppositions, which create the basic objections against Christianity, will disappear.

In order to do this, it is necessary to reconsider the entire problem of human destiny. Can man as he is in reality be sufficient unto himself and give a satisfying solution to his thought, to his personal and social life, to his superior inclinations and his religious aspirations? Or, from the lowest to the highest levels of human experience and in the most rigorous analysis, do mental clarity and moral probity demand that we recognize a radical and incurable insufficiency? If this latter affirmation is the only one which responds to our historical state and to our philosophical inquiry, is it possible to go beyond the mere admission of the fact? In the face of this void, is it legitimate to examine the edges of the abyss, to observe and draw some positive lesson from such contingency, such defect, from such emptiness which seems at first entirely negative? This fact must be emphasized: This void is called such only in contrast with the apparent and false plenitude of those experiences which never reach their goal and which themselves should be called negative rather than satisfying: *vanitas vanitatum*. In addition to the fact that this void of which we speak is not fictitious, since it is found as the climax of every reality experienced, it must be added that it represents the very antithesis of that which finally appears to us as vain, inconsistent and weakening. As a result, one can say that, despite the mystery and the indeterminacy with which it appears to us, such an abyss of obscurity is invincibly conceived as containing the maximum of being, the term of our aspirations, the only plenitude which does not deceive.

We have just reproduced by a purely experimental and rational procedure the very expressions and the teachings of a John of the Cross who seeks being only in the obscurity of night and in nothingness. Still, we must be on our guard against the temptation to which so many metaphysicians and pseudomystics have succumbed by leaving in absolute indetermination this supreme term of speculation. It is here that we shall have to insert the concrete data of history and of revelation and to justify the attitude of a St. Teresa who protests most forcefully against all who, in order to attain "the God without form," would wish to set aside the humanity of Christ as a simple means easily superseded. The Christian spirit would disappear to the extent that it becomes a sort of gnosis and an idealism divorced from incarnate realities. It is, then, more than ever necessary not only to show that supernatural faith supposes and completes the entire edifice of nature and of reason which serve as its basis (just as the human composite serves as support for the spirit in this world and in the future life), but constantly to reattach the most lofty Christian speculation to the concrete data of history, to the experiences of popular piety and to the most humble devotions, to the love of the details in which the lives of Christ, of the Virgin and of the saints have become incarnate. There are those who would hope to ascend by freeing themselves from the pretended "childhood" of Christianity; truly, they lose the Catholic sense without gaining (quite the contrary) the sense either of philosophy or of humanity.

THUS, little by little we shall see assembling within a single scheme elements which at first are most opposite—the most lofty philosophical speculation and the devotion of an unlearned child, the secret of the entire creation and the apparition at a point in space and time of a fact which appears infinitesimal and totally disproportionate with that immensity of centuries, of generations and universes. Still more, in the moral as in the philosophical and historical order, it will be necessary that contrasts be founded in the same light and that the rigorous demands of the Divine shall be seen, in the words of Dante, to take birth from the first and incomparable love. Only on that condition can one hope to arrive at the unique and incomparable spirit of authentic Christianity. But, as is easily seen, the task required by the method proposed is actually immense and we shall be able to plot out only certain landmarks which are meant to orientate our research in the manner in which Catholic tradition has always proceeded (often without pausing to discuss them) towards the resolution of the many objections which harry her progress.

This synthesis, it is true, cannot be achieved for us in this life with that perfect unity which remains a pledge and a promise for the celestial Jerusalem. But, as Newman said, even in the infirmity of our earthly thought, it is good always to realize and even to possess to some small degree the presence of the blessed vision of peace and of unity. One would not participate in the Christian spirit, one would not even be able to speak of it in any way whatsoever, if he did not have some realization of the final harmony of nature, reason, faith and the union of Grace.

Translated by GEORGE E. BRANTL

A PLEA FOR ECONOMICS

D. F. MUNBY

IT IS strange that Christian thought on social matters has so largely ignored the "economic problem", by which I do not mean the various economic problems that have faced the world at various times, but the problem that is involved in all of them, that of "making ends meet", as we colloquially but correctly assert. To the economist his subject is the rationale of means and ends, his problem set by the existence of competing ends for which scarce means are to be employed, his particular competence largely delimited by the sphere to which the "measuring rod of money" applies. Christian moral teaching has been so concerned with the relation of means to ends that it might be thought that theologians, and in particular moral theologians, would have contributed much to a field where the problems of means and ends in a complex society are seriously studied. But it has not on the whole been so, and, though the economist undoubtedly has much blame to bear, so has the Christian social thinker. Here I am more concerned with the failings of the latter.

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The problems of "technics" and "technology", for example, are discussed interminably by Christian sociologists without a suggestion that there is any third term between the technical sphere and the sphere of the human being which is the concern of the Christian. These remarks are indeed partly provoked by some examples of this kind of discussion in *The Frontier* for February last year.¹ I do not deny the validity of this approach; but it is not the only way to look at the social problems of our time. It implicitly ignores the contribution of the economist, who has the longest, deepest, and most developed tradition in the whole sphere of the social sciences, which the layman who tries to understand the modern world neglects at his peril. To the economist the technology of a period is one of the given factors, one of the means available to satisfy given ends; it exists as a body of knowledge, which may or may not be embodied in a given capital equipment, and is carried in the experience of certain men to be used as required. It is not always clear indeed whether Christians who use this sort of language are aware of the distinction between the technical and the economic problem. The technologist can tell us which is the way to heat a house with the minimum amount of coal; but only the economist can point out to us how to go about deciding which of the alternatives suits us best on the whole, or in other words which is "cheapest". (Money cheapness is not always identical with real cheapness, but only the economist can adequately analyse the divergence).

Strangely enough, in spite of Christian acknowledgement that we live in a world subject to the Fall, many Christian thinkers, and not always those least

aware of the implications of the Fall, do not like to admit that we live in a world of scarcity, a world where we have reluctantly to choose between alternative good ends and objects, a world where the avoidance of unnecessary effort and the achievement of "cheapness" are positive virtues. They sometimes seem to think the clue of our problems to be not "All this and Heaven too", but "Heaven and all this too". But in fact the "Age of Plenty", that many once thought, and some still perhaps do think, they live in, was an illusion of a world of unemployment, where needs were certainly not met, but purchasing power was not available in the right places to create effective demand. Then it was possible (up to the point of full employment) to have both guns *and* butter, because machines and men were idle, in enforced and unwilling leisure—a state of affairs both undesirable and largely avoidable. The scarcity economics, to which we have been used during and since the war, is not the result of the destruction of war—a temporary phase which we shall one day leave behind—though some of its symptoms and its particular scarcities are. It is primarily due to the fact that demand has been up to and above total output, an inevitable phenomenon of full employment and adequate total demand. In that situation, as we know today, guns *or* butter and bridges *or* butter become real choices. In fact the world of illusory plenty will never come back again until we are faced again with unemployment due to deficiency of demand. It was a delusion at the best. The real situation (on earth) is that we men are creatures never satisfied with the material riches we possess, ever ready to create new wants the more we have. That is a fact, though it implies criticism of a society that does not set curbs on this inevitable tendency of human nature. But the Christian social thinker will entirely fail to grasp the measure of our problems unless he starts here.

Failures of Christian Thinking

LET me give some examples of the kind of failure to comprehend the nature of these issues that occurs in Christian writings. A great deal has been written by Christian sociologists, and much of it of the greatest importance, about the respect due to nature and the land, which have been grossly neglected during the growth of the industrial order. The way of life on the land is extolled as good for its own sake, traditional methods of husbandry are approved because they are in accordance with the natural order of God's creation, and we are told that the following of these methods will make us happier and healthier, and, implicitly, if not explicitly, better off in the ordinary secular sense. It is often implied that a greater proportion of the population should not merely be living near to the country, or in it, but actually working on the land, though we are rarely told how many, or what proportion. All this may be excellent, but we are never told the cost, which, if we were aware of the real nature of man's relations with nature, his boundless wants and limited means, would be one of the first questions to ask. For the greater the proportion of workers there are on the land, the lower is the standard of living. The achievement of modern agriculture and industrialism is that by multiplying the number of mouths that one worker on the land can feed, more can be released for other occupations and for raising standards in other spheres. The solution of the prob-

lems of the undernourished Malthusian areas, such as India and China, is to be found in greater capitalization and the application of modern agricultural techniques, less people on the land, and more people in factories. I am not arguing here against the back-to-the-landers; I can see clear Christian grounds for deliberately advocating a policy of cutting down the standard of living in order that people might live simpler lives working on the land; but the price you would have to pay would be doing without not only tobacco, films, motor-cars, wirelesses and so on, but also complicated hospital services, electricity and drainage supplies, good housing, education, and all the things that a high standard of living means; a low standard of living means more people dying sooner, with more pain. My complaint is that we are never told that these would be the price of redressing the balance of industrialism. It is assumed that we can have "Heaven and all this too".

Again, it appears to be sometimes assumed that the agricultural problem is totally different from the industrial problem, with which economists might be supposed to be concerned. Thus *The Frontier* in April 1950 states that "If the relief of need and necessity is our aim, we must start from quite a different point of view; this is not a power-problem, but a cultural one"; and this attitude is contrasted with the attitude of "production engineers".² It might, however be said to be neither a cultural nor a power problem but primarily an economic problem. For us as human beings what matters is quite simply the serving of our needs with the least use of scarce resources, and particularly that most scarce of all, human labour and effort. And this is a criterion we apply both to the use of power and to the acquiring of bread from the soil. We will not use atomic power (however powerful) if, as seems likely for many years ahead, the labour (and other resources) required to produce electricity from it can produce more electricity from coal. Nor will we use oxen to pull wooden ploughs if we can be more sparing in human effort by using tractors and steel ploughs (after taking into account any possible adverse effects on future production from the same land). (And if we are economists, and not megalomaniacs, we will not forget that tractors also cost human labour to produce . . . a simple fact, but often implicitly forgotten in the current discussions of output per man-shift and production per man-hour.) And if the extra effort required by more primitive methods is extolled as a more satisfying kind of effort, or is some way required by our proper obedience to the Creator, and positively to be striven for, then that can also be taken into account in our calculus. The important thing is to balance all the relevant factors and not leave some out, because they do not fit into simple moral rules or *a priori* judgments.

Another kind of example of neglect of the economic problem is to be found in the way Christians have tried to moralize or theologise the various economic crises we have had to meet after the war. These so-called "crises" have involved a series of complicated technical economic problems, where the solution has lain in a delicate choice among a bewildering number of "priorities". There has never been the same sort of clear-cut moral issue that sometimes arises in international "crises", such as the Munich crisis. Where Christian leadership would have been helpful would have been in trying to sort out the various priorities, in estimating the importance of full employment (or even over-full employment) and of the various social services and insurance pay-

ments, the dilemmas of cheap food versus high taxation and the demands of social justice in equalizing incomes versus the need for incentives, and in assessing our obligations to other less-well-placed countries, and the relative importance of present satisfactions and future demands. This was where guidance was needed rather than in the insipid demands of some Christian leaders and ecclesiastics for national governments or more "national unity", and attempts to point to the underlying spiritual significance of these crises, without even understanding wherein their nature lay.

Some Real Problems

CONSTRUCTIVELY it might be worth while suggesting some problems towards which Christian thought could be fruitfully directed in this sphere:

(1) How far is the price mechanism the appropriate social mechanism for equating production with the wants of consumers, and in what spheres must it be superseded by direct planning, that is by conscious control by or on behalf of voters or consumers? (The importance of the concepts of choice and responsibility in Christian theology suggests it should have something to say about the embodiment of these in the social mechanisms of the market or the "machinery of democratic planning".)

(2) How far are the possibly conflicting ideals of full employment and economic progress to be reconciled? If hopes of a higher standard of living depend on flexibility and reliance on a larger volume of world trade at the expense of security of employment and income, which way should we choose? If it is indeed impossible to have at the same time full employment, free wage bargaining and the avoidance of inflation, of which should we prefer to have rather less?

(3) Of what value, after all, is a high standard of living? Does equality of income in any sense embody a Christian standard? And what of our privileged position in relation to the masses of mankind who lives "poor, nasty, brutish and short" in India and China? (It is strange how often those who assert the vanity embodied in our modern strivings towards higher standards of living, and our attempts to ape American levels, are those who in fact live at a standard which there is no practicable hope that the mass of the people of this country will enjoy for many years even if we make the most tremendous efforts to increase our material wealth.)

(4) What store do we set on future needs at the expense of present demands? And what importance do we give to public expenditure rather than private? Would we for example be wiser to have less to eat and fewer motor cars, and even perhaps less slum-clearance if necessary, so that our cities of the future could be more beautiful and rationally planned?

(5) Finally, what are the appropriate relations between the industrial producers and consumers and those primary producers on whom they depend? How should we set about stabilizing farmers' incomes throughout the world, and what sacrifices are involved for industrial workers and national sovereignty?

Why Christians Have Gone Wrong

THE difficulty for Christians largely arises because the problems of the modern world are so often quantitative problems; all economic problems are of this nature, and most of our social problems have an economic aspect, in so far as they involve a balancing of claims upon resources. Unless this technical aspect is understood, judgment will often be wide of the mark, and this so often happens with Christian judgments, precisely because, while they may be admirably trained in the study of means and ends, Christians have hardly ever applied the study to quantitative problems, and tend to assume that such problems must be simply soluble by the methods of qualitative analysis that would be applied for example to the morals of marriage and the family. The fact is that modern society is not only different from earlier societies, but the factor of scale makes the sphere of economics more important than in former times. Though economics only covers a part of the social scene, there is hardly a social problem that does not involve economics somewhere. It is the economic mechanism, largely the price mechanism, that provides the means that enables our society to function at all on its world-wide scale.

The disorders of a money economy, it would hardly be untrue to assert, cannot be understood by those who have not undertaken the discipline of trying to learn how money works in the modern world. How many Christians, who boldly assert their diagnosis of our ills and proclaim the "end" to which modern society should conform, could admit that they understand the rôle of money, in even such a comparatively simple matter as the functioning of the banking system? And if it be claimed, as it might perhaps be, that such matters are merely technical, and not of very great importance, it is at least disturbing how often Christians rely implicitly, if not explicitly, on theories about money that do not pass a moment's serious scrutiny. The monetary system and the price system are one of mankind's greatest inventions, like all great inventions capable of being perverted to the most untoward uses, but none the less a great invention. It is only through them that a world society can function at all, and, though a world society as we know it to-day is at least a mixed blessing, it is only through our money system that we can enjoy the standard of living of modern man. It is only through our money system that we can ensure that production meets the needs of consumers, a matter which Christians often assume to be a simple matter requiring no social mechanism in a complex society, but which is in fact one of the most urgent problems of our day.

It may be said that these are largely matters of means, and that the concern of Christian thought must be with ends. This is fundamentally true, but in the kind of problems with which economists deal, a knowledge of the relevant means is almost essential before one can make useful judgments about ends, and further it is almost impossible to disentangle means from ends. This arises because we are dealing with competing ends in situations where it is not a question whether to kill or not to kill, or to marry or not to marry, but whether a little more unemployment might not be desirable to allow greater flexibility and a possibly higher standard of living, etc., etc. The little less and the little more may make all the difference, and who is to guide us to draw the line among all the manifold possibilities? It is true that the economist may be pre-

disposed to certain solutions by his own sociological conditioning. Until now, economists have very largely taken their colour from the Liberal utilitarian tradition, for historical and other reasons, and the fact that they, alone amongst ordinary citizens, can understand the workings of the price system and admire its beauties (which to others seem perhaps as the workings of a blind fate driving they know not where), predisposes them to solutions of problems which would allow them to continue in their admiration. Hence the fascination, from Ricardo through the Bank Charter Act to Hayek and Harrod in our own day, for "automatic", as opposed to "managed", solutions of problems. However, it is or should be possible for the economist to see where his technical sphere of means comes to its limit, and his prescription involves an "end" of some sort, which he assumes as a citizen. It is, on the other hand, harder for the layman to see where a problem is purely technical and where a judgment depends on what is really a political assumption. Not that economists should never make political judgments; that would be self-stultifying. The only possible solution is for economists, on their side, to make their assumptions more explicit, and for the public to be made more aware of the difference between a technical economic judgment (which may of course be fallible, for much of the application of economic analysis is more nearly akin to the diagnosis of the general medical practitioner than to the experimental certainty of the laboratory worker) and the political and social bias of the economist in question.

Are Christians Using Their Resources Rightly?

THOSE primarily concerned with ends, such as Christian social thinkers, must be aware of the technical factors before they make their pronouncements, or must deliberately avoid these problems, if they are unable to acquire the technical competence necessary. There are various inter-related factors at work here: (1) Christians are ignorant about economic facts partly because they are unaware that economics is within limits a science and that it is impossible to apply the old categories of moral theology directly to the complex social facts of to-day. (2) Those Christians who have directed their attention to these spheres have largely ignored the contribution of serious scholars and directed too much attention to ephemeral utterances or the works of cranks and non-specialists. (3) There has been a disproportionate attention given to the ringside commentator who has intellectually stimulating things to say. This inevitably follows an intellectual attitude that is ignorant of the contribution that the social sciences can make, and does not understand the proper rôle of the expert in this field. (4) For similar reasons, more attention has been directed to sociology as compared with economics than is perhaps warranted by its development as a science and its general importance.

It may indeed be seriously questioned whether Christian resources would not be better used if Christian thinkers about social problems ceased reading their colleagues' prolific and stimulating works about the modern world, and gave more time to first hand study of the facts of that world, or even of the surveys and commentaries to be found in the works of those who devote their lives to the social sciences. It is rare indeed to pick up a book about the relation of Christianity to modern society which shows even a cursory acquaintance

with the vast literature written by experts on such subjects as full employment, planning and the price mechanism, money and the trade cycle, international trade, the development of backward areas or indeed the economic history of the last thirty years.

Such serious studies are part of the work of *The Frontier*. And though in some fields they are being undertaken more than one might hope for in view of the resources available, yet in the particular field of economics which, as I have suggested, touches most of the major issues of our time, there is a sad dearth of understanding even among acute and lively minds, and a failure to use limited Christian resources to the best effect.

¹ i.e. "Few even yet realize the importance of the new technics that have developed since the century began. . . . More than a further extension of the use and elaboration of the power of machines. . . . It consists primarily in the large-scale organization of human actions as means to the same end." (It would be interesting to compare this in detail with the typical "large-scale organization of human actions" that results from the forces of supply and demand in a world-wide economy.) Finally . . . "the issue between man and the latest creation of his spirit, power-technics" (pp. 44-5, 52).

² cf. S. G.'s "Agriculture versus Agri-Industry" in the same number, a typical example of the new scholasticism. . . . "scholastic" because it imposes its *a priori* categories on the world rather than finding out those appropriate to it.

THE MYTH OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

*Remarks in reference to Mr. Roepke's memorandum
concerning Germany's economic policies*

RICHARD LOEWENTHAL (Paul Sering)

*What never and nowhere has happened
That alone will never grow old.*

IN THESE post-war years, while Europe is seeking for ways towards unity, a new line of division, economic, political, and ideological, has arisen, splitting this very Europe into two camps. Italy, Western Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and not quite to the same degree, France, have committed themselves to a resurrected economic liberalism; Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries and Holland are attempting to set up a democratically planned economy aiming at full employment. The differences of economic policies have produced not only innumerable political difficulties, but not infrequently it appears as if the communication of ideas had been interrupted, as if the "liberal" countries behind their golden curtain were no longer able to comprehend exactly what is novel in the developments of the planned-economy countries. Prejudices take the place of serious investigations, and impressions that of statistical analysis, to a degree that the average Continental newspaper

reader up to this very day often lives in the belief that the inhabitants of England spend most of their time queuing up with rumbling stomachs in front of empty stores, and that from year to year they are anticipating, undismayed, the inevitable bankruptcy of the island kingdom.

The survey of Germany's economic policy rendered by Switzerland's Professor Wilhelm Roepke at the request of the German Federal Government is particularly interesting for the concise form and the, as it were, undaunted consistency with which it sums up the economic outlook of this continental neo-liberalism. As to its scientific value, it may be compared with the programme of the Communist Internationale: like his collectivist counterpart, Herr Roepke is too experienced a propagandist to allow his straight ideological course to be inconvenienced by factual obstacles. The mythical characteristics of his inter-

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pretation stand out most clearly in his attempt to apply them to the realities of today.

A critical review of Herr Roepke's commentary hence cannot help turning into a criticism of myths. This being so, I shall not attempt to follow Herr Roepke into the field of his practical proposals for the future of Germany's economic policies. But I cannot forego a few words of criticism in regard to the past and the present since they are essential for taking a stand regarding the over-all concept of liberalism.

What Herr Roepke Says

THE basic lines of Herr Roepke's argument may be abridged as follows: The world of today is confronted with the inescapable alternative between the free market economy and the collectivist-authoritarian economy of the Russian type. In order to function, the authoritarian economy requires an omnipotent state which destroys any individual liberties. The free market economy, the only one compatible with political and legal liberty, has proved its worth, in economics, as well, for more than a century. It rests on the freedom of prices to find their own level as the organizing principle of economic life, and on the use of individual private interest as its driving force. It carries out, in a democratic manner, the will of the consumer, not the arbitrary will of the planning authority, and results in a maximum of productivity, stability, and justice: in a balance of performance and reward. It is incompatible with administrative interference or monopolies, least of all with the particularly dangerous monopoly of unionism. It can be reconciled with interferences "conforming to the market" (e.g. protective tariffs) and corrections of the distribution of incomes for social purposes by means of taxation, but only within those limits where the interferences will not paralyze the functioning of the motivating mechanism—limits which in present-day Germany have already been trespassed.

For the functioning of the free market economy, three things are required according to Herr Roepke: free exchange of currencies, free fluctuation of interest without interference for the sake of monetary policies, and free distribution of investments by the financial market. Interference with the free fluctuation of interest leads to inflation; inflation on the domestic market leads to a controlled currency; a controlled currency, advocated by the "national socialists" in the interest of their inflationary full-employment policies, leads to the disintegration of world economy. The administration of the Marshall plan has foisted a "planned-economy" type of capital distribution upon Europe and is engaged in a wild-goose chase of a planned-economy type of integration, closing its eyes to the fact that integration is possible only by a return to the free convertability of currencies, which in turn presupposes a renunciation of the socialist policy of full employment. The future of the market economy depends on whether the Americans, under the pressure of rearmament expenditures, will relinquish the methods of the Marshall plan and, in the future, direct their loans via the free capital market, in which case they would benefit only countries with a liberal economy.

The aim of the socialist economic policy to achieve full employment by means of creating credit, and to keep under control the inflation thus produced

by means of rationing and currency controls, has according to Herr Roepke, led everywhere to extremely severe disturbances of the functions of the economies, to a paralysis of initiative, and to a decrease of productivity. A "mixed system" which retains the market while subordinating it to such interferences cannot help lagging behind the fully collectivist authoritarian system due to the confusion of initiatives: unless it winds up by becoming fully authoritarian, it will fail and thereby endanger all of the Western world. Besides, it will necessarily cause a deficit in its relations with the "liberal" countries and consequently depend on their financial help, which they will not be willing to extend indefinitely.

Various people have proposed to reduce German unemployment by the expansion of credit; this, according to Herr Roepke, would lead to conditions identical with those in the countries of the "socialist inflation"; i.e. to essentially the same state of affairs as that which prevailed in Germany before the currency reform. The cause of unemployment must be looked for not in the lack of credit, but in a lack of jobs, enhanced by the insufficient freedom of movement for the workers (lack of housing, problem of vocational re-training), by the abnormalities of post-war economy, as well as by the unsound economic basis of many plants. The idle capital appearing in statistics is actually due to such abnormal circumstances and the uneconomical operation of plants; and to put it to use would be tantamount to impeding recovery. The solution is therefore: a boost in the free formation of capital (to be encouraged by a higher rate of interest, lower taxes and free exchange of currencies) and intensified rationalization of the economy, but particularly control of investments by means of increased interest.

So much for Herr Roepke. Before submitting his arguments to scrutiny, we shall look at them briefly in the light of actually existing conditions.

What the Facts Say

HERR ROEPKE calls the "dangerous liability and lack of balance in the British economic system" "a particularly striking and disturbing illustration" of his contention that a third approach halfway between liberalism and totalitarian "full collectivism" is impossible. He writes, not quite concealing his surprise: "If British democracy continues intact in its essential components, it must not be overlooked that the functioning of British democracy has to be bought at the price of the non-functioning of British collectivism" (in other words: The British themselves are to be blamed for the continued functioning of their democracy—why, one should like to ask, don't they carry out their planned economy 100%?) Among the consequences of such a "mixed system" illustrating the "extreme British example", Herr Roepke lists, among others, a "lack of order and initiative in all spheres of economic life (achievement of workers, of employers, investments, savings)" and the lag of economic yield behind the degree technically possible.

Let us take a look, then, at this warning example. Listed below are the 1949 production figures for five "planned economy" and three "market economy" countries of Western Europe—omitting, for well-known reasons, special cases like Germany and Austria.

*Production Indices 1949**

	Industry (1938=100)	Agriculture (1934-1938=100)	Total Production of Goods (pre-war = 100)
Great Britain	137	119	129
Sweden	153	109	132
Denmark	139	112	128
Norway	138	101	127
Holland	127	112	123
France	122	87	111
Belgium	116	96	111
Italy	104	101	101

These figures show conclusively that production in the planned economies "with impeded initiative" has increased faster than in the liberal countries, and that the "warning example" of Great Britain stands far above the average. The indices for the two preceding years which must be omitted here for lack of space, present the same picture for the two groups, despite fluctuations in the harvest, and for industry and production of goods, even in identical sequence; only Holland lagged behind France and Belgium in 1947, behind Belgium in 1948, while in 1949, Holland and France had surpassed Belgium, traditional example of liberalism in practice.

Absolute figures of production do not tell the whole story. Perhaps the successes in countries of full employment were gained at the price of low productivity? Following is the list of the index of industrial production per capita (1935-1938=100).

	1947	1948	1949
Great Britain	106	113	118
Sweden	110	116	118
Denmark	90	95	97
Norway	88	91	94
Holland	72	77	81
France	84	95	102
Belgium	81	85	93
Italy	88	92	98

It will be seen that in this instance not all countries with full employment are superior to all the liberal countries. France is doing better than Denmark, Italy better than Norway, Belgium quite a bit better than Holland. But the two socialist industrial countries, the "extreme British example" and Sweden, again are far ahead of all the others. These, however, are averages. What about the notorious decline of productivity in the nationalized British mines? From the Monthly Economic Review of the New York Herald Tribune, dated October

* These and the following figures are taken from "Economic Survey of Europe 1949", published by the Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1950).

9, 1950, we quote below the figures for the daily output in the mines in six mining areas, before and after the war:

	(IN TONS)		
	1937	1948	1949
Holland	2.55	1.68	1.74
Ruhr	2.00	1.26	1.36
Great Britain	1.53	1.49	1.56
Saar	1.44	1.20	1.32
France	1.24	0.97	1.10
Belgium	1.14	0.88	0.93

Great Britain was the only country of Western Europe which, in 1949, had surpassed its prewar mining productivity.

What about the alleged paralysis of investment and savings activities? Most liberal critics are censuring the planned-economy governments for a tendency to over-invest, regarding this more than anything else as the cause of inflationary dangers. The investments, so they argue, are boosted far above the level covered by savings—with a resultant unplanned deficit in the budget. Something like that actually did happen in England, in 1947, and in Sweden, in 1947/48; in both countries, though not for the same individual reasons, there occurred, temporarily, acute crises in the balance of payments. In Norway, an under-developed country forcing its industrialization and under the necessity of restoring heavy losses from the war, a particularly high rate of investment has been financed for years systematically through a high deficit of the balance of payments. Let us look at the results. Below are listed, in percentages of the national income, the levels of net investments and of their two components—balance of payments and net savings:

	Net Investments		Balance of Payments		Net Savings	
	1948	1949	1948	1949	1948	1949
Great Britain ...	11	11	—	—	11	11
Norway	23	26	—9	—14	14	12
Holland	17	19	—9	—7	8	12
Sweden	13	10	—2	+2	11	12
Denmark	10	12	—1	—2	9	10
France	13	11	—6	—1	7	10
Belgium	10	7	—3	+2	7	9
Italy	8	11	—4	—3	4	8

It is evident that the planned-economy countries, as a group, attained a higher level not only in the total of new investments, but also in the "genuine" domestic formation of savings capital. Only the unusually high investments in Holland and Norway—two countries very hard hit by the war—have been financed to an essential part by the deficit in the balance of payments. The much-vaunted export surplus of Belgium in 1949, however, has used up so many savings that the domestic investments went down, and thus must be held co-responsible, at the same time, for the general recession in the production of the country which lasted up to the Korean crisis.

Where, then, in this display do we notice the consequences of the English and Swedish crises in the balance of payments? The answer is: nowhere. They

have had no effects, neither on the development of production nor for the future of the balance of payments. In 1949, Sweden achieved an active budget out of its own resources—simultaneously with Belgium and without unemployment. During the current year (1950), England operates with a surplus, disregarding any and all support from the Marshall plan. Combined with the rest of the sterling block, it shows a surplus of dollars and a quick increase in its gold and dollar reserves—at a time when Western Germany is applying to the European Payments Union for emergency aid in order to bridge its deficit. The causes are in both instances partly accidental, and they furnish no proof in itself, either for the British, nor against the German, economic policy as in the case of the British deficit during the months preceding the devaluation of the pound, which had accidental external causes; in present-day Europe, surpluses and deficits are liable to develop quite easily, without anybody's fault or merit, from the fluctuations in the economic activity of the United States. All it goes to show is the irresponsible nature of Herr Roepke's talk about the planned-economy countries being dependent upon financial support by the liberal ones—especially, to mention but one example, if we consider that England, from its trade with Western Europe from early 1946 up to the middle of 1950, derived a surplus of about three quarter billion dollars, and did not show any deficit except during a few months in 1947 and 1949.

No matter where we compare Herr Roepke's theses with the facts of international economic development, the "guides for orientation" offered by the Geneva professor prove to be dangerous will-o'-the-wisps. May we, then, assume that at least in his investigation of German economy, his theme proper, he has taken care to acquaint himself with all the pertinent facts? Unfortunately, even here he leaves himself open to doubt. For instance, in order to refute the thesis of a German "depression," he maintains that since German currency reform the total employment figure had steadily risen; actually, in the fourth quarter of 1949 and in the first quarter 1950 it was below the corresponding figures of the previous year.

He develops considerable acumen to show why, despite a statistical surplus of capacity, there is no margin for a swift increase of production in Germany by the broadening of credit; yet, from March to September 1950, the total industrial production rose by more than a quarter, that of investment goods by well over a third, with construction materials, automobile industry, iron and steel goods showing even more pronounced advances. These jobs were not newly created since spring (1950)—they existed before, only they were not occupied.

From Science to Utopia

THE above may suffice to indicate that Professor Roepke's train of thought does not start from the scientific analysis of economic experience. Its real source, the liberal doctrine of the pure logic of free-market economy, is of a normative nature. What we have to take exception with is that he attempts to apply the final conclusions of this pure doctrine of norms to a reality in which a totally different set of factors is in force. The result is a mythological distortion of reality—at best, a reversion of economics from its scientific to its utopian stage,

at its worst, short-cut conclusions from "ideal" premises to the crude justification of utterly materialistic interests.

One feels, for instance, frankly ashamed to have to discuss the phrase of the free-market economy as a "democracy of consumers" in this day and age—as if it had not been shown a hundred times that in the actual market economy, with its stratification according to property and income, this democracy is characterized by an unlimited right of plural votes, i.e. one vote to every dollar. We have seen how the hoarding of profits in the wake of the German currency reform kept the major part of the construction business engaged in building stores, restaurants, and other non-essential premises while hundreds of thousands had to "live" in holes and barracks—a perfect example of the democracy of effective demand according to Herr Roepke's definition; finally, in 1950, the federal parliament, by means of a law formulated by the joint efforts of government and opposition, began to direct building activities toward more social ends, with important consequences for the rise of economic activity—an example of "planned-economy interference" which "distorts" the economy by diverting it from the "natural" pattern of demand.

Or let us look at the prerequisite of free competition, the elimination of all monopolies. Herr Roepke certainly *must* know what today is the common knowledge of all scholars, that this free competition has never yet existed; that not only do large-scale enterprises tend toward monopoly, and even worse, toward destructive competition of a few quasi-monopolies; but that every vegetable market enjoys a monopoly by virtue of its situation, and every branded merchandise enjoys a monopoly by virtue of its name. He makes it a point to mention that German industry financed its reconstruction after 1948 from monopolistic excess profits and, up to this day, suffers from a reduced ability to compete in the international market, due to forced increases in the profit and trading margins. He does point out that German wages are lower than in most other industrial countries. But he does not come out with a single concrete proposal as to how to take measures against these profitable monopolies, except for some general philosophical observations on the desirability of a society without mammoth cities and mammoth businesses, and he brings the full force of his attack to bear against a monopolistic force "more dangerous than any other", the "legal constraint" of which in Germany would turn into a "problem of life and death for the nation"—against the unions! This problem he calls the "biggest gap in anti-monopoly legislation",—a legislation which, interestingly enough, does not even exist so far in the Germany of today.

This call for an emergency law to curb the unions (for which even the slightest justification by facts is lacking, in Germany) reeks of firm-fisted brutality. But this brutality forms such a striking contrast with the vague poesy of Herr Roepke's deproletarianized dream-world that it is hard to maintain one's faith in the naiveté of the theorist. Are we, perhaps, to look for its justification in the statement that a salary, while too low even according to international standards, may be too high in relation to the "margin of productivity" of work, and thus may produce unemployment? The "maximum justice" of the market economy theory, to be sure, states that each "production factor" receives its compensation in that amount of value which, in a given market situation, depends on the ultimate unit of this factor. In other words: if in a certain place or industry

there are too many workers available in proportion to capacity, this just wage "in the purely economic sense" may doubtless fall far below any minimum level of existence. This does not deter our Herr Professor; he speaks with scorn of those opportunists who take it for granted that the wage cannot be adjusted to a lower level. We are reminded that, as long as 20 years ago, an intellect rather more original than Herr Roepke, Vilfredo Pareto, drew the conclusion that one would have to demand dictatorial powers for the state in order to carry out the liberal programme of economics with all its consequences, and that eventually he wound up hailing Mussolini as the hero of his dreams. . . .

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that only the "free economy" in the meaning of proper "purely economic" definitions will bring the realization of democracy and justice, and even that such an economy presupposes a pronounced disregard of the human claims made by the "production factor of work"—will this assure, at least, its correct functioning? Will the free formation of prices in all fields solve the organizational problems of the economy? The answer is: No. The decisive question, that for the total range of economic activity, which determines the ups and downs of the market and of mass-unemployment, is not answered by any one automatic system. Herr Roepke claims, as if he were writing 140 years ago, that interest is the price of capital formation, and that the free formation of interest is the way to balance savings and investment demands, and thus to regulate the rate of economic growth. But we have long since learned that the interest rate has no decisive bearing upon savings activities; and that the interest rate does not depend on the amount of savings, but rather on the creation of money and credit by the banking system and on the willingness of the money-owning people to forego having liquid assets available. In other words: interest is *not* the price of capital formation,—rather, it is essentially a monetary phenomenon, determined by the whims of banking policy, fluctuations of "confidence", estimates of risk, and anticipations of future developments. There is an uncharted gap here in the market-economy system through which today an inflationist boom, tomorrow crisis and crash, and the day after a long-term depression accompanied by chronic unemployment may penetrate—as happened time and again in the one hundred years' history of "free" capitalism.

It is impossible, in a "free-market economy", to eliminate this element of arbitrariness and instability. For the very process of unplanned and unconscious price formation due to the actions of countless individuals on the market, while acting as an "organizing principle", according to the definition of liberal theory, in regard to the interrelation of merchandise prices, also is active in the field of money and credit economy. In the peculiar mechanism of the banking system, it adds to every unstabilizing factor, to every up and down movement of prices and of the entire economic activity. The banks are unable to attenuate the process because it reaches beyond their ken; they cannot fail to augment the fluctuations by trying to keep up with them.

The "free market economy", and even more the market economy shot through with monopolies, of which alone we have any experience, is consequently unable to solve the basic problem of an economic system in a stage of growth; it is unable to provide for steady growth and, at the same time, to make use of all productive forces. The rate of growth and the scope of the total activity within the economy are not determined by economic rules but rather

subject to accidental fluctuations. At this point, the modern planned economy with its goal of full employment is set to act. It does not aim to replace the market mechanism with the omnipresent administrative ukase—the “fully collectivist” solution in this sense is just as utopian as the “fully (100%) liberal” one. Rather, it strives to close the central gap in the market-economy system by conscious planning of the scope of investments and by fully exploiting the productive potential of society. It regulates the flow of purchasing power through surplus or deficit in the state budget, of money, the rate of liquidity and interest through open market policy, if necessary even the investments directly, through public works or investment in industries taken over by the state. The result is not only full employment, but, as we have seen, an accelerated and better balanced growth of total production.

The Disintegration of World-Wide Economy

BUT it is impossible to pursue such a policy in one of several individual countries without screening it off, by currency controls, from the fluctuations of the unplanned international economic system. Is Herr Roepke right, after all, in blaming this policy of a “national socialism” for the disintegration of the international economic system during the past 20 years?

Here it is necessary to remind Herr Professor Roepke of what actually led to the disintegration of international commerce. Foreign currency control was invented neither by socialists, nor even by “national socialists”. The first large industrial country to introduce it was Germany, in the summer of 1931, and she did so under a government which was extremely conservative in economic policy, that of Dr. Bruening. This step had its origin not in any plan, but in sheer desperation: it was not a matter of creating full employment but of preventing a further spread of unemployment which by that time had passed the 6 million mark. The immediate occasion was the acute insolvency of Germany when short-term foreign loans were recalled in huge numbers, and the collapse of the Danat bank which threatened to cause a chain reaction of bankruptcies. To deal with the crisis in terms of “market-economy”, i.e. by permitting the “process of natural recovery” to rage uncontrolled no matter how many people would be doomed in its course—that was impossible. Our benefit from the unduly protracted attempt to cling to this procedure was Herr Hitler. It was not planning but the unrestrained extravagance of a “free market economy” shot through as it was by monopolies and political debts, that led to the severest crisis of the industrial age and consequently to the “disintegration of the world economy.” The various types of planners, like Roosevelt, Hitler, and the Swedish social-democrats, could put their hands only on the broken fragments which, each in his own manner, they tried to put together again.

The collapse of the universal currency system, however, was not only the outcome of an unusually severe crisis; it was also the belated yet inevitable result of the final breakdown of that division of labor in the international economy which, unique and irretrievable in its way, formed the basis of that golden age of liberalism, the 19th century. The world-economic system of liberalism developed during the period of the British industrial monopoly and sur-

vived as long as the European monopoly of industry lasted; it was doomed once the United States replaced Great Britain as the foremost industrial power, and as soon as large parts of the rest of the world started developing their own industries. That is not to say that a considerable amount of trading and a profitable division of labor would be impossible between industrially well-developed countries. But this requires a different division of labor, and the problems of conversion are exceedingly complicated.

During the liberal period there developed in England a crowded industrial population for which, partly due to the lack of raw materials, partly due to the limited agrarian basis, export trade became a matter of life and death. For Britain, there was no way back to "autarchy"; for Britain, therefore it became standard procedure to apply its capital surplus toward the development of future partner-nations. The United States, however, while turning into the leading industrial nation, continued in its role as a leading agrarian nation, and in addition it has the larger part of the necessary raw materials in its own possession. American imports preceding and following the second world war constitute 3% of the national income, compared with about 20% in Britain, and 30 to 40% in Belgium! For the American owners of capital there exist consequently no compelling reasons to finance underdeveloped partners with their capital surplus, and since the great disenchantment of 1929 to 1932 they have shown no inclination to do so to any considerable extent; not even when, according to Herr Roepke's recipe, they were offered high rates of interest. The liberal mechanism of the international flow of capital was no longer functioning, so how could the liberal mechanism of universally interchangeable currencies and of multilateral trade be expected to function? The postwar solution by means of American government loans, the "planned-economy" nature of which Herr Roepke deplors, is caused by the unwillingness of American capitalists to conform to the theory; they would rather pay taxes to finance the Marshall plan than invest their moneys for their own profit in a Europe threatened by risks.

In the meantime, another factor contributing to these disturbances has developed through the tremendous growth of the American economy which, completely unaffected by the destruction of war, actually was spurred on by its wartime tasks. Thus, even minor fluctuations in the economic activity of the United States will cause extremely critical disturbances in the industrial countries of Europe which are strongly dependent upon export trade. It so happens that the United States for the last 18 years, has represented a typical example of the "mixed system" as defined by Herr Roepke, i.e. a market economy with important though incomplete elements of planning in it, under an administration which in principle is given to planning even though it is normally unable to obtain the consent of Congress for such planning measures, except under the pressure of emergencies. This mixed system, first in the sign of the New Deal, then in that of war planning, has been responsible for the amazing advances in production of the United States; today, it is the determining factor for the economic environment in which the planned economies as well as the liberal countries of Europe are forced to move, and in the sign of the new huge armament program it certainly will not yield to a more liberal regime. This is most welcome; if the gigantic economic structure of the United States were subject to the violent ups and downs of a "free market economy" in the style of '29, and

if we in Europe were simultaneously at the mercy of collapsing private loans as Herr Roepke desires, we would long ago all have perished, whether we live in liberal or planned-economy countries.

"Dollar Crisis" and Foreign Currency Control

THE decisive and world-wide weight of the United States with its high degree of autarchy, the drying-up of the international flow of capital, the extreme dependence on exports of the single-track industrial countries of Europe with their dense population in a changed world: these are the facts to keep before one's eyes. Only then is it possible to sound the profundity of that liberal thesis according to which postwar Europe's difficulties with the balance of payments, and especially the so-called dollar crisis, are largely to be traced to the "inflationist policies of full employment" of the planned-economy countries, and that it would suffice to relinquish these policies in order to restore the free convertibility of currencies and, with that, the "integration" of the world economy. Actually, these difficulties must be traced to no less than four different causes.

The first of these is the genuine demand for capital among countries either heavily damaged by the war or industrially underdeveloped.

A country with its production largely paralyzed due to the destructions of war, with roads, bridges, communications and cities to be rebuilt, with its stocks of provisions and cattle exhausted, and its merchant marine mostly at the bottom of the sea,—such a country under normal circumstances is not going to starve until it has rebuilt all these objects out of its own resources; rather it will float a loan to accelerate reconstruction and keep up the standard of living in the meantime. The same holds for countries which, with the change in the economic situation of the whole world, are compelled to undertake extraordinary investments in order to restore the viability of their economies. Such a genuine need for capital existed after the war everywhere in Europe to a high degree, and in the face of unobtainable private loans, the Marshall plan was the only solution available.

The second cause for these difficulties is to be found in the increase of the drop from the level of productivity in the United States to that of all, or almost all, European countries ever since the war. The real costs of most articles have decreased considerably in the United States compared with those of Europe, and Europe's ability to compete has been considerably impaired. Wherever this new lead in productivity could not be compensated within a short period even with a maximum of effort—and in the long-range view, too, American productivity will continue growing, after all—the only adequate solution was the devaluation of currency. With the proper degree of application, and that is probably not yet true everywhere, this will restore the equilibrium of costs, and consequently the ability to compete, of the nations affected.

The third cause, as mentioned above, lies in the new sensitivity of European countries to fluctuations on the world market, and similarly in a new sensitivity of the world market to relatively minor swings in the American economy, in activity as well as in prices. With particular severity, swings in the general activity of the United States are felt in Great Britain; it suffered heavy losses

in gold and dollars at the time of the slight American slump during the first half of 1949, and since the start of American rearmament it reaps phenomenal surpluses. For all of Europe, the situation has radically changed due to rearmament; despite devaluations up to 30%, the dollar take of Europeans has increased since by 10%, and the "dollar crisis", for this reason alone, is well on the way to disappearing. Yet Denmark, for instance, is decisively affected by the relation between the price of agricultural and industrial products, which continues unfavorable, and shows consequently a growing deficit despite an extremely cautious domestic economic policy, whereas Sweden, on the other hand, profits from the price-boosting demand for its exports, timber and iron ore.

This third cause—the extreme dependence of Europe upon the fluctuations of world trade—is the chief obstacle to a general return towards the convertibility of currencies, even after the reconstruction has been completed and the rates of exchange have been adjusted to the level of costs. During the liberal age, deficits resulting from foreign trade were paid from the gold reserves of each country, and, at the same time, it was customary to interpret such a deficit as a signal for limiting domestic activity by means of a boost in the discount rate. This was supposed to lower prices, wages, and the demand for imports, to boost exports, and to do away with the deficit.

Under present conditions, this method is bound to fail, as it did fail in the world economic crisis. The fluctuations from the outside are too big, the gold reserves in most European countries are quite insufficient, the chances for the individual European country to adjust are too small. An attempt to revert to the "orthodox" policy under such changed conditions would result, through the throttling of credit induced from the outside, in periodically returning mass unemployment and production slumps alternating with waves of inflationist price increases. These disturbances and sacrifices, however, are beyond justification if they are avoidable.

The prophylactic against this danger, as well as against that of capital flight, is the control of foreign currencies. It enables the individual country to deal with the deteriorations of its balance of payments as a matter of choice, by limiting the imports to essentials, and not by a general lowering of the level of economic activity. As long as no international means has been found to prevent the fluctuations of world trade, or to attenuate them considerably, control of currencies is the only way for a country depending on its foreign trade to determine its level of employment on its own. Herr Roepke is right, therefore, in that the policy of full employment under present conditions does require "compulsory foreign exchange controls." But this necessity, instead of being the cause, is the result of the disintegration of the world economy. It is not even necessarily connected with a policy of "latent inflation"; maybe it will be, and it has been so temporarily in some countries with full employment, but it does not have to be. This depends entirely on the employment of the freedom of action gained by a planned economy government through control of currency.

This leads us to the fourth and last cause responsible for the development of deficits in the balance of payments: differences in the level of economic activity as between the European countries themselves. A nation pursuing an adequately calculated policy of full employment, i.e. creating exactly that degree of demand through the interplay of consumption and investments necessary for

exploiting the capacity of the productive installations, will tend neither toward a deficit nor toward a surplus but toward an equilibrium of payments. A nation harboring inflationary tendencies in the domestic market, perhaps due to miscalculations in its policy of full employment and an attempt "to do too much", or just the reverse, due to a lack of domestic controls which cause it to be sucked into a inflationary world market boom, such a nation must induce an import surplus to satisfy the increased domestic demand, and that means a deficit in the balance of payments. A nation investing less than compatible with the available installations and manpower, with consumption remaining the same, because it desires either to effect a deflationary adjustment to slumps on the world market, or to attract flight capital by "strengthening the currency", is bound not only to create unemployment at home but to spread the same unemployment abroad through export surpluses. At any given moment, the cause of the disturbance may be found as easily in the deficit as in the surplus column. A deficit in a full-employment country may develop either through its own mistakes in inflationary planning, or through the deflationary practices of its liberal trade partners notwithstanding the correctness of its own policies, or through both causes combined.

This pattern can be studied by looking at the development of intra-European balances of payments during the last few years. The British deficit of 1947 resulted largely from the actual inflationary pressure in Great Britain; in the summer months of 1949, this pressure had long ago ceased to exist, and its temporary reemergence was caused essentially through the passing slump of activity in the United States and in the liberal countries of Europe (enhanced further by devaluation speculation). The liberal countries, renouncing an independent policy of full employment, experienced an increase of unemployment and also of intra-European surpluses symptomatic of that very American slump; with the present armament boom of the United States, their production is rising rapidly, but so do their partly intra-European deficits, which reappear in the shape of surpluses in British bookkeeping. One cannot help smiling when rereading today Professor Roepke's warnings to the European Payments Union in which, as he believed, the liberal countries would only accumulate surpluses, without practical use because not convertible into dollars, as long as the planned economies would not be reconverted to liberalism. The ink can hardly have been dry when the EPU published its first quarter budget—with a British surplus of 96, and a West German deficit of 177 million dollars.

The Policy of Full Employment

WHAT then are the domestic means of the policy of full employment, and the reasons for its production successes? By and large, the planned-economy nations have aimed at a continuous mass consumption accompanied by a high investment rate. In order to do so, they resorted to intervention equalizing the distribution of incomes (tax policy, expansion of social security, wage policy in favor of underpaid groups, sponsoring farmers' cooperatives, foodstuff subsidies); they limited the free choice of goods for consumption by rationing them and controlling imports; they kept the interest rate down while assuring a high savings rate through public saving and limitation of dividends; finally, they pro-

moted officially the investments in the key industries, agriculture, transport system, and housing industry.

A high level of mass consumption and high investments can, of course, be assured at all times only within the limits of the given production potential and, during reconstruction, within those of help from abroad. But it ought to be obvious that these limits will be less confining with the full exploitation of the productive possibilities than with reduced employment. If consumption is affected by intensified taxation of non-essentials and even restricted by rationing and import controls, the object is to concentrate the resultant increase in general purchase power upon the mass consumption goods; joined to this is the goal of diverting production and imports from non-essentials, and restricting the price competition of the higher income groups in regard to the mass consumption goods. The loss of freedom in this sector—which, by the way, is rapidly contracting since all forms of rationing are gradually being relaxed in all full-employment countries—has paid off in Great Britain, for instance, by a remarkable improvement of public health. By restricting new housing to publicly subsidized types of dwellings and giving it special attention, a higher standard of housing is aimed for such as Sweden had achieved a long time ago. The investment plan of the state concentrates its attention on those industries which, with capital direction of the liberal type, by means of the interest rate, would be neglected to the disadvantage of the total economy; either because the initial investment requirements are too high (e.g. Norway's hydro-electric industry), or because these industries have been working at a loss for decades (like the British mines and railroads), notwithstanding the decisive importance of their expansion or modernization for the sake of the productivity of other industries or of the balance of payments. State control of investments affects particularly speculative enterprises (like the building of restaurants, amusement places and luxury shops) that due to the expectation of quick profits will not be discouraged by the interest rate, and that will cause a diversion of building materials and manpower out of all proportion to their value for the national economy. Professor Roepke no doubt is right in saying that no planner can gauge the value for the general economy *exactly* if he rejects the private-enterprise yield as a yardstick. But even he should think twice before claiming that the private-enterprise yield is a sufficient yardstick, especially in Germany where the increase of industrial productivity is so largely dependent on providing housing for those people who are least able to pay the rent!

Professor Roepke, like most liberal critics, holds that the policy of full employment is always and everywhere based on a "latent inflation". This notion seems to arise through tying up the policy of "cheap money" with the insurance of a high savings rate; another assumption of his appears to be that rationing and import restrictions are the chief means to effect "compulsory saving"—and if this were the case he would be right indeed. The facts are that in the countries with full employment the "collective" form of saving—from taxes and social security as well as from the profits of holding companies with restricted dividends—is gaining more and more the upper hand, and a surplus in the national budget has formed these many years one of the most important means of planning in all of these countries. It is justifiable to talk of "latent inflation" if there develops, at first too much purchasing power in relation to productive capacity,

and then, the need to restrain the price-boosting tendency of this "hypertrophy of purchasing power" by a series of constantly renewed administrative interferences. But in present-day England and Sweden there is not the slightest indication of such a hypertrophy of purchasing power existing; the interferences are predominantly financial and no longer administrative, and they serve mostly the purpose of directing a larger share of this purchasing power into savings, and a smaller one into consumption, than the higher income groups would be willing to do of their own accord. This is a necessary conclusion from the basic idea of the full-employment policy, i.e. the regulation of the level of activity and the rate of growth of the national economy by the state. But this has nothing to do with "backed-up inflation".

The latter will appear only when the planners are overreaching themselves and try to do more than possible with the given means. In Great Britain, during 1947, and in Sweden during 1947/48 this resulted from planning mistakes. The planners no more than the liberals are in possession of a measuring device indicating the scope of possible investments; they have to study the economic situation and the suitable methods of direction, and that, like any new technique, requires experience. Norway, however, has willingly accepted the sacrifices of "super-full employment" knowing that the exceedingly high investment in expansion could be accelerated only by the administrative restriction of consumption. With the slowing down of the investment rate during the current year (1950) the "latent inflation" will be at an end there, too.

The better to scare the German reader, Herr Roepke not only identifies the policy of full employment with "latent inflation", but the latter again with the state of Germany before the currency reform—with the empty stores and rations on paper, with the flight away from useless money to compensation of workers in kind, with starvation and general lack of productivity. Such conditions were not to be found in any of the nations with full employment, to be sure. In a country without a lost war, without paper billions and without its production prostrate, a "latent inflation" looks quite different. The stores are not empty, but the selection of goods is limited to essentials; money is not useless but serviceable only in part; rationing is not a farce but annoying and time-consuming; people do not starve but look shabby, and so do their houses; they do not spend their time on the black market and with barter deals, but they work not very intensely, frequently change their jobs, and are not easily induced to go where they are most needed. Such conditions did exist no doubt temporarily in certain countries with full employment.

But how seriously do we have to judge the danger of such mistakes in planning policy compared with the dangers of the "free market economy"? The answer lies partly in the figures quoted above. Despite initial mistakes, the economies of England and Sweden are ahead of the rest of Western Europe, not only in the growth of production, but also in the advances of productivity since the war. Despite reduced productivity (what with numerous rural workers being absorbed in the new industries over-night) Norway's economy has reached its goal, i.e. unusually high investments and a corresponding production increase. The economic results of these three leave those of the liberal countries far behind.

But there is another type of answer to be given. On one scale, we have the one thousand little annoyances of a badly planned "full employment economy": the insufficient selection of goods and the enforced austerities, especially for the higher income brackets; the protracted delivery dates and the delays in repairs; the fatigue symptoms of a life poor in luxuries; the loss of time and expenditure of energy in all-too-frequent encounters with the bureaucracy. On the other scale, we have noteworthy achievements: the certainty that for millions the exacerbating fate of unemployment has been eliminated; the conviction of no longer being excluded from society as useless; the conquest of material misery; the inestimable gain in human dignity enjoyed by the employed worker in a free state because full employment frees him from the nightmare of being dismissed. It shall not be denied that, with this last competency of "the boss" removed, there arise completely new problems of the discipline of labor; the figures, however, prove that these problems can be solved, and that all alleged and real drawbacks of full employment in regard to productive yield are of slight importance compared with the decisive advantage of an economy running full speed without interruption. But quite aside from that: the experience of the changed atmosphere in such an installation ought to help make up the minds of those who still remember that once upon a time liberalism embraced the cause of freedom.

Planning and "Integration"

SO FAR, the greatest limitation of the full-employment policy has been that everywhere it is planning on a national scale. Herr Roepke is untiring in protesting that the unity of the world economy can be restored only on the liberal basis. According to him, a planned-economy integration would require an international centralized "superstate" with the authority to prescribe everything down to the smallest detail in every country, something no nation would be willing to accept, least of all the liberal nations. It is another case, apparently, of Herr Roepke's failing to take note of actual developments during recent years, preoccupied as he is with his market-economy logic. Actually, there exist already promising beginnings in the direction of international planning. On the one hand, a study-group of the U.N. has published its findings in regard to national and international measures towards full employment. This survey points out ways of boosting the rate of employment in various countries at an even pace without an all-powerful central authority, the individual countries pledging to adhere to a common set of principles. This survey, the focus of international discussion within this sphere of problems today, is not even mentioned with a single word by Herr Roepke! The question of maintaining the advantages of full employment in the long run and of overcoming the disadvantages of "compulsory currency control" is, however, absolutely dependent on whether such an agreement can be reached. It is not unthinkable that the last of the knights of Continental liberalism will not renounce the sovereign privilege of unemployment in their own country; yet in that case, they have no right to put the blame for the continued existence of international economic barriers exclusively on the adherents of planned economy.

On the other hand, we already have practical beginnings toward international steering of investments, due to the administration of the Marshall plan

in various countries influencing the projects financed by it. Also the recommendations of the Paris Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), characterized of late by great concreteness and unanimity, point in the same direction. Herr Roepke, to be sure, deplors that the administration of the Marshall plan is "planning" the distribution of capital instead of letting it follow the course set by the "free" rate of interest. But let us imagine for one moment the effects of simultaneous and long-term investments on a large scale within the various European countries, e.g. in steel, power production, petroleum refineries, ship-building—and the indispensability of such central supervision and coordination of projects will not be denied. As a matter of fact, in the beginning the powers of the various Marshall plan agencies were too feeble to prevent serious mischief in some of these fields; besides, their authority in the participating countries does not amount to power of command in details, but is restricted to the disapproval of large projects of international significance. The resistance to such supra-national planning has been disappearing to a satisfying degree. In the meantime, the OEEC has also recommended to break the impact of the danger of international inflation in the wake of rearmament by a "policy of selective investments"—i.e. not by a general deflationary restriction of economic activity, but through planning. In the same spirit, it has proposed international agreements aiming at the stabilization of the price of raw materials through collective purchases and distribution of quotas. All this goes to show that here too the needs of reality are stronger than the liberal myth.

Myths About Postwar Germany

SO FAR, my criticism was occasioned by the outlook of Professor Roepke in the field of economic theory. It remains my task to liquidate some of the specific myths concerning the economic development in Germany.

In Germany, a none too fruitful discussion is being carried on as to how far the quick recovery of the economy after the currency reform was due to this reform as such, and how far to the simultaneous end of rationing. For an observer on the outside, the matter appears simple enough. The restoration of the monetary system, together with the preparatory imports of goods through foreign aid, had created a basic willingness to sell. With that, the reason for the rationing (which didn't function, anyway) of a great many consumer goods had disappeared. Currency reform and foreign aid, in other words, were the decisive factors, and the restored availability of goods had a complementary effect in the same direction. Admittedly, the German people could have been spared the hoarding profits and the price boom of the second half of 1948, together with the equally unnecessary contraction of the volume of credit, if the price controls on goods of the most urgent accumulated demand would have been lifted with a little less haste. In the interest of German economic recovery it was most certainly not necessary to put the axe to every mechanism for the distribution of raw materials. Through this, the currency control, which was not abolished, became superfluous, and the West German economic policy, in the face of all fluctuations of foreign commerce, left only the weapon of credit policy—which, by the way, is wielded by the "autonomous" Bank Deutscher Lander (Bank of the German Lands), and not by the government.

Herr Roepke feels compelled to enter this discussion with a veritable "credo quia absurdum". It is his opinion that, if necessary, the German recovery might have been affected even without currency reform, simply by the return to the free market economy—the "latent" inflation would have been set free, prices and wages would have multiplied many times to be stabilized at that new level where money and goods would have achieved equilibrium without interference. Proof of the converse, the futility of monetary reform without restored availability of goods, according to him, was furnished, temporarily in the French, and permanently in the Eastern (Russian) zone. Well, anyone who has lived through the currency reform in Germany will react to this "theoretical argument" with a good-natured chuckle. We are aware, after all, that the success of the monetary reform and the possibility of restoring the availability of goods presupposed the existence of hoarded supplies, and we know only too well why such supplies had ceased to exist in those two zones! The transitional period during which rationing was maintained in the French zone was used by the merchants of that zone to fill their stores with goods from the British-American bi-zonal area; with the result that also there the availability of goods could be restored. But to ascribe to Professor Erhard's political magic alone the differences of development between the bizonal area, which lived from the hand-outs of Garioa and Marshall-Plan goods, and the Russian zone, which had to send out goods for reparation,—that would mean overdoing the creation of myths just a bit.

Let us turn to more immediate problems. Historians of the black market may conceivably date its origin from that day when the German occupation authority in France prescribed a general inventory of all supplies. From that day on, so people said, there existed no more dependable statistics of supplies in France, and materials, livestock and consumption goods now turned "black" furnished the basis for a special "black" circulation of goods. I am under the impression that something similar occurred in the German postwar period of Allied dismantling and "level of industry" plans in regard to industrial capacity. While it may be more of a job to veil industrial capacity than to hide supplies, it is fortunately not impossible. Since 1936, the basic year for the West-German production index, German industrial capacity continued growing for years, and destruction from bombing has crippled industry far less than metropolitan centers and residential areas; hence, it was easy to foresee that West German industry, even before large expansions took place, would be able to considerably surpass the index of 100 in almost all fields.

In the light of these possibilities, the rise of German production during 1949 must be termed quite unsatisfactory, and the plans formulated at the end of that year for the rest of the Marshall-plan period, nothing less than incomprehensible. These plans, at the time the occasion for much-discussed American criticism, envisioned, for total industrial production (including building) indexes of 91 for 1949/50, 99 for 1950/51; 106 for 1951/52; this was the basis for pessimistic predictions concerning future unemployment. Actually, the index has risen, during the current year (1950), from 96 in March to 107 in June and to as much as 121 in September, thus surpassing for the first time the level of 1938. We have mentioned already that the increase for investment-finished-goods is even bigger—from 101 to 135 in the same six month period.

An analysis of this rapid rise leaves no doubt that only a fraction can be traced to expansion of capacity. The chief cause for the rise lies in idle capacity being employed due to increased demand—the same idle capacity, by the way, which Herr Roepke, and with him all defenders of the economic policies of Germany in 1949, stubbornly denied being available to any extent sufficient to cover an essential boost in production. The demand arises partly from sources not yet tapped in 1949, that is, the rapid increase of German exports. But the larger part of it is probably a simple outcome of relaxing the severe curbs upon credit in 1949, and of getting started with new housing, a task scandalously neglected before.

It is, then, pure sophistry of Herr Roepke to quote the steady increase of production since the currency reform as proof that unemployment is *exclusively* the result of structural factors. Production increases, despite considerable idle capacity, have been slowed down in a disastrous manner through restrictive credit policies, and this prevented the possible absorption of part of the unemployment. But the effects of this voluntary underproduction upon unemployment far transcend the element of immediate activity. Whether the actually existing structural difficulties can be overcome depends to a decisive degree upon the possible maximum of production: full employment of production installations is the quickest way toward full employment of workers.

Herr Roepke holds that the first prerequisite toward overcoming structural unemployment lies in the increased formation of capital and expansion of capacity, that is, in maximum saving. To boost capital formation it is first of all necessary, according to the experiences of countries with full employment, to boost the national income of which the savings rate forms part, and to boost it through maximum exploitation of productive possibilities! The second prerequisite is increased freedom of movement for the workers, and this again presupposes overcoming the lack of housing. But new housing was impeded more than anything else through the policy of credit restriction; and nobody is able to estimate in what numbers the unemployed will move, however bad housing may be, from the equally overcrowded refugee settlements and camps into the industrial regions once a serious shortage of workers arises there. The third prerequisite is increased competitive capacity of the German economy in the world market, through increased productivity. Now, it is only necessary to compare the rise of production during the last few months with the relatively smaller rise of employment to solve a secret for Herr Roepke: the increased exploitation of capacity did not lead to an increase in costs, as Herr Roepke fears, by helping along uneconomic plants, but quite the contrary: it has brought about the biggest boost in productivity registered since the spurt during the first few months after the currency reform! It is but another proof of a truism experienced also by the full-employment countries: within those limits beyond which inflation sets in, nothing is more productive than maximum production.

I do not presume to judge whether these limits have been reached already. I should like to put all the stress, however, on this: the present difficulties in the West German balance of payments and in the formation of savings which have led to a renewed restriction of credits do not in themselves form proof that these limits have been reached. Taken by themselves, i.e. without proper implementation by means of dependable data concerning the attained degree of

capacity exploitation and the development of serious bottlenecks, these financial disturbances are only proof that a "free market economy" of the West German type is exceedingly unstable, and that it is impossible to pursue the goal of full employment with the restricted means of such an economy.

The war in Korea has caused a sudden wave of hoarding in exposed Western Germany. The private savings rate has dropped sharply; the demand for imports has risen sharply. Such shocks of demand, caused by non-economical factors, are inevitable in the world of today. A planned economy has various means to absorb them. It can prevent hoarding by rationing, guarantee the distributive shares of raw materials for industry, restrict all other imports. If private savings recede, nevertheless it can compensate by increased public savings. All these means of absorbing the shocks are unavailable in Germany. The result is a heavy deficit in the balance of payments and a deficit in the financing of new housing through savings. The first factor leads to the general contraction of credits and raising of the discount rate, at the risk of curbing the new upswing of production without any inner justification and of producing more unemployment; the second factor has produced already some prophecies that next year (1951) it will be impossible for "financial reasons" to continue new housing construction at its 1950 level—though this was a major step forward in the economic policy of Germany in 1950. Somehow, after all, the equilibrium of imports and exports, of savings and investments, has to be restored—and the "free market economy" knows of only one remedy, that of indiscriminate restriction of credits which never fails to hit the weakest hardest.

What an advertisement for the "democracy of consumers" that, while one part is hoarding today, the other part will have to do without housing next year! What a sample of "maximum yield, stability, and justice" to see the inability of absorbing sudden shocks in the balance of payments overcome, first by credit restrictions, then by raising the costs and reduced capacity exploitation—with the worker as the scapegoat whose "marginal productivity" suddenly drops, without any fault of his, and makes him expendable!

Perhaps it is unfair to Herr Roepke to apply his nice theory to such an ugly reality. But, after all, he started it himself.

Let me conclude with a fable.

In a far-away country, whose doctors enjoyed an excellent reputation for systematic learnedness, a stranger was suffering from stomach pains.

A famous professor was called in.

The stranger, who hailed from a country where medicine had a more empirical orientation, was waiting nervously for the learned man to investigate the painful organ and to decide whether an operation was required.

But the professor dismissed the idea with a smile. "In this country" he said, "medicine is founded upon solid scientific principles. We have learned that there are only two basic methods of the art of healing: the violent un-natural surgical intervention, or the exploitation of the natural healing forces of the body. Our motto is: *Laisser faire la nature*—by far the better and less exacting method."

The students present listened full of awe to the words of the sage, and

even the patient was quite convinced despite his pains, and eagerly accepted the diet prescribed.

Unfortunately, the patient was suffering from cancer, as the autopsy revealed.

Postscript

THE ideas presented above were formulated before I learned that the German Federal Government had published the survey of Professor Roepke prefaced by the Federal Chancellor, formally declaring his views their own, as it were.

This procedure gives rise to two observations. It is natural for a democratic government to defend its policy in public and, in so doing, to make use of opinions authored by third parties who appear to serve this purpose in an impressive manner. But it is quite a different matter (and highly regrettable) if such official backing is given to a document like Herr Roepke's memorandum which to such a large extent arrives at its conclusions by giving a crudely distorted picture of the methods and results of the economic policies in other European countries. For Europe's own good, the "planned-economy" and the "liberal" groups of nations in Western Europe, now drifting apart in matters of economics, ought to try to understand what is happening on the other side of the ideological barrier that separates them, and public opinion in all free countries ought to be enlightened in regard to the common economic conditions of survival which form the basis for a common international economic policy within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. A memorandum seriously attempting to "analyze the economic facts in critical evaluation, beyond the bias pro-or contra of the parties," as Chancellor Adenauer put it, could be a great help in bringing this about. Herr Roepke's survey achieves the opposite; it makes it harder for the German reader, if he has no individual judgment of the facts, to gain an understanding of the development in the world economy, as well as of the events in the "full-employment countries". But we admit that an outspoken propagandist for an extreme liberal theory like Herr Roepke, with decades of experience to his credit, could hardly be expected to offer an impartial analysis of the new sets of facts.

The other observation bears upon the relation between the Christian democratic movements of Western Europe and economic liberalism. Future historians will probably be puzzled as to exactly why these movements in Belgium, Italy, and Western Germany—much less so in France, should more and more have become tied up with the liberal economic doctrines, and should have so eagerly adopted liberal professors like Roepke, Erhard, and Einaudi, as if they were the authoritative representatives of Christian social doctrine. The Catholic church especially never allowed herself to be moved by the springtime of liberal illusions during the nineteenth century; what could be the mysterious reason moving so many Catholic politicians to succumb to the charms of the Indian summer of liberalism? I do not know the solution of the riddle; but a comparison between the strength of Communist influence in the "liberal" Latin countries and in the countries of full employment should be sufficient to point out the dangers of such an orientation.

Translated by EDMUND TOLK

THE INNER APOLOGETICS

M. F. SCIACCA

FOR almost five centuries since the decline of Scholasticism, world thought has been engaged largely in an attempt to do without God, and in an effort to establish the autonomy of philosophy. Science, morality, gnoseology have been called upon in turn to assume this autonomy and the absolute character which would resolve the whole of reality. Modern thought now begins to recognize its failure in these attempts and is witnessing the emergence from within of the problem of religion and transcendence. After five centuries of adventurous development thought has gained at its own expense a critical consciousness of its limitations: it returns to its starting point, but with a sharpened awareness. Nor does it return to the precise point of crisis which engendered its quest, but to a position somewhat higher, to the spirit and not the letter of Scholasticism. This must not be forgotten if we wish to respond to the true exigencies of modern thought and to channel it into new orientations which arise from the exhaustion of its pretensions to unconditional sovereignty.

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"When the Son of Man returns, will he find faith on earth?" It is not for us, poor men, to answer: let us remain humbly suspended on the terrible interrogation. We can only say that He would find preparation for faith, and many souls in that state of inquietude and expectancy which is the indispensable condition of the true Christian.

For what concerns our thesis, let us ask: is it possible to convince a philosophy that is so *well-disposed* and made wiser by its experiences and misadventures to limit its bearing, to convert itself completely and become a Christian-Catholic philosophy? Let us be precise: we do not speak of converting a philosophy which is unbelieving and convinced of its own self-sufficiency, and thus already prejudiced against the problems of theology and religion; we are speaking of *moving towards* a philosophy which, from within and upon its own strength, has arrived at the conviction that it is unable to explain ultimate problems, and has in this way recognized the intrinsic necessity of transcendence and religion. To meet it, to clarify it better as philosophy and open it to faith—this would be to satisfy its own exigencies. It has arrived at God by a process which is not that of Scholasticism. Indeed, after having made from the very beginning an effort to separate reason from religion and God, it has concluded with the failure

of this attempt and has thus ended by meeting religion and God. It is indisputable then that modern and contemporary philosophy have arrived at transcendence, or at least at an admission of its possibility, by becoming more human, by returning to meditate upon the problem of the person, his value, significance and limitations. In other words, the theological problem which thought contains is born from within itself, from reflection on itself: it is born as a problem of interiority. There is neither reason nor necessity for calling this procedure "the method of immanence", a phrase which generates so many equivocations and suspicions. It is better to say that meditation on man, on the singular, the turning of thought back upon itself, leads to an aspiration towards God, creates a disposition towards transcendence, and acknowledges at least the possibility of religion. Catholic philosophy is called upon to take serious account of this method of posing the problem of God, if mistrust is to be dispelled and the total adhesion of philosophy, the meeting and understanding between faith and reason is to be encouraged.

THE problem we are now touching requires a deeper discussion of the relations between religion and philosophy. Though such a problem does not fall within the limits of our work, a treatment of it is most fitting if we consider that, on the one hand, contemporary philosophy in general oscillates between the extremes of fideism and rationalism, without succeeding in re-establishing the Christian-Catholic balance of the relations between faith and reason; and, on the other hand, that the problem today is not only of a moral and apologetic character, but of a theoretical and speculative nature concerning the value of philosophy and religion. We shall limit ourselves to the two aspects of the questions, the speculative and the apologetic.

To have noted that the most unprejudiced philosophy and the most intransigent reason acknowledge an order which transcends them and constitutes, at the same time, their natural vocation, is already to put the problem of the relations between religion and philosophy on the theoretical and speculative level. So, at bottom, does the identification of the object of philosophy and of religion. Thus, the problem of the value of the one and the other is located in the object common to both.

To insist on this point is to utilize the possibility of giving to errant spirits faith in a metaphysical end, and a hope of "conferring a meaning on the word destiny". It is first necessary to achieve a great revitalization of the philosophic-theological formulas (not of dogma, of course) of traditional scholastic thought (those, for example, of St. Thomas), so that these formulas, as Gabriel Marcel writes, if "presented in another language, fresher, more direct, more pungent, more exactly in accordance with our experience . . . may gain in communicative power and dynamic value", a "terribly ungrateful" task, but "indispensable for those who already believe and who otherwise run the risk of remaining desiccated in a dogma devoid of life". It is equally necessary, moreover, for those who do not yet believe, but "who are seeking, who would certainly like to believe, but hesitate to confess it to themselves; who are afraid that, by submitting to the temptation, they might abandon themselves to this faith, to this hope which they feel growing in their souls."

Returning to our problem, it might be observed that to put the problem of God—the God of religion—in the terms in which we have put it has no rational foundation. The idea of God, in such a case, would arise out of the obscure needs of the human heart, out of our passions—hopes, fears, etc.—that is, out of that in man which is most relative and deceptive and least philosophical, out of our intellectual and moral weakness, as it were. This observation does not hit the mark, for it is based on an equivocation of terms. Let us despoil man of all his purely psychological needs, of all his contingency, and let us consider him in his essence, in his reason. Now, it is precisely reason which knows that it can neither deny nor satisfy its need of a higher order transcending it, of God who creates and guarantees it, of knowing what God is, of tending to beatitude. God, then, is an “essential disposition” of reason, the exigency of every finite intelligence, of every contingent will. Moreover, what the previous observation erroneously considers to be an explosion of irrationality and passion is, in fact, the deepest and most universal conviction of the human spirit: that reality is a moral and spiritual order which is unfulfilled in the world of nature, and that the clearest and most infallible testimony of this are the laws sculptured in the hearts of men. If reason attests, by and through nature, that this order does not fulfill itself on earth, is it not a natural and rational consequence that a vigilant and just Providence assist reason in re-establishing that equilibrium which the whole created universe is impotent to reach? Is it not evident that the most rigorous process of reason which no man can escape—unless he is blinded by passion—leads to God? It is precisely the invincible exigencies of thought which impose and justify the “conversion” to God of thought itself. We are speaking of a rational and systematic—thus rigorously philosophical—way, revealing such evidences that in confronting them a reason which does not repudiate itself must believe and assent. And this is not a defeat but a victory. It is difficult to understand why any other science is considered justified in acknowledging its own limits of research and investigation without abdicating its own rights, while philosophy alone must achieve a perfect and all-comprehensive order and must even protest, unjustly and illegitimately, against anyone who does not acknowledge for it an end as exorbitant as it is absurd.

In other words, it is a question of acknowledging—and such acknowledgment is the rigorously exact result of a speculative investigation—not only the insufficiency of philosophical solutions, but the impotence of philosophy to resolve, in the present and concrete state of man, problems which he cannot escape. It is a method essentially philosophical, which, as Cardinal Dechamps has acutely noted,¹ plants in the very heart of philosophy “the psychological thesis of the permanent, subsistent, intrinsic insufficiency of reason, even the most developed, to resolve the religious question which is born inevitably from the state of mankind”. If philosophy cleaves to its own premises, it cannot pretend to self-sufficiency and freedom to ignore Revelation.

It is an inner fact, a universal “fact of conscience”—not of an *ideal*, but of a concrete and real universality in every man—a “real emptiness”, an insufficiency, a need, which impels us to confess that it is impossible to stop at a philosophy separated from religion. In a positive sense, the same inner fact is the need which reason constantly demonstrates of a divine authority, a teacher in matters of religion. It is not a question of “moral dispositions” merely prepara-

tory and extrinsic, as M. Blondel has made clear and demonstrated,² but of a moral disposition at once constitutive and permanent. Philosophy, the science of thought and life, by an act of thought confirms its own intrinsic insufficiency to resolve precisely the essential problems of thought and life. In this sense, we may say, remaining always within philosophy, that in philosophy we discover, so to speak, a dialectical source of faith. Thought, caught at the root of its being and development, is a kind of universal grace, which labors, makes man restless, and finally stimulates him to open himself to the particular grace—transcending the natural and human order—of faith.

AT THIS point the problem passes from the sphere of philosophy into that of apologetics. The question presents itself: is the classical or traditional apologetics capable of discharging the task of convincing the philosopher of today—already open to transcendence and disposed to faith, yet neither convinced of the former nor adhering to the latter—of the existence of God, of the historical fact of Revelation and of the divinity of the Church of Rome, depository and infallible interpreter of the revealed Word? We cannot give a hurried answer to this question. We are convinced that a cut and dried “no” would lead, in one way or another, to heterodoxy, just as a superficial “yes” would lead to false assumptions regarding what is essential for traditional apologetics and orthodoxy. With these observations, we do not wish to escape the question through neutrality, which in the field of philosophy and religion is not permitted and is but an indication of a conscience both uncertain and hardly sincere. We shall merely try to consider it with the balance, care and the responsibility which our profession of the Catholic faith imposes upon us.

Let us give, first of all, a sketch of the traditional apologetics. It is very simple and straight-forward: a) the existence of God is rationally demonstrable; b) the *possibility* of God's revelation to man is demonstrated logically and the *fact* of Revelation is demonstrated historically through the miracles, the prophecies and the authenticity of the Sacred Books; c) Sacred Scripture serves as documentation for the divine origin of the Catholic Church, which origin is confirmed anew by its prodigious diffusion and perpetuity throughout history. Apologetics, in brief, demonstrates the rational foundation of Christianity. It is, therefore, “a science both in its object and in its end which is certain knowledge, both philosophical and historical, of the fact of Revelation in the light of natural principles, that is, demonstrated by objective arguments valid for everyone, believer and non-believer. This knowledge is both prior to and necessary for faith and theological science, since before believing in God, it is necessary to know that He exists, that He has spoken, and that it is therefore reasonable and obligatory to believe Him.” The existence of God is demonstrated by ineluctable arguments accessible to all, according to which natural reason arrives at the notion of God “either as a first cause, ascending through a necessarily finite chain of created beings, or a most wise ordering mind, contemplating the spectacle in the universe of a perfect, universal, constant physical order, or a supreme legislator, considering the existence of a moral order, even more efficient than the physical order. . .” Having demonstrated the existence of God, there arises in the creature the natural obligation of religion

towards God, which is strengthened by "the hypothesis that God speaks to man through a positive Revelation, either of truths accessible to the capacities of the created mind" or of supernatural truths, "mysteries". But the apologist cannot demonstrate *a priori* the existence of the hypothesis, because it is superior to every natural exigency: he cannot therefore suppose it to be immanent or postulated by nature itself. On this point traditional apologetics is emphatically opposed to the so-called method of immanence and to other methods, either modern or modernistic, and proscribes them as more illusory than well-founded. Apologetics, therefore, demonstrates only the "fittingness"³ of such a supernatural elevation, since that which is supernatural can neither destroy nor oppose natural perfection; nor can positive Revelation contradict the natural elevation achieved through reason, since God, the author of the one and the other elevation, is one and the same, and can not contradict Himself. This apologetics excludes any disagreement between faith and reason; if it discovers apparent disagreements, it shows that their inconsistencies are due to the false supposition which attributes to faith or reason what in truth is neither imposed by the one nor demonstrated by the other. In brief: supernatural Revelation cannot be established through philosophy; it is verified by means of testimony and fact. Thus, from the hypothesis, apologetics moves on to verification, to the fact of divine Revelation. That God has spoken is a credible fact demonstrated historically by means of miracles and prophecies. Passages of Holy Scripture, the authenticity of which is demonstrated, serve to prove the divine origin of the Church of Rome; its perpetuity through the most varied and terrible events, its infallibility in matters of faith, etc. This is the outline of traditional apologetics, traced from a valid and authoritative source.

A FEW years ago I had the opportunity of hearing this type of apologetics expounded, with acuteness and enviable clarity, by an eminent Jesuit priest who defended it in relation to the "new apologetics" of Pascal, Blondel and their followers. For the sake of clarifying what we are about to say it is worth summarizing his presentation:

Apologetics is a science which demonstrates rationally the existence of God, the fact of Revelation, the divinity of the Church, prescinding from faith, dogma and the Revealed Word. Let us imagine a man who not only does not believe in the content of Revelation, but is not rationally convinced of either the existence of God, the fact of Revelation, or the divinity of the Church. Apologetics presents a means to convince him with purely rational, ineluctable arguments. Within a sealed envelope the apologist carries the dogmatic content of Revelation which he does not use at all in his demonstrations. With the arguments mentioned above, he first proves the existence of God, thus confounding atheism and pantheism, and laying the foundations of theism; then comes the historical fact of revelation, Christ the messenger of God: theism ceases to be generic and becomes Christian. Finally, there is set forth the divinity of the Church as the continuation of the work of the Apostles, depository as well as unique and infallible interpreter of Truth revealed by Christ. The demonstration is complete in that it gives the rational foundations of Christian Catholic theism. When the atheist has become convinced rationally that God exists, that Christ

is His messenger, and that the Church, divine in origin, is the depository of truth, he cannot refuse to believe in the content of Revelation, that is, in the dogmas established by the Church and in the secrets of the envelope, which it is now time to open, so that the convert may become acquainted with its contents and accept them.

This method has been accused of extrinsicism, and, if valid for the patristic-scholastic period, has been judged insufficient today, as a rational preparation in order to lead minds to faith. Up to what point can we accept this accusation?

Let us understand that an apologist may be trying to convince a man, through the power of reason, of the rational truth of the preamble to faith, and that this man may be indifferent to these problems, may be incapable of any religious experience even if most learned in matters of religion and theology, may be someone who does not feel the religious problem in any way. Such a man, after having listened, can very well answer that, though holding as possible the hypothesis of Revelation and of authentic facts to prove it, he does not feel at all obliged to adhere rationally or to govern his life in accordance with such a possibility. Every man is attracted towards and occupied with many facts while remaining insensitive or indifferent to many more. Among the many which do not interest him may be *the fact* of Revelation, the fact "religion" in general. At this point he closes the envelope, hands it back to the apologist and continues to give himself to those things which have always claimed his attention.

Such a reaction proves that the way of apologetics not only cannot produce and communicate faith, but cannot even produce the *disposition* towards faith. The arguments of apologetics become most valid and incontrovertible in their simplicity and power of reasoning when man *searches for* arguments to confirm and translate his original disposition into rational conviction. Apologetics is indeed demonstrative, but the good will to accept its conclusions is not produced by demonstration but presupposed by it. In brief, the apologetical demonstrations must be preceded by at least the *desire* for God, for the Revealed Word, and for participation in the communion of the Church.

It is necessary that the soul be first *touched* by God Himself, whom it does not yet know, so that it may then greet Him. It is necessary that the flame be first lighted that faith may then feed it. Up to a certain point Pascal is right: if you seek God, you have already found Him. The exterior fact—the Church—Dechamps says, and we might also cite Newman, is proved by itself; but "the 'inner fact' is also necessary, not as a substitute but as a preparation for demonstration." To verify this fact or avow the need we experience of being instructed divinely in divine things is deliberately to place the one we wish to convert at the point of view of good faith; it is not a demonstration. It is clear then that if the fact of conscience is sufficient, there will be no need to verify the external fact. On the other hand, "the very beginning of faith is not validated unless grace leads our will to submit our intelligence to the divine will, unless there is an act of free response to grace and a beginning of love." Converts do not speak of having been swayed by an argument, but by a light which illumined their whole souls.

There is an "experiential knowledge", distinct from the intellectual, which bears a clarity and richness *sui generis*, that no effort of reflection can either

supplant or suppress. This does not mean that faith is not an act of intelligence, but precisely the contrary. The living and concrete bases of faith must not be overlooked in favor of a preoccupation with reasons of intellectual or historical credibility. St. Vincent de Paul instructed his missionaries to make known the truths of faith to unbelievers not by means of theological reasoning, but by reasoning taken from nature: "for you must begin here to show that you are but developing those traces that God Himself has left in them."

Blondel has written that "the God of abstract understanding" and "the God of the vibrant soul" cannot merge one into the other. This does not mean that rational demonstrations are not at all valid, or that one must first have the ardent faith of the mystic in order to understand them; but it does mean that any demonstration remains inefficacious, though it retain its entire rational weight, if the soul does not "vibrate" with the desire and need of convincing itself rationally of the existence of God, or if it is not at least predisposed to interest itself in this demonstration. Otherwise the logical demonstration remains *static*, and does not provoke that inner movement which concludes with an act of total assent, an act in which the whole spirit is present as a concrete unity of sentiment, will and intellect. And in order that the demonstration provoke the movement of adhesion, it is necessary that it be first sought, desired, I would say *craved*; the soul must move towards the demonstration so that reasoning may in turn move towards the soul and be accepted. In brief, "abstract understanding" must be animated by a "vibrant soul" so that it may cease to be merely abstract and become rather the whole spirit, the concrete man. Any argumentation is condemned to remain sterile, static and *extrinsic* unless it presupposes an *intrinsic* movement on the part of the subject, a movement which is an exigent need of demonstration. This is not to say that the demonstration is true because we desire it: indeed, it is rather because it is rationally true that we experience a desire for it; nevertheless, it is imperative that we seek it. The obstacle lies not in the argument but within us: if the spirit cannot recognize the void within itself, no amount of reasoning will fill the emptiness. The spirit is free to give its assent to the demonstration of the existence of God or to the fact of Revelation only when the need of God touches it and frees it from the vanity of neither searching for nor desiring God. The spirit *opens itself* to God when it discovers that it cannot do without Him, when it ceases to think itself autonomous and begins to acknowledge its own incompleteness, when it is convinced that the absence of God is its own absence. That same reason which pretended to demonstrate its self-sufficiency now attempts to remedy its proven incompleteness. Only the consciousness of our indigence disposes us to receive the infinite richness of God: reason then offers us proofs of His existence to which we assent by virtue of that intrinsic intelligence which has made us free to accept God, as we are free to accept or reject demonstrative reason.

ONLY when the spirit has regained such a freedom—towards which present-day philosophy is at least tending—can it readily convince itself that if the Son of Man were not also the Son of God, Christianity would have no meaning: it would be only one civilization temporarily victorious over another, one which

awaits subjugation on the part of another. If, instead, Christ is also the Son of God, Christianity is then *the civilization through which we embrace the Cross*, even if pagan Rome falls to pieces or a certain "culture" or "civilization" falls in ruins. Only the spirit already freed by apologetics can grasp that the Church must not be viewed, as Judas would have it, in its external successes, but in its divine essence; that the apparent failures are precisely the irrefutable proof of its perennial and inextinguishable life.

Let us clarify our point of view with two concrete and famous examples from Manzoni's novel, *The Betrothed*. Let us suppose that Cardinal Federico, moved by his great zeal as a pastor, had foreseen the visit of the Innominato and had gone to visit him, sealed envelope under arm (as in the example above) and rational argumentations in mind. In a dialogue with the Innominato the Cardinal sets forth all the demonstrative proofs of the existence of God, of the historical fact of Revelation and of the divinity of the Church. Would the Innominato have been converted? I believe that unless he had called the Nibbio in to systematize the whole matter, the Innominato, prompted by other "facts", would have sent the Cardinal away without ceremony. The amazing conversion does take place, but not by means of rational demonstrations. The Innominato feels "the Hell" in his heart softened by the sound of the bells: he is irresistibly moved to seek comfort and peace, a single word, from the minister of God. To the question: "Where is this God?" the simple and truest answer was sufficient: "Do you not feel Him beating within your heart?" The Innominato's tears attest his conversion. The good Federico has known how to make his own the invitation of Christ, "Come and follow me and I shall make you fishers of men." No one wishes to be a fisher of formulas, for they are not the bait that catches souls. And one soul that is reborn is worth more than a corpse that is brought back to life.

Padre Cristoforo also goes to Don Rodrigo; begging, admonishing, and warning that "a day will come", he only receives ridicule and threats. Don Rodrigo "was not prepared" but was still closed to God: he was not seeking, he did not want God. The speeches of Padre Cristoforo were "extrinsic" to him; they were not the words he desired and which he could make his own; the "innerness" of the demonstration was lacking.

Today there is a philosophy which, by its own inner process, has reached the same point at which the Innominato had arrived when he asked the question "Where is this God?" This philosophy is ready to listen to God, to acknowledge the necessity of faith and the rights of religion. After the failure of its autonomy, it has arrived at the threshold of God; it is stimulated to reflect on the concept of being, and of being in the concrete, which is man, the person. As a philosophy of the person it has concluded, by its own exigencies, that the conquests of reason—indeed, the very nature of reason as spiritual activity in all its forms—have meaning and consistency only if reason remains open to God. Shall we refuse to go out and meet this philosophy? Would we deny it the aid of religion and of Christian philosophy which alone has discovered and given foundation to the true concept of the integral person? If present-day thought wishes to arrive at transcendence—I do not say the supernatural—through moral proofs, are we to turn it from this road or force it to follow another against its will? Is not that reason happy which submits to and accepts the reasons of the heart? Jesus

always loves defeat, annihilation, for it is the principle of rebirth, the sign of redemption from sin. Simon, seeing the miracle, cries out: "Lord, go away from me, for I am a sinner." To know God is to feel in oneself horror for one's own sins. Let us try to make this clearer.

ABOVE all—and this is actually quite evident—we are not here doubting the veracity of the traditional apologetics, nor seeking to prove that it has lost its efficacy. If we say that it is extrinsic, we do not mean that it is apologetics which has become extrinsic; it is modern and contemporary thought which, in general, has made itself extrinsic to apologetics. There is no such thing as a two-fold apologetics, one intrinsic and the other extrinsic, but a two-fold disposition towards apologetics, a participation in it either extrinsically or intrinsically. The scholastic thinkers adhered to apologetics and were invincibly convinced of its efficacy only because they brought a living soul and a deep interiority to those proofs which, for contemporary thought, are cold logical formulas or undemonstrable facts. It is necessary to bring these to life again, to make traditional apologetics a living experience, but it is a work to be done seriously. It is not sufficient, we repeat, to adhere freely to the rational evidence of the external testimony of God; a more intimate adherence is necessary, for God acts as His own witness in us through the exigencies which penetrate into the very sources of our thought and our will. Everything in us justifies the presence of a "soul naturally Christian." Therefore, not a new apologetics, but the ancient and grandiose apologetic of the Church of Rome. But let it be whole and complete, composed not only of formulas but of the very life which dictated them: let us have not only a conceptual scheme but along with it the intellectual light which informed it. The minds of the Middle Ages did not reach faith by means of apologetics, but were driven into apologetics at the spurring of God; they were incited from within to seek the divine fount. Apologetics is neither old nor new: it is always present, just as it is, with its argumentations and historical proofs. Old and new are rather the terms which apply to the spirit which must receive it, which must be ready to accept it with a free, rational conviction. The necessity of proofs and facts is beyond doubt; but it seems to us there is also the necessity of realizing that the preambles to faith, in order to fulfill their aim of leading us to faith and of being an intermediate zone between the purely natural and the supernatural, must be preceded by an interest in religion, by a desire for God. And this "state of fact" of the spirit is the result of a whole preparatory process, of a conception of life which, developing from within, reaches a point at which it must either renounce a conclusion or go beyond itself. In fact it does go beyond itself at the very moment when it feels the religious exigency, the need of God. The problem of faith, understood not in a purely theoretical manner but as a concrete problem of life, of the whole man and the very consistency of his entire spiritual activity, forms the core and indispensable condition for the subject to enter into apologetics and be convinced rationally of the truth it demonstrates. Afterwards we may wait and trust that the gratuitous gift will be bestowed. In brief, there is a subjective, intrinsic movement which makes the subject enter apologetics; this alone can render apologetics intrinsic and exact a rational assent which is total adhesion, integral par-

ticipation of man in the truths demonstrated and accepted, because it is thus the whole man who participates in the demonstration, bringing with him the infinite burden of his problems, which have made him gravitate towards transcendence and religion. It is through the intimate and subjective motive, the birth of a need of God in us, that we enter apologetics. "Nobody can come to me if the Father who has sent me does not first attract him". And to the paralytic: "Have faith; your sins will be forgiven." Have faith above everything else: even as much as a mustard seed. It is on the mustard seed that Jesus works. He reads the hearts of men; those who are simple experience immediately the miracle of His glance. No other external signs take place: the correspondence is inward, subterranean. "Before Philip called you, while you were under the fig tree, I saw you." It is enough; Nathaniel answers immediately. "You are the Son of God." He meets the Samaritan woman and reveals her own life to her, so that the sinner cries "Come and see a man who has told me all I have done". These are all "inner" miracles of an irresistible power which opens the soul, discloses it to itself and works upon it. The external acts of Jesus are perhaps less numerous than those he accomplishes in the depths of our souls. As Mauriac writes: "The miracle of miracles is that which does not fall within the scope of the senses and which faith alone can recognize." Jesus, the Teacher, is also the Teacher of the intrinsic, interior apologetic, of the deepest response in the inmost recess of the soul.

WHAT, then, is the task of apologetics today? To make itself intrinsic to the exigencies of philosophy, and to make itself intrinsic means to encounter philosophy, to spring out of its very incompleteness, not because others, from without, offer demonstrations, but because reason finds itself in the state of grace to agree. This favorable condition is born because reason has reached the point of proving the existence of God, the fact of Revelation and the divinity of the Church. Every soul, in this manner, re-experiences apologetics and does not accept it passively as somebody else's experience. It reaches shore after an inner travail. The demonstrations of truths are neither given away as gifts nor are they taught: they are conquered. The apologetical truths are the result of a rational process intrinsic to every intellect which searches for truth *ex veritate*. Must the objector be counselled to invoke philosophy and await the answer merely by virtue of having launched an appeal? No, most certainly not. Rather one must go forth to meet philosophy which, from within, as the last result of the attempt to separate itself from religion and to resolve the whole of reality in the immanence of thought, now presents the necessity of transcendence and religion. Philosophy constitutes itself a proof of the existence of God and a testimony to the historical fact of Revelation; it is, I would say, "pre-apologetic" and thus led by an ulterior inner process towards apologetics.

It is evident that what we are saying cannot raise the suspicion of our making the supernatural order a continuation of the natural, as if the supernatural were the natural and necessary destiny of man; that we do not base faith on sentimental and psychological reasons, nor do we maintain that grace is not gratuitous. Our position demonstrates, in harmony with traditional apologetics, only the "fittingness" of supernatural elevation, attested in its integralness by

the whole man and the concrete person. Here again we may quote Cardinal Dechamps: "This method is to be distinguished from the ordinary method in that it insists with great care and strength on two categories of permanent facts; the first, external, constitutes the foundation, properly speaking, of the demonstration; the other, inner, prepares the ground for it; facts which the classical treatises sometimes neglect or do not mention except in passing, without stressing their divine efficacy." This method presents a two-fold advantage: "the first is that it does not proceed in an abstract manner, by isolating different elements of its proofs, but in a concrete manner rests on the great argumentation of Irenaeus, Tertullian and Augustine, who never separate in their reasonings what is not separated in fact. The second is that it professes to follow the path of God both within and outside of us in the work of the generation of faith." Again, we are not speaking of the method of immanence: on the contrary, ours is the method of transcendence. Let us make this clearer.

Philosophy thought it could forget man and thereby gain its own autonomy as a system of clear and distinct ideas, as a science, as a critical construction of experience, as an autonomous morality, as reason adequated to reality. In these systems no account is taken of man, but of universal rationality, of humanity, of nature and the cosmos. Each of these points of view is unilateral, incomplete, conditioned by the others, and all of them together are insufficient to explain man, who is not appeased by mere rationality and science. The insufficiency of philosophy and science is attested by the infinite aspiration of man, by that incompleteness of which man becomes conscious. Infinite aspiration does not mean possession of the infinite, but its absence; therefore it means transcendence. Thought, in every act, as concrete reality, becomes conscious of transcendence, as thought of the *other* towards which it aspires. The process of concrete thought is from transcendence to Transcendence; from *others* to *Him*, which means from the *I* to the *Thou*. It is what I call the "creaturely sense of being", the awareness of ourselves as creatures which is precisely to attest the existence of the Creator, to consider existence a *gift*, a grace received, the grace of existing. As we have written elsewhere, "We overturn the animating principles of a good part of modern and contemporary thought, for it is not a matter of conquering the immanentistic position of the creative activity of the subject, but to conquer—and this, too, is a difficult and bitter conquest—the sense of being created, the spiritual warmth of being a living part of creation." All the forms of spiritual activity, in our conception, are ascending steps through which the subject conquers an ever clearer sense of being created, penetrates the meaning of creation and aspires towards the genuine act of Love from which it originally sprang. These steps form an itinerary which leads to seeing creation not as corrupted, but, as far as possible, as it came from the hands of the Creator; they are a gradual approach which the spirit makes to the warm love of the creative act. Let us not be misunderstood: we are very far from ontologism; if a name is wanted for this method, let it be called "the method of transcendence", rigorously philosophical and moving from the fact of the concrete person. Do we want to deny the proofs of the existence of God *ab interiore homine*? I do not think so, as I shall proceed to show.

FROM what we have written it appears clear, both explicitly and implicitly, that we are validating the moral proofs of the existence of God. God is not only a logical principle; He is above all *Love*. It is likewise clear that we do not exclude the validity of the so-called cosmological or a *contingentia mundi* proofs. Indeed, on this point let us say that to limit the proofs of God's existence to the human dimension as if man alone were His witness is almost to wish to make God small. It is true that man alone has been created in the image and likeness of God, and therefore has divine vestiges. The cosmological proofs, however, integrate the moral proofs and all together they offer the mind and the heart the magnificent spectacle of a universe which attests its divine origin and is a witness to the truth of God. This is the richest, most integral, most comprehensive proof. Nor are the two proofs separate, as some have insisted, even though they are distinct. The cosmological proofs do not prescind from man, but include him, and exhibit the character of interiority which is the essence of the so-called moral proofs.⁴

Let us take, as an example, the following proof: contingent being exists; therefore there exists necessary being or God as necessary Being; from the effect to the First Cause. Resting firmly on the principle of causality, the rational force of this proof is well founded, and it is evident that it is much more than the cold and arid application of a principle as if it were a geometrical theorem. Its persuasive power is validated by the human sense of participation in the things of the world by love of that which is created by God, who cannot create anything but what is good. A spiritual road is established between man and creatures, a testimonial to the creative Act of love, as such, to the love of God. The world is not loved for itself, but for Him who created it. We do not mean an external meeting with things, but an intimate contact of love, creaturely warmth, our fraternal communion with the world, because we live, together with all created things, by virtue of a common fatherhood. To *see* the world is to *love* it, to love it for the sake of God. The conceptual transcription of the principle of causality is not disjoined from a living contact with creation for the "rational evidence" is also the "sensible evidence" of the traces of God in things.

Let us examine the formulation of the first "way" of St. Thomas. Reality is becoming, movement (*motus*), that is, transition from potency to act. Does a reality which is not pure act but becomes actualized and therefore contains potentiality, contain in itself the reason for its existence? If it did, it would be the Absolute, the Unconditional. But, in becoming, every movement is conditioned by the preceding movement: *omne quod movetur ab alio movetur*. Thus, the reality which is an actualizing and not Pure Act does not contain within itself the reason for its existence and therefore, in order to be explained, points to the unconditioned pure Act, to the *primum movens quod a nullo movetur*, that is, God.

In order to understand the complete meaning of the proof we must not impoverish the rich content of the term *motus*, which means not only local motion and transformation of bodies, the complexus of physical and chemical phenomena, but any movement whatsoever, thereby including the becoming of the spirit. Spiritual becoming means the actualization of the perfection of man, the

development of the cognitive and moral activity as of any other activity. It means that the dynamism of the spirit addresses itself to God, leads to God and in God alone finds its explanation and the reason for its existence. Why have we tried to deprive the Thomistic proof of this richness and reduce it to a purely physical proof, rejected or accepted only from a single limited point of view? It is also a proof which stems from our inwardness; indeed, it poses interiority itself (the spirit in its activity or movement) as a problem, which is a demonstration of the existence of God and as such a solution. The metaphysical and spiritual meaning of the term *motus* is different from its purely physical meaning. Cosmological proof, yes, not in the naturalistic sense which is usually attributed to this term, but in the other more comprehensive sense of the human-physical cosmos, of the contingency of man and nature. And the contingency of man means limitation, insufficiency, imperfection, and at the same time consciousness of overcoming the obstacles, desire of perfectibility, passage from potency to act.

It is evident that the metaphysical proof has nothing to do with physics, with the physics, for example, of Aristotle. This may change and become the physics of Galileo or Newton, or the modern *quantum* physics, without making the Thomistic proof less valid. Certainly, however, if it is to be viewed in this manner, it must always be considered in its integralness, in its deep metaphysical sense, without losing sight of its very soul and motivating exigency which is the aspiration of the imperfect created to Perfection, the necessity intrinsic to the dynamism of the spirit of fulfilling itself in God, of actuating thus its norm and its consistency. If this spiritual sense is lost, the proof of St. Thomas is no longer valid. Whatever the proof possesses of the physical may fall or be set aside, since it belongs to the domain of science; what remains, the metaphysical, is in perfect agreement with the spirit of Christianity.

THEREFORE, to acknowledge the perennial truths of Scholastic philosophy does not mean to be an integral Scholastic; above all, it does not mean a repetition of the formulas of Scholasticism, but an understanding of its spirit, bringing it closer to our exigencies as men of today. It is indispensable that traditional Catholic philosophy become intrinsic to us and that, in turn, we penetrate and experience its inwardness and become intrinsic to it. It is not a matter, naturally, of adjusting Catholic philosophy to our tastes, as if to apply to it a certain historicism with the purpose of titillating the excessively delicate palates of the moderns and ultra-moderns. It is a matter of not pretending to adhere *tout-court* to the whole complexus of Scholastic philosophy, its methods and scaffolds, without having first established an intrinsic relationship between the two spiritual and cultural climates. There exist profound exigencies both in Catholic philosophy and in modern-contemporary philosophy which demand of the former that it be not estranged from all that has been thought since Scholasticism and in opposition to it, and of the latter that it neither ignore Catholic philosophy nor look upon it with diffidence and hostility.

A meeting with this contemporary philosophy which has come to recognize the necessity of transcendence can give birth to a renewed Catholic philosophy. It must be engendered by an integral, richly human conception of Catholicism,

spiritually lived, not merely externally practiced, of ideas and not of words, of action and not only of intention, a Catholicism which commits itself in the front lines of every problem of contemporary society.

Translated by ALFRED DI LASCIA

Translator's Notes

¹ Cardinal Dechamps (1810-1883), archbishop of Malines, played a decisive role in drafting the various articles on Faith and Reason, Revelation and the Church, at the Vatican Council; his work (*Les Oeuvres complètes*, 18 volumes, published in Malines, n.d.) rests on a development of the two-fold dialectic of 'inner fact' and 'outer fact', of consciousness and history. The most directly pertinent of the 18 volumes is the first, entitled *De la démonstration de la foi ou Entretiens sur la démonstration catholique de la Révélation Chrétienne*.

There are not many studies available on the work of Dechamps, but the few which have been written are all of superior merit. The earlier studies devoted to the great apologist by Mallet published in the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* (October 1905, February and March 1906, March 1907) and by Wehrle in the excellent book *La Méthode d'Immanence* (Bloud & Gay) may be completed by studying the *opera omnia* of M. Blondel, particularly *Le Problème de la Philosophie Catholique* (Bloud & Gay, 1932), in which Dechamps' apologetics is presented as "La Méthode de la Providence".

² M. Blondel develops the idea of the inner moral disposition as constitutive of the rational movement towards faith in *Le Problème de la Philosophie Catholique*.

³ We are suggesting, with some hesitation, the English word 'fittingness' for the original expression *convenienza* (in Blondel it is "convenance"). Extreme caution must be exercised in understanding this term correctly, for it is of critical importance in preserving the original meaning intended, which is to express the unbroken continuity between the natural and the supernatural without merging their distinctive natures into one or the other of the terms. Only a patient study of Blondel's works can serve to clarify this difficult and delicate problem, although a fruitful beginning may be undertaken by consulting one of his own recent statements published in the *Giornale di Metafisica* (Jan. 1949) under the title "Réponse irénique à des méprises. Comment comprendre et justifier l'accès à la vie surnaturelle."

⁴ The thoughts here presented in a somewhat schematic fashion are more fully developed in the central section of *Filosofia e Metafisica* entitled "L'Esistenza di Dio". Sciacca advances some deeply stimulating ideas on the problem of God's existence; moving from 'the life of the spirit', in its deepest interiority, which is the world of objective and transcendental Ideas, he traces the dialectical itinerary of the mind from its rational, judging activity to its intellectual intuition of the principles of judgment which are shown to rest, ultimately, on Truth itself or God. Sciacca accepts 'the critical problem' as an authentic philosophical problem, and shows how, rather than demanding and arresting itself at a cosmological immanence, it leads, under a rigorous criticism, to the Supreme, trans-cosmical Being.

THE MODERN ARTIST AND RELIGIOUS ART

Christian Possibilities in Artists Without Faith

PIE-RAYMOND REGAMEY

CAN an artist with no faith build and decorate churches, and deal validly with Christian themes? This is a question which has been raised quite vividly in the minds of many by the church at Assy, the chapel designed by Matisse in Vence, and the recent exhibition of sacred art in the Museum of Modern Art in Paris. Most people do not even bother to raise the question, or if they do they are too willing to solve it in a peremptory manner. Nevertheless it is very complex and a simple answer is not possible. For twenty-five years I have been puzzled by the cases I have examined. The best approach, I think, would be to disentangle the problem methodically, like the medieval "Disputed Topics," and we shall mention first of all the arguments for and against religious art by artists who have no faith.

Pie-Raymond Régamey is one of a group of French Dominicans working to encourage a religious art for our time. He writes often for L'ART SACRE and the liturgical review MAISON-DIEU; Sheed and Ward published his study of POVERTY last year, and the JOURNAL OF ARTS AND LETTERS has translated two of his articles. The following essay is taken from LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE, March 1951.

Pro and Con

IN ORDER to follow the dialectical process more closely, we shall give the negative arguments first, for it is the opponents who raise the question. It does not exist for those who ask unbelievers to create religious works of art.

C.I.—When we are concerned with a wholly religious work—the construction or decoration of a Church—the artist himself must be a religious person. This requirement goes beyond the exigencies of the psychological order. It is a law of the supernatural order. For according to Our Lord, the first principle of every religious act is faith. The person who would reach God must believe!¹ This is especially true if his work is to bring others closer to God—if it is in some way to carry on the *opus Dei*. Such is the case in the liturgical arts.

Fra Angelico's phrase, "To paint the things of Christ, one must live with Christ" must therefore be understood in the fullest and deepest meaning of the Mystery at stake: the Mystery of the eternal Alliance of Christ and men, which is honored by the religious arts as "noble handmaids of the liturgy."² But if this external honor is to be in harmony with the entire divine liturgy and not be a discordant lie in the eyes of God, it ought to represent that interior celebration which springs from faith. It is even more certainly a flagrant impropriety, a kind of sacrilege, to entrust religious work to artists who make an open profession of their materialism.

It must be specifically noted that this objection is rooted in the most authentically traditional idea: the meaning of the Christian Mystery in its fulness,³ the meaning of the liturgy by which the Mystery is realized among us,⁴ and the meaning of faith without which one cannot grasp the essence of these invisible things.⁵ This meaning has been lost to the faithful and even to the clergy, and is just now beginning to reappear. It alone can rediscover the traditional meaning of the religious arts and should work towards their effective recovery. It is this meaning that reacts, obscurely, against the collaboration of unbelievers in the work of God.

C.2.—Without faith, the artist cannot undertake his work as a Christian. Its purpose—the truly Christian and supernaturally religious theme and character—are only pretexts for him. The meaning that he gives to his work is only accidentally what the Church requires and is in great danger of exalting his pride.

C.3.—Léon Bloy and André Gide agree that there is no art unless the devil collaborates. Without going that far, we are indeed obliged to take note of that aspect of artistic creation which points to the "powers of darkness." At any rate there is a great danger that these will gain ascendancy. Nowadays the danger is even greater, for the artist tends more and more to value solely what he receives from his innermost self; he subjects himself to his creations more than he wills them into being.⁶ We are therefore forced more than ever to purify our sources, and this can be done only by the life of faith.

Were we not limiting ourselves to a very brief summary, there would be good reason to treat in greater detail the forms these dangers take. Two of them must however be pointed out. The modern arts love to be in the domains which are morally and spiritually dangerous; they are fearful of "nice sentiments" as though bad literature and painting would inevitably result. The young Delacroix wanted to "humour an old ferment" that he felt within himself, in "the darkest recesses." Since then great inroads have been made into these suspect regions. When art undertakes religious themes, it takes great pleasure in their tragic and sinful aspects. Without faith, despair—and how many of its malevolent deviations—are then almost inevitable. Here rises the second disturbing element which must be noted: often our contemporaries, more or less consciously, and sometimes most cynically, look upon religion as a kind of absolute in the submission to the passions, if not to diabolical forces. The sorcerers Sade and Laubréamont are their prophets . . . Old Saint Peter cries out a special entreaty to whoever is engaged in artistic creations for the Church: "Watch, resist, be strong in faith."⁷

C.4.—Faith is still the principle of union that should exist between the artist and the faithful. Without faith the artist does not understand the true needs of the Christian community and follows sentiments that are all too personal. In proportion to his sincerity, he means to impose an astounding and often offensive way of reacting to the Christian mystery—quite independently of the misunderstandings resulting from the general corruption of artistic taste.

C.5.—Lack of faith does indeed affect the creations of modern religious art. Sometimes one must deplore the scorn of Christ's true teaching or the results of contamination with "suspect mystics." As a rule such works are spiritually indigent. When their inspiration does not remain vague, they express

some aspect which, too humanly, has struck the artist, and exaggerate it so much that it contradicts the purer aspects of the Mystery in question.

The fullness and equilibrium of belief are always ignored.

SUCH are the main difficulties to be presented. What is to be said on the other side?

P.1.—The criticism of religious works of art produced by non-believers is answered by a criticism of the works that stem from an artist's Christian faith. It must be admitted that in general they give a very bad idea of his faith.⁸ It is important to emphasize that, as it exists today, faith is far from being an effective principle of artistic creation. The first difficulty is immediately brought under fire and at the same time it seems that the adversaries are really on different levels.

Indeed, the former have an abstract notion of natures and their reasoning is carried on in the name of *faith*, whereas the others are concerned with *de facto* situations. The former assume that their faith is alive, complete, balanced and effective enough to put even emotional disorders aright. But it is the faith encountered in our contemporaries that must be considered. Now the question is, what is the value of their faith in its present state and condition?

It very often includes large areas of ignorance, error, ambiguity and inaccuracy.⁹ It appears as a rather timorous and negative obedience, more concerned with not going counter to the teachings of the Church than with producing a living and personal familiarity with the invisible world. It remains theoretical. Nevertheless, even in theory, it is far from being consonant with present patterns of thought. The artistic themes it claims to construct smack of the system, of the catechism. No longer do they have the naturalness and vigour of the great ages of the past.¹⁰ They are caught up in sentimentality. Between these two extremes the Christian artist's faith often is no better than that of the most ordinary layman. It is a mixture of mediocre devotion, anemic ideas and a piety which is either affected, forced or totally lacking in character. Let us not be surprised if artistic creations by and for religious people resemble current devotional practices, particularly the public devotions which only very exceptionally bear the marks of true religion. We are not passing judgment on the consciences of these people. The heart-rending conditions under which real and even heroic faith finds expression, in lamentable forms, are determined by an inextricable complexus of historical factors. Witness Saint Thérèse of Lisieux. One may discourse as long as he likes about religious art on the abstract level, but how can these factors be ignored when we attempt to discern the valid works and the conditions of their creation? And if these factors are kept in mind, one must note that the works inspired by faith habitually aggravate rather than rectify the worst kind of involuntary deviations (in doctrine itself, and even more so in sentiment and emotion).

Even when the concrete behavior of faith is free from criticism and not likely to spoil its expressions, an artist is not justified in setting up as his aim the creation of religious art. Religious values, as any other element in art, ought never to be willed as an end. They can only be received as a gift. A schema wherein religious art emanates directly from the artist's faith usually involves

the unfortunate fancy that faith must dominate the artistic media. And these media, so they say, must be subservient to the religious ideal that the artist is laboring to interpret. As Bazaine so rightly says, this is the "reason for the constant failure of artists concerned with 'religious art' . . ." To take a transcendent religious act of faith as a point of departure, and try somehow or other to adapt to it a profane, everyday reality, is to try to associate two independent realities. There is no hope that they will ever meet. This is indeed the error in all "engaged art." The partisans of the condemned illusion little realise how rightly they use the word "interpret," for the works of art created in this manner of imagining the rapport between faith and art do in fact remind us of essays awkwardly written in a foreign tongue. Artistic values do not have faith as their source, but are artificially directed to the good cause. And indeed, this cause is betrayed by such artists in precisely the measure they mean to serve it, for the religious value of plastic arts is not something that can be superimposed on the pretext that it is naturally a superior value. It can be achieved only in the quality of their forms, and every purpose foreign to it hinders this quality.

P.2.—The habitual faith of many Christian artists that leaves no mark on their artistic creations is contrasted with the fervently Christian reactions of "believers who have no faith."¹² We all know non-believers whose spiritual demands both stimulate and shame us. In no way do they come from conformism; there is nothing of the tailor-made about them. They spring up with all the naive spontaneity of instinct. The artistic order shows an analogous phenomenon and the Church ought to profit by the works of non-believing artists that are created in virtue of the sensitivity of their being to certain realities of our faith. Indeed, many of them, whose integrity we as Christians cannot help but admire, evidence a truly vital aspiration towards things religious, that is loftier and stricter than among believers.

P.3.—The plastic arts moreover fall so short of expressing supernatural mysteries that imaginative substitutes for faith become quite adequate. In the sphere of the imaginary (which is proper to the arts) the argument is sometimes carried too far. Following the German romanticists and Kierkegaard, they give importance to the "ironic," an aspect of art which is opposed to life, inasmuch as it submits to the interior in order to succeed in a mere ex-pression, and not because this order urges the immortal self on to fulfillment. Such people, and others following Paulhan, Grenier and many psychiatrists, tend to insist on the playful aspects of every language—one can almost say the necessarily treacherous aspects which cause men to ex-press exactly what is ex-ternal to their profound essence.

Still others, heirs to a certain baroque and classic tradition, consider art as no more serious than decoration and contend that it is a question of adaptation and "expediencies" for which real faith is most certainly not required. We have all read or heard amateurs, critics and artists who constantly find a painting quite pious provided it is good. A serious beauty in art is often found in this direction, but only in the achievement of an honestly executed work. This concept was formulated in famous terms by Michaelangelo: "All good painting is noble and devout in itself." It is therefore worthy of giving honor to God, without needing a supernatural faith.

P.4.—But the main argument is found in quite another domain. It has been

expressed most strikingly by Father Couturier: "The great artist is always intuitive. And that is almost enough."¹³ "Genius does not produce faith, but the analogy between mystical inspiration and the inspiration of heroes and artists is too profound for one not to be immediately prejudiced in their favour." "The bet must always be placed on the genius," says Delacroix. "Every true artist is inspired. By nature and temperament he is predisposed and prepared for spiritual intuitions, then why not for the coming of the Spirit Himself who after all breathes where He wills? You Hear His voice. . . But you know not from whence it comes nor whither it goes . . ."¹⁴

The realm in which this argument is valid, if it is valid at all, is larger than one might believe at first sight. It appears to esteem only great artistic genius, but they represent only privileged examples. Indeed, as soon as "artistic genius", great or small, exists; as soon as there is an outburst however small of this poetic instinct in the fullest sense of the word, there must exist also, in proportion to and dependent on the direction of this instinct, an ability to perceive and express certain realities of faith.

Doctrinal Synthesis

AS FAITH is, so is religious art. By now one might easily suspect the presence of other factors. The primordial role of faith must nevertheless be affirmed on two levels which we have seen to be distinct: that of the profound nature of things where the work of art will take on the value of worship in proportion to the faith that produces it, and that of experience, in which the works of art permit one to perceive even the nuances of faith which gave it birth. Works of art seem decidedly to be recording instruments of astonishing precision. So much the worse for the poor graphologists of art who do not know how to read them. Whoever enters into their field does not discover the presence or absence of faith, but rather this or that quality of faith, this or that insufficiency.

Theological reflection and observation in many cases agree on a precise statement of three aspects of this activity of faith as far as religious works are concerned.

1. What matters is not so much the quality of faith in the artist's heart as its presence in his creative powers. The point is, how is it translated into images, into the sensory, in accordance with the forces emanating from the subconscious depths? What is its vital connection with what one might call "artistic faith"? By this we mean a certain compelling conviction,¹⁵ though indeed obscure, of being born to create—and to create in a certain way: this "interior order" where according to Rouault, only the law of the artist must be recognized. And what a strict law! If one remains in the realm of experience the entrenchment of this "artistic faith" appears as profound as that of supernatural faith. And its grasp must be just as complete if the work is to have value. Artistic faith is the acceptance of a destiny, just as supernatural faith has the gratuity of a gift. "No man plucks the golden palm unless he be guided by fate," said Poussin.

We could not undertake here an explanation of the relationship of these two forces. But from our point of view one thing is certain: when we ask whether or not an artist has the spiritual dispositions required to deal with certain

Christian themes, the question amounts to this: can the theme become amalgamated, so to speak, with his own essence in such a manner that the vital obligation to create, this enigmatic "interior order," may find consistency, direction and efficacy in the theme? By formulating the problem in this way we make clear the risk involved whenever artistic creation answers a demand—the risk that the demand be tempted to enter the realm of the supernatural. An artist's previous achievements or attempts and the affinities he manifests enable keen observers and even the artist himself to conjecture the possibilities. The kind of preparation which is important takes a very long time. Christian influences must be at work in the depths of his being and they must grow and ripen—even without his realizing it—in the mysterious stream on which his works must draw.

Is it necessary to say that "all things being equal," supernatural faith is from every point of view more effective than its substitutes? This would be true only if it were realized in a *life* in which man's powers are focused. If it is stricken with some of the defects we have mentioned, and even if it perfectly fulfills its human role (which is to obtain precise concepts and to guide resolute wills and to adjust emotions), faith can quite easily be outdone in the creation of religious works by a kind of spiritual sensitivity common to many creative "geniuses," even non-believers.

2. We have said that one finds in artistic works this or that quality or insufficiency of faith, rather than a pure and simple presence or absence of faith. One might just as well say he does not know whether it is faith itself or some substitute. Here again we note how theological reflection and experience agree, how the first accounts for the second and is far from being contradicted by it. True faith, in principle, is most certainly capable of setting everything aright in the artist. But every one already has an immense task in conforming to it in the realm which more properly belongs to faith—the realm of judgments, motives and feelings. Think of the good fortune needed if its influence is to be effective in the world of the native instincts and tendencies from which art receives its character. Once more we find ourselves in those regions where we abstain from dogmatizing and are content to observe and profit by occasions.

Let us suppose that Christian habits do not more or less withdraw the believer from the life of his time and that they inspire him (as they should, since they ought to assure him of more correct reactions in regard (salvation) with greater courage to face his day and age. Then the life of faith should attune him to the full scale of supernatural realities and at the same time, under God, to all the things of the present life. On the other hand, the person without faith cannot in his whole being be in complete harmony with the Christian universe. The intercourse takes place only in certain directions and in specific sectors. Theoretically then, the Christian artist should be like a radio station and capture every supernatural wave-length; the non-believer only a few at best. Theoretically! But in the truly infinite complexity of artistic natures, believers and non-believers seem actually to be in just about the same situation. However, the theory is far from being invalidated by this fact, for the entire array of artistic gifts is quite different from the main preoccupations of faith which concern eternal life. For the believer and the non-believer alike the field is generally rather limited, but here it is that they share in the meaning of Christ and the *sensus Ecclesiae* according to their creative sincerity.

The analogy shows how the artist is capable of finding "*sensibles*" equivalent to realities of mystery, or rather, to suggest something of these realities in and through sensory things. In this task the essential things are the values of the sensory order and the ability to raise them to a higher level. Here the difference between authentic faith and its substitutes, approximations, and equivalents, may be imperceptible. What difference is there between a live understanding of certain supernatural realities and faith in these realities? A spiritual adherence that can change nothing of this understanding, especially in its sensory forms. Is it faith that inspires the artist who succeeds miraculously in fittingly presenting believers with the things pertaining to their faith?

Who would dare affirm or deny it? Let us not pretend to penetrate the secrets of their hearts or usurp God's prerogative to judge.

3. It is equally difficult to determine which comes into play in the artistic sphere, supernatural faith or its substitutes, for both are a participation in faith in the Church, and here the participation can take place according to the same behavior. Whenever there is a certain point of faith which is vitally fitting for the believer or non-believer, both are open to the teaching of the Church with equal profit. Certainly the believer is usually privileged in this as well. His life in the Church ought to assure him of information, understanding, doctrinal equilibrium and supernatural tact—things which the non-believer can benefit from in a less normal way. But here again, how many exceptions nowadays! We cannot judge these matters in the abstract or in generalities, but let us look at everything in terms of the very life of the artistic conscience. Whatever it reacts to, whatever it blends with for the purpose of bearing fruit depends much more on spiritual sensibility (where the core of the problem is really found) than on faith itself.

In any case we can see how the extreme complexities typical of our times break the tranquil line whereby the artist's faith ought to govern the sacred value of his work. We have here a double breach: one in the faith and its power of attaining the creative forces, the other in the forces themselves. It is always through the radiance of faith that nourishes the Church that works of art receive their religious value. But these ruptures are such that any artist's simple substitutes of faith may happen to be more effective than another artist's faith. The occasions of this anomaly may be numerous and they can be more striking than the normal situation. In a way such exceptions confirm the rule, for substitutes always play their role according to the exigencies of the faith itself.

Clarifications

IT IS now easy to clarify briefly the points that may seem too partial in the arguments of the two schools of thought. Several points of doctrine must be precisely stated.

The religious work of art does not strictly require the artist to be religious except in the realm of his artistic creation—in the very exercise of his art. The truly religious artist in the service of the Church is the one who imprints a religious character on the forms of his creation.

Today extreme cases are in evidence where artists most qualified for a certain liturgical task are Marxists! Men who openly profess materialism are neverthe-

less able to take their task very seriously. Their situation is much more complex than it seems and it is aggravated by all kinds of misunderstandings which nowadays seem so important. Instead of challenging *a priori* the fruits they may bear, it must be agreed that the fruits show their great potentialities for religious art. Each case must be considered in itself.

It is quite evident that these are unusual cases; they would be scandalous in the perspectives of true Christianity. But they are justified in relation to the world we live in.

Our times decidedly impel us towards a kind of extreme tension whenever we try to satisfy every need. Our age is paradoxical, and our solutions are sometimes as strange as they are just. And though we appear to be excessively liberal, we ought to rediscover the traditional meaning of religious arts which opponents speak of. But let us not have illusions: to organize a system of life "with Christ" so that the "religious" artist may correspond entirely to his ideal is not only economically difficult at present but experience proves that there is a risk insofar as his soul's freedom is concerned. The few experiments that have been made up to now have always resulted in a sclerosis of art into arbitrary rules, formulae of style and procedures. We go counter to our aims if we do not succeed in *transposing in accordance with the inescapable facts of our times* the great traditions whose echoes reach us from antiquity, from the Middle Ages and more particularly from Byzantium. Let us not succumb to a desire to remove the mystique from the religious artist or impose the narrow and rigid forms of the decadent monks of Mount Athos.

We should not hesitate in choosing between a work that springs from the highest ideal and proves its religious ambitions (though its form may be found wanting) and a work whose inspiration is more modest but of certain quality. In the Church the latter honors God more. We must always realize that the religious character is found in the very quality of the forms.

As for the other difficulties we have said everything that needs to be said in order to determine their just validity. And let us not exaggerate the accusations of pride and baseness launched against contemporary art; they may be applied to it only after many distinctions are made. It is quite upsetting to note the levity and pride with which too many Christians criticize it. It would be more in conformity with the spirit of Christ to recognize the admirable spiritual resources which contemporary art offers.

We are uneasy about all the troubled things which artists like to bring to light. It is easy to turn down works which may contain such defects, if they mean to introduce them into the Church. But instead of exaggerating this very slight danger, we would do better to take note of the troubled sensuality, vain complacency and abuses of superior values to the profit of the more base, which are found in current liturgical art. We do not have to be psychoanalysts to recognize the sickly character of the entire *Kitsch* production.¹⁶

IF WE now put the favorable arguments together we see that they are valid, with the corrections we have mentioned. Thus it is that "imaginative substitutes" ought to be understood in terms of the realm of "artistic faith" which is so

deeply enrooted in the soul of the artist that they branch out in all their potentialities.

Let us repeat: the intuitions of genius in which Father Couturier has confidence do not equip just any artist of calibre for just any religious task. Father Couturier is the first to take this into account. It would be interesting to observe how he and Canon Devémy, who were responsible for the decoration of Assy, called in a Bonnard, a Matisse, a Léger, a Lurçat, a Braque to work precisely in the region which appeared to be spiritually open to each of them; to see how they created one of the rare new churches in which the faithful are struck by a religious atmosphere; how a Matisse himself experienced an interior necessity, a need to expand all his work in a church which he would be entirely responsible for bringing to reality, from the architecture to the chasubles; how a spiritual meaning is revealed in these works, retrospectively, a meaning revealed no doubt in an unexpected way, but in perspective we are surprised not to have perceived it sooner. Never do artists like these exceed the possible. And they show that the possible goes beyond what we may suppose.

We must ourselves rediscover the meaning of the possible. That is to say, we must profit from the values our contemporaries can give us, instead of hoping for what may be theoretically more desirable. Of the latter we see nothing but parodies. Let us express to the full what we want. We must insist on it even more—we must rediscover the complete mind of the Church on the subject of religious art. The creative powers of many artists, believers or not, would be stimulated. But these days of radical changes are a time of poverty, and only the values of poverty show fecundity. They are richer than we realize. Spiritually the poor are the non-believers, sometimes lamentably poor, sometimes magnificently, but they can restore authentic riches to the Church by being enabled to bear fruit for her. Then Christ will restore them to the Church, for it is indeed from her faith that they first received their riches. And its accent is often so convincing for the men of the new age because, without realizing it, what they mould in those mysterious places where art is born is the profound destiny of the Church.

Translated by LEON KING and RUSSELL S. YOUNG

¹ Heb., XI, 6.

² A phrase of Pius XI repeated by Pius XII in the encyclical *Mediator Dei*.

³ Eph., I-4; Col. I, 13-27.

⁴ *Mediator Dei*, Nos. 1-2, 13-24.

⁵ Heb., XI, 1.

⁶ We are obliged to allude to a world of realities which may not be known. . . Let us prevent at least one misunderstanding: it is not necessary to put the docility of modern artists to their obscure forces in opposition to conscious and voluntary labor. Never have works been more consciously, rigorously willed than those of a Matisse, a Braque, etc. But the reflective work of the artists is at the service of their spontaneous talents.

⁷ I Peter, v. 8.

⁸ On the insufficiency of faith as inspiration of the arts, I have given an explanation in *La Vie Intellectuelle*, Dec. 1948.

⁹ Cf. Paissac, "L'athéisme des chrétiens", *Supplément de la vie spirituelle*, May 15, 1947.

¹⁰ Cf. A. M. Martimort, *L'Art Sacré*, Sept.-Oct. 1949.

¹¹ *Notes sur la peinture d'aujourd'hui*, Floury, 1948, p. 59.

¹² An expression of Claude Mauriac, *Le Figaro littéraire*, Nov. 4, 1950.

¹³ Cf. *Werk*, 1949, No. 4, p. 120.

¹⁴ Cf. *L'Art Sacré*, Sept.-Oct. 1950, pp. 17-18.

¹⁵ Cf. The first of Rilke's *Letters to a Young Poet*.

¹⁶ F. Demenge, "La Kitsch dans l'art et la vie chrétienne"; *L'Art Sacré*, Nov.-Dec. 1950.

THE CHURCH OF SINNERS

KARL RAHNER

IN CATHOLIC dogma the concept of the "Church of sinners" is for the most part very briefly treated. There is really so much that is more important and magnificent to be said of the Church. The fact that the Church is a "Church of sinners" does not occupy a very prominent place in theological interest, perhaps also because it is only too clearly an every-day experience. Nonetheless the subject is essentially of great significance in the teaching of the Church, not merely because one is concerned here with one of the most troublesome questions of theology in all dogmatic history, but because it is of such importance for the faith of the individual. The question is paramount because in the final analysis the problem as understood here is not so much that of the obvious, everyday experience, but of its dogmatic implications, whose answer therefore must be sought in Revelation and not in any confused, sin-distorted experience of men.

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We say we are confronted with a thorny problem which is ever recurring in the history of the teaching Church. Christianity has always professed belief in the "holy" Catholic Church. And again and again historically the question has arisen, where then is this Church which so confidently declares that she is holy, the very Church on which the splendor of God's own holiness rests? And repeatedly with appeal to this article of faith the Church in the concrete has been rejected as a sinful one. Repeatedly some new Church has been established as the true, holy one and proclaimed to be the real Church of God and of His Christ. Tertullian declared that the great Church of his day was not the true Church of the spirit and of spiritual men but a brothel, because she did not cast out adulterers once and for all from her community. Montanism and Novatianism gave a similar teaching in the third century. Donatism in the time of Augustine, Messalianism and other heretical currents in monasticism, as well as movements such as that of the Cathari, the Spiritualism of a Joachim of Flora, the Spiritualists among the Franciscans, the Hussites in the Middle Ages. And even the Reformers of the sixteenth century, who taught so impressively the sinfulness and corruption of man, fought a large part of their struggle against the Catholic Church with accusations against a corrupted Papacy and the unholiness of the Church generally.

No less in the life of the individual, the experience of an unholy Church in inner conflict with his faith almost always plays a significant role. When anti-clericalism breaks out somewhere, what charge is more often hurled against the clergy than that their lives are in contradiction to their preaching? What more frequently said than that Church-going Christians are no better than others and that therefore the Church has failed? Such reproaches and the attacks on faith which grow out of them are, humanly speaking, not wholly unjust. Here

after all is a Church proclaiming herself necessary for salvation, preaching in the name of the one holy God, declaring herself to be in possession of all truth and grace, insisting on being the only ark of salvation in the deluge of sin and corruption, believing that she must convert and save everyone. And it is precisely this Church, making such claims, that often seems to measure with a double standard. She preaches to poor tormented men the Sermon on the Mount with its "impossible" demands, but her official representatives seem personally to have let themselves off from these demands quite cheaply. Do they not seem to live in comfort? Are they not often greedy, arrogant, haughty? Are there not repeatedly scandals reaching into the ranks of their Religious orders, whose very purpose is to strive after sanctity and perfection? Are the "bad" popes a hostile epithet only or are they not historical fact? Have not even the sacred institutions of Catholicism been misused repeatedly throughout the world for sinful purposes: the confessional and the sacraments, the exploitation of the papacy for transparently political ends, etc.? That we are all men (so go the complaints) is not to be wondered at; and that even churchmen, ecclesiastical leaders, are men and sinners, in itself also is not astonishing. If it were only a question of this, it would be naturally unjust to probe the dark spots of Church history for her sins; but it is the Church herself who makes the claim to be essentially more than a human institution in which inevitably very human ways prevail. She insists that she is the representative of God in the world, the "holy" Church. She even declares that in herself she is through her "conspicuous holiness and inexhaustible fruitfulness of all good, a great and stable motive of credibility and an irrefutable witness of her divine mission" (Vat. Council, Denz. 1794). Precisely here is the crux: were the Church more modest, so runs the eternal objection of unbelief, we could be indulgent to her and forgive her everything we forgive ourselves. But because she sets herself up as the holy one, she must endure scrutiny of her life and history by norms and standards of judgment that exceed the human. But even then, is not the claim to holiness which she makes a unique presumption which proves rather precisely the opposite?

From yet a third angle the subject has relevance. It is not, that is, a question of how we as Christians who believe in the holiness of the Church meet our experience of unholiness there. More important is the dogmatic aspect, what, namely, Revelation itself says on the subject. In other words we do not wish at the moment to advert to the human indignation (we know perhaps better than earlier ages that "public opinion" even with considerable unanimity is a very problematic thing indeed, and that not uncommonly men will discover what they wish to discover), but to regard the Church's own testimony on this point of her unholiness. For the fact of the "Church of Sinners" is part of what the Church believes about herself. If someone, for example, with superficial optimism should pronounce the Church to be altogether perfect, she would not reply: Thank God here is someone finally who judges me with justice. Rather would she have to declare very bluntly: That is heresy and the truth concerning me is not in you; your indulgent spirit is wrong in that you have not taken into consideration the estimate of God Himself, either of that sanctity which He has bestowed on me His holy Church, or of the sanctity which I, the unholy Church of Sinners, surely lack; you yourself do not have the holiness you ought

to have, otherwise you would not believe that you had found perfection in me—any more than he who in his disillusionment berates me because I actually do not have it.

I

THE Church of God and of His Christ is a Church of Sinners. What this means can be considered under two headings: the sinners in the Church and the sinful Church.

1. It is a teaching of faith that sinners belong to the Church. Literally sinners, the eternally lost, can really and truly belong to the Church. This is a truth of faith which the Church has continuously taught from patristic times against Montanism, Novatianism, Donatism, through the Middle Ages against the Albigensians, the Fraticelli, against Wyclif and Hus, down to modern times against the Reformers, Jansenism and the Synod of Pistoia. The reverse proposition that sinners, deprived of grace and seen by God in His foreknowledge to be lost, do not belong to the Church, is a heresy definitely and conclusively condemned by the Church herself. Still it would be rash to say that this is an obvious fact which it is fantastic to question. It is actually far from obvious. There is merely this much obvious: there exists a civil, religious society called the Catholic Church and to it belong others besides the superficially respectable bourgeoisie, the good citizens, the paragons of virtue, and the genuine saints. So much is clear enough. But this is not what is normally meant in Catholic dogma by the terms "Church" and "sinner." For "Church" in the dogmatic concept is the visibility, the sacramental symbolism, the abiding presence of God and His grace in the world; it means the historical presence of Christ in the world until the dawn of His second coming and His manifestation in His Godhead. "Church" is the human thing which is bound up with the Divine, distinct from it certainly, but united. And the "sinner" in the Church is here not the man who on occasion falls short of the code of penal law, which can happen to the best of us. Rather the sinner in the proposition of faith is the man who really lacks the grace of God, who strays far from Him, whose destiny works itself out with fearful consequences to perdition. And it is *this* kind of sinner that belongs to *this* kind of Church. He is not merely registered as it were in her parish files; he is a part of her, he is a small bit of the concrete embodiment of God's grace in the world, a member of the Body of Christ. Is this a belaboring of the obvious? Or is it not rather a truth so inconceivable that it far outdistances everything which the protests of unbelief against the unholiness of the Church can marshal?

This specific truth of Revelation is notwithstanding in both Scripture and Tradition clearly indicated. The Kingdom of Heaven is likened to a net which draws in from the seas of the world both good fish and bad. Only on the shores of eternity will the angels of judgment sort out the bad catch from the good and cast it into the furnace (Mt. 13, 47-50). At the very wedding-banquet of Heaven some will sit down who have not on a wedding garment and these will shortly be tied hand and foot and cast out (Mt. 22, 11 ff). There are some who, like the virgins awaiting the bridegroom's arrival, have not enough oil for their lamps (Mt. 25, 1-13). There are "brethren" who through continued disobedience to the Church become finally like pagans and abandoned sinners (Mt. 18, 17). Even

the steward of the Lord's household can be cast out (Mt. 24, 45-51). Of the truths that the Lord teaches in these parables, the Apostles also give witness: there are sinners in the Church, men to whom the Spirit speaks: "I know your works; you are called living, but you are dead." Here is the terrifying aspect: one has actually the appearance of life, but is dead.

It was hard enough for the Church of the earliest centuries to accept this truth of faith without dismay, and even in St. Augustine, who enjoys, by virtue of his struggle with the Donatists, no little authority on this point in the history of dogma, it is not always quite clear whether, with his theories of wheat and chaff and of the free mingling of Jerusalem and Babylon, he always clearly and decisively regarded dead members as true members of the Mystical Body of Christ, or meant merely that the dividing line between these states is already drawn but reveals itself only at the end of time. In this respect the doctrinal consciousness of the Church has clarified itself in the course of time on our particular proposition that there are sinners and that they belong to the Church. In the Church are sin and rebellion. And these sins and shortcomings are a distinct part of the embodiment and manifestation of that divine salvation and grace which we call "Church."

This belonging of the sinner to the Church must necessarily be viewed from another angle, i.e., as negatively limited: the sinner does not belong in the same full sense as the non-sinner. For it is in the first place very obvious that one can and must speak of a belonging to the Church in whatever directions and dimensions the Church herself exists, and that whoever therefore does not belong in a single given dimension can not be regarded as her member in the fullest sense. Both Leo XIII in his encyclical "Satis cognitum" (1896) and Pius XII in "Mystici Corporis Christi" (to point only to more recent official teaching utterances) emphasize that it would be a kind of Nestorianism with regard to the Church and a rationalistic Naturalism to see in her no more than an external, legal organization, a mere visible society, a "confession" in the sociological sense of the word. She is rather the living Body of Christ, vitalized by the Holy Spirit of God, to Whose reality belong the divine life, the grace and the power of future aeons. But the sinner himself does not possess the Holy Spirit, it is clear; nor unfortunately does he belong to the Church in this full sense of the word. Now such a statement implies no contradiction to previously cited propositions from dogma in which the sinner is without qualification called a member of the Church. For in those propositions the concept "Church" is taken in the sense of the visible society, as only on that supposition could the absence of interior contrition in the sinner be inconsequential for his membership.

That this sense of "Church" is not in contradiction to the teaching just cited of Leo XIII and Pius XII will be clear from the following thoughts. The Church has so to say a sacramental structure. But in the concept of sacrament one must distinguish between sacramental sign as such (and the condition of its validity) and the sacramental sign insofar as it *de facto* produces the sacramental grace and is filled with it. Both aspects are perhaps best kept distinct, for in certain circumstances there can be a "valid" sacrament which does not produce grace in the recipient. Now the Church is, so to speak, the prime sacrament. Therefore here as well one must distinguish between the body of the Church insofar as it is visible as a symbol of grace, and the Church as a body insofar

as it is reality filled with grace, and, in consequence, also between a merely valid and a fruitful belonging to the Church. In the first category of membership is the sinner, but not in the second. Nor is it to be feared that by this distinction the abiding presence of sinners in the Church is diluted into a negligible business of some external, quasi-canonical sort. The point is the sinner belongs to the visible Church still, but that visible membership has ceased to be the effective sign of any invisible membership in a spiritually fruitful, holy community. The sinner has as it were given the lie to this sign (somewhat as when one receives a sacrament validly but illicitly), for he has defrauded the status which he enjoys of the significance and effectiveness to which it is ordained by its whole nature as the inner living bond of men with God and with each other in the Holy Spirit.

2. With that we come to the explicit affirmation of what this teaching of faith in all its austerity expresses: the Church is sinful. After what has so far been said, one can no longer in any context of faith maintain that there are sinners "in" the Church as in an external confessional organization, but that this carries no implication about the Church herself. For we have already seen that these sinners are, literally, according to traditional teaching, members, intimates, therefore a portion of the very visibility of the Church itself. This must now be further clarified. To see it more clearly we have to consider two things. If one should freely admit that there are sinners in the Church, but then maintain that this fact has nothing to do with the real Church, one would be implying an idealistic conception of the Church which is theologically very questionable. "Church" becomes an idea, an ideal, something which should be, a thing to which one can appeal from the concrete realities, something which can be approached merely but never quite realized. This kind of ideal one can naturally always cherish, one can acknowledge it, it is an intangible thing beyond contamination by the wretchedness of the every-day. But it will not be found in theology. There the Church is something very real: she is the one Church that is and is to be believed, in all circumstances and at all times the visible and validly organized sum total of the baptized and in her external profession of belief, in submission to the Roman pontiff, one. Of such a Church one can hardly say that she has nothing to do with the sins of her members. To be sure she does not sanction sin. Obviously there are in her ranks men (perhaps even many) who in some true sense must be reckoned saints. But if she is something real, and if her members are sinners and as sinners remain members, then she is herself necessarily sinful. Thus the sin of her children is spot and stain even on the Mystical Body of Christ. The Church is a sinful Church: it is part of her creed and no mere conclusion of experience. And it is terrifying.

IF WHAT we have said is true, then it is also obvious that the official leaders of the Church, those men whom the theologically untrained, portions of the Catholic laity included, regard as being in themselves in effect "the" Church (as if the layman were not also the Church and the leaders alone were her faithful image), can also be sinners and that such was and is actually the case in a very conspicuous way. Then it is once again so much the more clearly brought home, the concrete Church—again, only as 'concrete' is she a Church—

is a sinful Church. For it is obvious that the sin exists not only in the private life of the churchman but can enter very essentially into the concrete context of his activities as a representative of the Church as well. When the Church acts, guides, decides (or omits to decide when a decision should be made), when she preaches—and she should of course always preach in a way corresponding to the demands of the times and of the historical situation—these activities do not occur by abstract principle nor through the Holy Spirit alone. Rather is this entire activity of the Church the activity of concrete men. And if these men are sinful, if they are shamefully narrow, sinfully self-centered, insolent, self-willed, materialistic, sluggish, their sinful shortcomings will inevitably affect those actions which they perform in their capacity as churchmen and transact in the Church's name as concrete Church affairs. There is no teaching according to which the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, which is always with the Church, would restrict this influence of sin in Church leaders to their private lives and not permit it to invade the area of their work in the Church. To maintain otherwise would be to hold an unrealistic, abstract ideal of an invisible Church. Of course the individual Christian can brood over such influences.

He can also, if sin should be enjoined upon him—indeed at such times he must—refuse obedience, but where nothing sinful is enjoined he may not refuse even though he be certain that a command is at least partly inspired by a sinfully narrow, legalistic or willful spirit. In any case he can never object that such doings of churchmen are not the deeds of the Church. But this is to admit that the Church in her activity can be sinful. And that this happens contrary to the interior inspiration of the Spirit and against her own traditionally preached norms and laws is obvious. But it is surely the significant point in this phenomenon of the sinful Church that she herself can really so suffer and notwithstanding (in contrast to all human organizations fallen away from their primitive ideals) remains herself, the Spouse of Christ and the vessel of the Holy Spirit. She remains despite her sin the uniquely saving Church, from whose ranks one can never desert by having recourse to her own ideal, i.e., because she ostensibly is no longer what she "once" was (she never was!), what she should be and claims to be.

Let us add at once that we are not saying the Church is a mere paradoxical union of visible sin and hidden grace. She is holy because she stands always in vital union with Christ, the fountain of all holiness. She is holy because her whole history with all its glories and its scandals is pressing constantly in the energy of her vital principle, the Holy Spirit, towards that last day in which all her truth, her law and her sacraments are orientated, when God Himself unveiled will appear in the world. She is and remains infallible when she proposes in certain circumstances a solemn decision affecting faith or morals. Her sacraments, independently of the worthiness of their ministers, are of objective validity and effectiveness: in themselves holy and sanctifying their recipients. She has never succumbed to the temptation to accommodate the truth and the norms which her very human leaders preach, to the weakness and lukewarmness of men (how little obvious is this wonder of the power and grace of the Holy Spirit: yet the marvel recurs ever anew through the centuries!). She has at all times in a sinful world stood for the holiness of God and of His Christ, and if we should consider for a moment how readily men incline to order their

principles by their acts, we would acknowledge the eternal "contradiction" between the preaching of the Church's Gospel and the human practice of her preachers, not so much as scandal but as very proof of the effectiveness of the Spirit of God working in a holy Church. Indeed the Church is possessed in so many of her members, of an empirically recognizable sanctity, that even in her external appearance, for men of good will who are illumined by the grace of faith, she is a steady motive of belief and an incontrovertible evidence of her own divine mission. Through the centuries, in ways which have not always been obvious, she has been miraculously the ever-fruitful mother of saints, the holy Church, the Spouse of Christ whose aspect even now is assurance for the faithful that she will one day be the Bride who can enter without flaw into the wedding-feast of the Lamb. Naturally none of this gives the Church or us as her children the right to keep aloof, proudly and pharisaically from sin which, we must not forget, is not in the world merely, but in herself as well. The Church literally remains sinful, even in those respects in which she is much better than those outside her, although in a uniquely distinct way for she alone through her sins can disfigure Christ's "manifestation" in the world which she is, and conceal Him from men who must seek Him in death and life. If, however, there is both sanctity and sinfulness in the total manifestation of the Church, one is not thereby saying that they have the same relation to her hidden essence and belong to her in the same way. Her historically tangible sanctity is the real expression of what she is, of what she remains indestructably until the end of time: the presence on earth of God and of His grace. The Church is immeasurably more than a club or a canonical body or a confessional organization because the Holy Spirit of God has united Himself with her inseparably. The Holy Spirit, hidden in Himself, provides ever anew reminders of His abiding presence in the tangible sanctity of the Church. It is in the holiness—not in the sin—that the inner glory is reflected "image-wise", which is the imperishable heritage from which her form derives. And in contrast to all other historical creations, including the "church" of the Old Testament, the visibility of the Church can never become so disfigured by sin that the vitalizing Spirit would depart from her, or, remaining, no longer be able to be seen historically. For the power of death shall never overwhelm her (Mt. 16,18). The sin perceptible in the appearance of the Church is of course really inflicted upon the Church herself, in that she is essentially "body" and historically "form", and insofar as sin can exist in these dimensions. For the existential source of sin, i.e., the "heart", lies deep and obscure beneath the historical and the social, into which it always necessarily penetrates, when as a matter of fact it becomes the sin of the Church. But sin in the Church is never the expression of what the Church is in her own deepest living roots, but is rather the disguising contradiction of it; it is, so to speak, an external sickness in her body, not internal hereditary defect in her spirit. For guilt as such is always a contradiction of God and Christ; Who being Himself without sin suffered and conquered it; a contradiction of the Spirit of Christ, through which He sanctified His Bride by baptism in the word of life. The guilt is therefore also in contradiction to what the Church is. One cannot sin in order that the grace of God may be seen more abundantly (Rom. 3,5: 6,1) a truth threatened by a "sin-mysticism" or cult of a dialectic, gnostic kind today furtively spreading even among Catholics.

Hence the Church is never sinful in order that the grace of God may overflow more freely. Sin in her remains a reality which contradicts her essence; whereas her sanctity is a manifestation of that essence.

Now from this proposition follows closely another two-fold one. First: In the concrete order of salvation, at whose center is always the cross of Christ, sorrow for past sins, remorse, anxiety, even despair, can all serve to manifest and to cooperate in the fulfillment, as it were, of Calvary in the world.

When the Church suffers from sin, she achieves redemption from her guilt, for she suffers her guilt in Christ Crucified, because sin, since it is not in the secret recesses of the heart but in the world and thus also in the Church, remains sin (since the "heart" has necessarily to project its acts into the world). But at the same time sin is also the consequence of sin (because it is the embodiment of the secret malice of the heart), and being absorbed as such by the Church, gives her the possibility of atoning for it and conquering it. When we encounter sin in the Church we should not forget this. As a matter of fact, we do not normally take scandal so much at the sin of the Church as at its consequences. We are scandalized by the hardhearted cleric, for example, not so much because he is without charity before God, as because he is niggardly with us, or because his refusal hurts our pride in the Church whose members we are in the eyes of the world. It embarrasses us before unbelievers. Why do we not so love the Church that we humbly and silently put up with the disgrace of her sins? That would sooner make her holy than our protests against her scandals however right and just protesting may be, and however little the protesters themselves deserve to be blamed by the man who has not beforehand examined his conscience, recognized his own guilt and tried to improve. Second: If the sin in the Church is merely contradiction to her spirit, is distortion and sickness in her external form alone, sin is not therefore negligible. For the Church should be the manifestation of the grace and holiness of God in the world, the temple of the Holy Spirit. But sinners in the Church make this outer form of hers an expression rather of the evil of their hearts, a "den of thieves." Thus the frightful truth remains, however much one is obliged to stress that sin and sanctity in the Church's form do not bear an identical relation to her inner essence.

II

WE COME to our second heading: the man of sin confronted by the Church of sinners. We do not ask how and in what sense this Church of Sinners is simultaneously the holy Church. This question was at least implicitly contained in what has been said. Another question seems to us here more important, namely how we ourselves, the children and members of this Church, shall deal with the fact of her sinfulness. Or more precisely, what must be our own position, that this eternal scandal of the Church may not be to us a scandal only, but an impetus to the renewal of our own Christianity and through us of that of the Church? In the first place, this Church in her concreteness is *the* Church, the unique Church, the Church of God and of His Christ, the homeland of our souls, the place where alone we find the living God of grace and of eternal salvation. For this Church is one with Christ and God's Holy Spirit, distinct but

inseparable. From this Church there is no escape which could be toward salvation. One can seek freedom in an undisciplined private life. One can flee into a sect or something similar. There one may hear less about sin, punishment, scandal, and with these things be less burdened. Such a man may then protest that he has nothing to do with "this" Church; he is perhaps closer to his ideals—he is certainly not closer to God. Nor can one appeal from the concrete Church to another theoretical one. There is only that ideal which has united itself forever with this Church and forever abides in her alone. And from this ideal one has fallen away if one seeks to cut oneself off from the unity of this Church, from her love, her belief, her obedience for the sake of self-made ideals. Thus one can never in an *"aequivoca generatio"* seek to found the Church anew; she is for all times till the end of days founded by one Lord. One may by complaining, weeping, entreating, raging, accuse and flee from her—but only to her; one can never justly leave her. One cannot abandon her without in some measure losing that which one pretends to wish to preserve.

All spirituality however austere which no longer endures the "figure of the handmaid" and the "mark of the sinner" on the Church—in humility and love and with the forbearance and patience of God—is soon found to be romantic delusion. Similarly one must sacrifice the madness of remaining in the Church and asking to preserve the prerogative of choosing between the "divine" and the "all too human." Wherever and insofar as the Church herself does this, then we really have the same right, whether in theology, or church art, in prayers and approaches to God, to assume the freedom of the children of God, and no one may demand more of us—as Pius XI says, speaking of dogma—than what the Church, the one mother of us all, demands. The more fully we know this Church, her life and teaching, the more objectively and the more freely we listen to her, the more we are impressed with her breadth and her generosity in rescuing us from ourselves into the greatness of God even where she seems to be forever setting down limits and speaking harsh words. But if, on the other hand, we begin to distinguish in opposition to this distinction between divine and human which she herself proposes, then where do we have a guaranteed norm for our distinction? Where the guarantee that we are not indulging our own narrow taste, that we are not rejecting the Holy Spirit, when we attempt to curtail and to purify the human in the Church, when we think we are obliged to note abuses and to do away with them?

Nevertheless, even holding the orthodox position, the sincere believer will see sins and stains, scandal and rebellion in his mother. And if he is really a Christian (if his heart and eye are fixed on the uncompromise of the Gospel, perhaps more than in the case of most he can discern abuse) shall he conceal or minimize them? No. Naturally if he be a mature man he will not place himself on the side of those who would show their objectivity and liberalism by assembling from all corners of the past and present the scandals of the Church and at every opportunity displaying them before all who will or will not see. Also he will understand that the darker pages of a great history (and the Church's history is really great even if viewed from a purely human angle) need not necessarily constitute the chief content of a history primer for the immature. He will not say it is a falsification or blurring of history if the story of the Church is not made into a "chronique scandaleuse"; the history of the

Spirit of God operating in the Church is always more attractive than the recital of human wretchedness. Despite all this for the sincere Christian there will remain in the total story a conspicuous dark residue, and this darkness will confront him not merely when he examines church history; he shall have to meet it in his life, especially when he lives with the Church and the more he does. How this grim residue reacts on the individual will depend naturally in good part on his psychic temperament.

BUT when in fact we perceive sin unmistakably in the countenance of our Holy Mother, when we encounter within the precincts of God's house the sad realities of pride, vanity, commercialism, imperiousness, gossiping, double-book-keeping, narrowness—what actually should our attitude be? We shall see these things as men who intimately know from experience that they themselves are also sinners. When we see the sins of others we forget so easily that we are only too inclined to pray: "Lord, I thank Thee that I am not as one of these sinners here, these self-righteous Pharisees in the house of the Lord,"—in a word, that we ourselves can be Pharisees in the guise of humble publicans. When sin in the Church calls up our own sin into consciousness, when it brings us clearly face to face with our personal connivance—whether we be priests or laymen, great or small in God's kingdom—and the realization that it is our sins which are the sins of the Church, that we have contributed our part of the Church's poverty and plight (no less true because our own petty sins have not been recorded in the scandal chronicle of the Church) then we are in the healthy, Christian position to see the sins of the Church in the right light. We may then, perhaps, insofar as it lies within our power and line of duty, protest, complain, struggle and try to better: but we shall first and last weep for our own sins with which we too crucify the Son of God in His Church and darken the light of His Gospel for the world. And we shall carry and endure the disgrace of the Church as our own; she is in reality ours because whether we will or no, we belong to her and we have sinned in her. So shall we rejoice in the comfort of God, inconceivable and to the world forever incomprehensible, which He gives to us, each singly: a Mother whose sin is encompassed in His own mercy, whom He blesses and sanctifies, in and despite her daily sin, who never puts her trust in her own strength but in God's mercy alone which is grace and not merit.

When we can see the sin of the Church in this light, our eyes will increasingly turn to the hidden and the manifest glory and holiness of our Mother. If often we see little of it, it is not because we look into the world and on the Church with admirable exactitude and critical realism, but because our eye is the eye of the self-satisfied sinner, limited and ensnared. But happily when once we have wept honestly over the sin of the Church and for our own sins, when once we have begun to admit our personal guilt and see that all true holiness is a wonder of God and of grace and not a human vanity, then this eye of ours, washed with the tears of repentance, does become clear-sighted to the holy wonder of God working in His Church. The every-day is seen as new: her hands, despite all, overflow today as always with graces; she now and always administers the sacraments of Christ; from her heart rise unceasingly the imploring of the Spirit and its inexpressible groaning; the angels of God ever and again

waft up like incense to the throne of the Most High the prayers of the just of this Church; her lips continue to preach the Word of God, faithfully and inexorably in the clear constancy and steadfastness of love; in her motherly womb she continues to conceive life for her children; the Spirit of God raises up for her endlessly holy sons—children and wise men, prophets and hidden men of prayer, heroes and humble bearers of crosses—and in her, till the end of time the redemption of the Lord recurs. And we shall always be able to pray, even if in tears—be they tears of repentance or of joy—I believe in the holy Church.

The Scribes and the Pharisees—they are not in the Church alone but everywhere and in all disguises—will always drag “the sinful woman” before the Lord and accuse her (with secret satisfaction that she is, thank God, no better than themselves)—“Lord, this woman has been taken again in adultery. What sayest Thou?” And this woman will not be able to deny it. No, it is scandal enough. And there is nothing to extenuate it. She thinks only of her sins, because she has rarely committed them, and she forgets (how could the humble maid do otherwise?) the hidden and shining nobility of her holiness. And so she does not attempt a denial. She is the poor Church of Sinners. Her humility, without which she would not be holy, knows only her guilt. She stands before Him to Whom she is espoused, Who has loved her and given Himself up for her to sanctify her, who knows her sins better than all her accusers. But He is silent. He writes down her sins in the sand of world history which—with her guilt—will soon be effaced. He is silent a little while, which to us seems thousands of years. And He judges this woman only through the silence of His love which gives grace and absolves. In every century new accusers confronted this “woman”, and stole away, one after another, beginning with the eldest, for there was not one who found her who was himself without sin. And in the end the Lord will be alone with the sinner. He will turn and gaze at His fallen Spouse, and ask: Woman, where are they who accuse thee? Has no man condemned thee? And she will reply with unspeakable remorse and humility: No man, Lord. The Lord will go to her and say: Then neither will I condemn thee. He will kiss her brow and say: My Spouse, my holy Church.

Translated by WILLIAM F. GLEESON

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CATHOLICISM

MARYSE CHOISY

I HAVE the habit of taking the bull by the horns. That is why I will cite Freud's worst book right away. In this book, though keeping the psychical separated from the chemical, he remains attached to the atheistic ideas fashionable in the university world of the 19th century; this is the book in which he attempts to destroy religion. In *The Future of an Illusion* Freud himself had the honesty to trace a line of demarcation between the psychoanalytic method and his personal *Weltanschauung*. At the end he even adds loyally: "Nevertheless the defenders of religion have an equal right to use psychoanalysis in order to appreciate truly the affective importance of religious doctrine."

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How describe the shock which that little phrase gave me? It was precisely this which indicated to me the call that every authentic writer knows at least once. I wanted to accept this challenge. It was after reading this that I had the idea of creating *PSYCHE*.

It is then with Freud's permission that I am able to place the analytical method at the service of my spiritual convictions. Even if I am as pious as Freud is atheistic, no one can reproach me for lack of scientific rigor or even lack of Freudian orthodoxy, so long as I use the analytic method as it ought to be used. My procedure is legitimate. Freud corrects Freud.

What matters for Catholics is not the starting-point of a scientific doctrine but where it arrives, its real end and not that which was intended. In science more than in any other domain, hell is paved with good intentions. The end which one proposes to oneself, like every *a priori*, falsifies rigorous procedure. I often cite the paradox of Pasteur and Freud. Pasteur started out from religion and had a religious purpose in his research. He wanted to refute spontaneous generation, an annoying idea for the Church at that time—today it certainly wouldn't be. And Pasteur ended up with the most materialistic concept of medicine which has ever existed, one which knew only local symptoms and pharmaceutical specialties, while the curative or destructive power of the psyche went for nothing.

Freud, imbued with mechanistic prejudices about the physical universe, wished to prove that the psyche itself was an ensemble of automatisms and easily-aroused psychic mechanisms. In order to show that everything is illusion he attacked the last defenses where irrational humanity had taken refuge: sleep

and love. But starting with the moment when the psychic structure won its independence from physiology, and even learned how to influence it, a path was cut from matter to spirit. From the moment that he recognized a reality proper to the psychic life, from the moment when he discovered by his patient method that man can also free himself from his mechanisms, Freud emerged towards a psychology open on all sides, even towards heaven. Pasteur and Freud are the most amusing ironies of the fate of thinking humanity. The ways of science seem as obscure as those of Providence. That is why a scholar needs a great deal of freedom in his researches and the theologian needs a great deal of farsightedness and patience for their direction.

PSYCHOANALYSIS has simply refuted the ontological argument. Kant had already done this before Freud. By his insistence on the mechanism of projective illusion psychoanalysis has made us more suspicious. The fact that we intensely desire an object is not only not a proof of its existence but offers strong probability that it exists only in our imagination. Nevertheless Freud himself puts us on guard against the opposite excess into which we fall too easily. That which we ardently desire, even for neurotic reasons can also be true. Men desired to fly. One day they arrived at the construction of airplanes. To take Freud's example: when a young girl dreams that a prince will marry her, this dream is not necessarily false. "Cases of this kind have occurred."

Analytical suspiciousness always cuts both ways. One may also be an atheist for neurotic reasons. The need of rational explanations itself needs to be explained.

The philosophic systems which propose to explain rationally all of universal life while leaving no place to the irrational (i.e., to that which has not yet found explanation) have been compared, as we know, to systems proper to paranoiac delirium. It is certain that such systems particularly respond to the needs of the paranoiac. These symptoms proceed precisely from the obsession that he experiences of rationally explaining his interior irrational tendencies by exterior universal life... The fact that there is always a crowd of psychopaths to follow a new system, an invention or a new scientific theory, physical or philosophical, for example, perhaps finds its explanation in such intimate rapports between the elaboration of a system and paranoia.¹

Let us be quite exact, and remember that the Freudians gave the word "magic" a meaning which does not correspond to current usage. If the criterion of the "sovereignty of ideas" is applied, one may say that the final representatives of the magic-bound mentality are not herb-doctors, but precisely the mathematicians and the "scientists". They flee from contact with the real and want to impose *their* formulas and *their* statistics on the facts. The man who pretends to dispense with the hypothesis of God ends by believing himself God. Either as the sin of pride discussed by the theologian or the paranoia familiar to the psychiatrist, what characterises the "magician" is that he utilizes cabalistic words or algebraic signs. The divorce between abstract imagination and real life betrays the "magic mentality".

It would be absurd then to think that God does not exist because we have a religious need, or because, as Freud wrote, "the religious need comes from the infantile state of absolute dependence," or again because we have transferred to an invisible being the love that we had for a father who deceived us. One might as easily demonstrate the neurotic motives of the atheist.

I have always felt sorry for the atheist. I would never have been able to breathe in his atmosphere of implacable puritanism. Only the observation of orphans and illegitimate children has made me understand why the ethical code of the unbeliever is more inhuman than the pious man's attempt at perfection. The atheist finds himself in the position of the baby who has lost one of his parents in his earliest infancy. Fortunate is the child who has disobeyed, but can ask forgiveness from living parents. He can win them over. He can reconquer their love. This gives a creative liberty to his conduct. But we know, through numerous clinical cases, that the orphan holds himself responsible for the death of his father. In his unconscious, it is as if he had killed him. He experiences a great culpability for it. In order to make reparation he makes the dead father's code his own, with all the rigidity of someone who will never change again. No mother lives who can soften this rigid image of reality.

The atheist is in the same relationship to God (I am speaking *psychologically*) as the orphan to his dead father. He has killed God. But he has assumed his code. And no one can pardon him any longer if he does not measure up to this code.

The objection will be made that there are certain "right-thinking" people who have a conformism as rigorous, as ungenerous, as narrow, and as uncharitable as that of atheistic puritans. I have not had the honor of sounding the depths of faith in the psyche of these devout people. But I do not know why I suddenly think of Léon Bloy's famous phrase: "the theoretical atheism of the unbelievers and the practical atheism of the believers".

Besides, was Freud as atheistic as he says? He asserts it too much. He himself has taught us to be suspicious of absolute assertions. Talleyrand's "Everything that is exaggerated is insignificant" is translated into the language of psychoanalysis as "Everything which is exaggerated contains a contrary element". Was there not rather an ambivalence in Freud in regard to religion? He is so anxious to convince me that I am not quite convinced. When he forgets that he is an atheist, sometimes it happens that he writes—doubtless, unconsciously—a mystical page of fine execution. He even goes on to maintain that *civilization is a development apart, unrolling above humanity*. He comes to discover a transcendence of the human. And he adds that

this development would be to the service of Eros, and would wish, in this title, to re-unite isolated individuals, later on families, then tribes, peoples, then nations, in one vast unity, humanity itself. Why is this a necessity? We know nothing of that; it would be precisely the work of Eros. These human masses have to be united *libidinalement* among themselves; necessity alone, or the advantages of work in common, would not give them the wished-for cohesion.²

MOREOVER I believe that the moralists have been more severe on Freud than the mystics. At root there is a grievous misunderstanding here. Psycho-

analysis has never wanted to prescribe but to *describe*. This is the distinction one must make between psychology and ethics. When Freud discovered certain traits of human behaviour, he kept himself from assigning any value to them. He registered facts and in accordance with them searched for useful attitudes. A few pragmatic considerations were able to be drawn from them. But facts ought never to frighten the observer. Like every science, psychoanalysis is neither moral nor immoral. Authentic morality exists for it only when man is completely free. As long as he is neurotic, he is not responsible. In this is not psychoanalysis in accord with theology which teaches us that it is necessary to be fully conscious in order to sin?

By this method of sounding unconscious motivations psychoanalysis simply places us on guard against false morality, false religion, false merit. Thus it eliminates, it cleans house.

I am always astonished too when certain pious authors, perhaps moved by a sickly fear of sexuality, prefer Adler. Probably they are not very familiar with either Freud or Adler; it is their only excuse. To me it seems contrary to the Catholic tradition to consider the desire for power more important than love. What becomes of the virtue of humility? Ambition does not attain and by its nature would not know how to approach a spiritual life. How would it start out from the tight cage of its ego of flesh? It closes all the passage-ways. Love—even in its base forms—is the only energy capable of leaving a closed circle of egoism and of cutting a path between two souls. Lucifer believed himself God's equal, just like Adler's neurotics. He wanted to surpass his father. He fell into a hopeless and bottomless abyss. But the love of Christ was able to transform Mary Magdalene and Angelo de Foligno into saints, in spite of—or perhaps because of—the nature of their sins which left intact their capacity for love. Starting with Freud's libido it is possible to glide to the superior level of the *Agape*. But the Adlero-Nietzschean will-to-power leads to the total drying up of sensibility. When he wanted to pass from individual psychology to moral considerations, Adler was forced to postulate a "social interest". The Adlerian sentiment of inferiority finally results in an over-compensation of pride. The Freudian sentiment of inferiority dissolves itself in the course of perfection. The purpose that is aimed at: to become more lovable.

I can understand better how a religious man would be more attracted by Jung than Freud. Jung was the first to re-establish the place of the divine in the norms of the psyche. He insisted on the reality of the myths. I have already shown in *l'Anneau de Polycrate* how the archetypes of the collective unconscious may be useful to the theologian, in order to preserve, as valuable, the place of the marvelous in the Christian patrimony, since those who apply only the criteria of the natural sciences have difficulty in accepting it.

But Jung's position remains uncertainly between two extremes. The theologian perceives very soon that under the psychic levels governed by the principle of the logos, Jung has rediscovered the cults of the pagan deities, and these he cannot obey.

Then the Catholic realizes that it is more difficult to go from Jupiter to Jesus than from a materialistic method to the doctrine of the Church. I believe that the theologian prefers the lack of presuppositions of a rationalist in which he can set down his doctrine, rather than a mystical pagan construction that it

will be necessary to adapt—if indeed, such adaptation is possible—to Catholic requirements.

In addition, Latin minds, fond of rigor and clarity, object to the obscure side of Jung, his very religiosity. With Jung we lose on both counts. The Jungian demonstration becomes a begging of the principle in question. Personally I admire Jung very much, but for the work that I have to undertake, I need an indisputably scientific base. To materialists I wish to speak the language of materialists. When you mention Jung, Cartesians turn this into an argument:

—Surely you see that the Freudian method is inseparable from atheism. One cannot be a Freudian and a Catholic at once. Jung is a religious mind, but cloudy and anti-scientific. You cannot then make anything spiritual starting out from solidly-established scientific knowledge.

If one applies a Cartesian norm to this Cartesian reasoning, it appears irrational enough. Just because the bridge with Freud has not yet been made, does not mean that it cannot be done. That is precisely what I proposed to myself.

What are the difficulties between Catholicism and Freudianism? I see only three, all more apparent than real:

1. the Freudian theory of sexuality.
2. the question of determinism and freedom.
3. the unconscious feeling of guilt and the dogma of sin.

Let us examine them one by one a little more deeply.

Sexuality

FREUD employed the term *libido* in its etymological sense of appetite, desire (non-sexual), according to an old Latin tradition of all the doctors in Europe, destined certainly to over-compensate their weakness in terminology. In Germany this use of *libido* has not led to any unfortunate results. We encounter first of all a semantic problem. Freud himself has explained it.

Libido is an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by that name the energy (regarded as a quantitative magnitude, though not at present actually measurable) of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word love. The nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists (and this is what is commonly called love, and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this—what in any case has a share in the name 'love'—on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friendship and love of humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas. Our justification lies in the fact that psychoanalytic research has taught us that all these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctive activities; in relations between the sexes these instincts force their way towards sexual union, but in other circumstances they are diverted from this aim or are prevented from reaching it, though always preserving enough of their original nature to keep

their identity recognizable (as in such features as the longing for proximity, and self-sacrifice). We are of the opinion, then, that language has carried out an entirely justifiable piece of unification in creating the word 'love' with its numerous uses, and that we cannot do better than take it as the basis of our scientific discussions and expositions as well. In proceeding in this way, in 'enlarging' the conception of love, the psychoanalyst has created nothing new. The Eros of Plato presents a complete analogy with this love-energy,³ with the libido of psychoanalysis, both in its origins, its manifestations, and its relation to sexual love, and when, in his famous epistle to the Corinthians, the apostle St. Paul boasts of love and puts it above all the rest, he certainly conceives of it in this 'enlarged' sense. It seems, therefore, that men do not always take their great thinkers seriously, even when they pretend to admire them.⁴

This conception of "tying", uniting, that Freud introduces in the definition of libido is essential. In a chapter on collective psychology, he explains the cohesion of the group by the ties of love among its members. Moreover, he insists: "With the discovery of the narcissistic libido and with the extension of the notion of the libido to each particular cell, the sexual instinct has become the Eros which seeks to reunite the parts of the living substance, and maintain their cohesion." And again: "It is thus that the libido of our sexual instincts corresponds to the Eros of the poets and philosophers, to the Eros which assures the cohesion of all that lives."⁵ Finally Freud often speaks of the "desexualized libido" or the "non-sexual libido".

In his last book *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (Norton, 1949) which constitutes in a way his analytical testament, Freud employs Eros more often than libido and says expressly: "the sexual function which indeed, in the popular view, if not in my theory, coincides with Eros".⁶ Thus in his theory, Eros does not completely coincide with sexuality.

For Freud sexuality itself has a larger meaning when he writes, "The greatest part of our cultural heritage and of our noblest values have been acquired at the expense of sexuality and by the restriction of forces of sexual motivation."⁷

Sexuality then plays an essential role in the "pattern of behaviour". The intellectual or spiritual conception, the creation of new social values, follow the same rules as biological conception, and are elaborated on the same model. In mysticism, art, science, human relations, creative activities, man conducts himself like a man in love. Sexual symbolism then is not a rhetorical image or an erotisation of thought (as superficial anti-Freudians have maintained), but the key of personality itself, the first mould of its destiny. That is why Freud could say that every time he found a social inadaptation or a professional failure, something also was disturbed in the sexual order.

Can one even speak of sublimation when there is a behavior-constant, whatever may be the level on which it may be grasped? In the fullest degree sex is a manner of being. But it is a manner of being *by rapport to another*. The saints, who have employed, before the troubadours, a language of love in their relations with the divine, have understood this. As Bergson demonstrated, it is the lovers who are the plagiarists. Love and war are the only possible

ties. Indifference isolates the individual, cuts contact with all the other members of the group. For a long time I have been struck by the biblical expressions, "Adam knew Eve", "Abraham knew Sara". It certainly seems that the Old Testament considers the sexual relation as an essential mode of knowledge. Without love beings are only what they appear: shades. Love is that immense fire in the gleam of which one finally sees the interior reality. It lights up the most secret and the most unconscious mechanisms. It is the reaction-constant of every being.

This constant point of reaction is fixed very early in childhood. The first bonds of love and hate have been tied with the family. Thus the family structure establishes the fundamental mould. The pivot of the family structure is the mother. It is the mother who determines the degree of ambivalence in the baby, and the future conflicts of the man. It is the mother that he absorbs with his first drop of milk and it is on the mother that he makes his first projections. The mother is the first being that he loves and hates at once. He loves her when she caresses him and gives him her milk. He hates her when she withdraws from him and frustrates his desires. A nursing infant is total in his reactions. He does not know of impartiality. The drama of man is that the first object of his love is also the first object of his aggression. It is an irreducible starting-point. The nursing child is exclusive. He wants his mother for himself alone. The duel of Abel and Cain is inscribed in the personal proto-history of each of us. The hostility of the baby rushes against the intruder who claims the attention of his mother, against the mother herself who dares to smile at another. This first infidelity will determine the future jealousy of the man. Or, on the contrary, by virtue of the tendency to repetition, he will seek unconsciously to reproduce this betrayal in his spouse or even in his friends. A reaction-formation may develop itself which will mix these two attitudes.

The first anger of the baby is a shock at the personal reaction of the mother. The baby is already clever. He has quickly understood. He learns to lie before speaking. For fear of losing his mother's love he checks his movement of aggression. But from that movement an element of ambivalence is in play. From this dawn hate is mixed with love. It will remain indissolubly attached to it and later on will vitiate all our love relationships, family, social, and even spiritual. One never loves intensely without hating a little at the same time. The inverse proposition is also true. In *The Trojan War Will Not Take Place*, Giraudoux speaks of "this fraternity of battles". There is always a warmth of friendship among hereditary enemies. There is the reason why psychoanalysis has a tendency to suspect the purity of excessive sentiments.

It is also in this light that we ought to consider the Oedipus complex, which in the beginning caused a scandal because it struck against a taboo, especially since it was badly understood. Freud has *never* said that the son *always* loves his mother and hates his father. He *also* loves his father. The drama is that his father is *also* the husband of his mother. The drama is that it is necessary for him to take on the risk of competing with his father, to go beyond him in order to become a man. Moreover, the Oedipus complex was already expressed by Diderot, before Freud:

"If the little savage was abandoned to himself, if he should keep all his imbecility and if he should unite the violence of passion of a man of thirty

with the bit of reason of the child in the crib, he would cut his father's throat and sleep with his mother."⁸

The Freudian theory of sexuality not only ought not to frighten the Catholic, but it is also of great use in judging the authenticity of the highest mystical values and in distinguishing, in extreme cases, between holiness and neuroticism. If our relations with God are relations of love, the supernatural grafts itself on our natural psychical structure. If at the start there is neuroticism in the relations of the baby with his family, the highest manifestations of love can be contaminated by this behaviour-constant.

Thus chastity ought always to be a sacrifice to the greatest love. Sometimes it is. But chastity can also spring from a neuroticism. Sometimes it can become a flight from the risks of human love. How then would one risk martyrdom for Christ? All of the love of charity would be contaminated by this lack of generosity. It is a psychological mechanism which every master of novices, every spiritual director ought to take into consideration. Too often the Christian choice is made on the basis of a negative virtue, on a fear of risk, on a flight from love, while on the contrary it ought to be the choice of the best out of an ardor, an élan, an overflow of life. Behaviour in love is the mobilisation of sexuality for the adoration of a value. Sexuality ought to be healthy in order not to vitiate adoration itself. Our religious life, like our sexual or social life, can serve as vehicle or means of expression of an infantile or morbid affectivity.

Determinism and free decision

Because Freud has revealed certain fundamental structures in the psychic structure, superficial critics have complained too quickly of determinism. "To accept oneself" has been interpreted illogically as resigning oneself. But for the Freudian "to accept" means to resolve by a psychological integration a conflict which opposes the subject to himself or to a situation. For example, for a woman it is to be in conflict with herself, or with a situation, if she does not accept her femininity. It is the same for a subject who does not accept his aggressivity: in this example, to accept it does not consist in giving it free rein, but in recognizing it as a utilisable element of personality while ridding oneself of the feeling of culpability to which it gives birth.—The acceptance differs from pure and simple adaptation, for it is possible to adapt oneself otherwise than by a psychological integration, notably in a neurotic manner. Acceptance differs from resignation by its positive and constructive attitude, especially since resignation and voluntary consent may allow a conflict to remain in the unconscious.

Liberty is born when determinisms are totally integrated. Freudian determinism is the liberty to create by starting out from mechanisms known and accepted. Thus it is only when the handling of a car has become automatic that the driver can freely find the proper rate of speed to avoid the accident at a dangerous curve. The driver who is less well determined by the possibilities of the car will do what he was taught, which may not fit this particular circumstance, and he will probably end up in the ditch. Liberty is born precisely from this perfect determination. All of psychoanalysis consists in passing from the conformism of the super-ego to the creative élan of the ideal of the ego.

The ego-ideal is the projection of a model. This complex notion ought to take into account gifts, a destiny already chosen or unconsciously foreseen, ten-

dencies, possibilities, and up to a certain point the reality-principle. At least it is necessary to know that there is a reality-principle, even if the ideal of the ego has decided to fight against it. But the man's ability to change and his capacity to defy the reality-principle is also contained in the reality-principle. The ego-ideal is a point around which scattered energies are condensed and put in order. In surmounting the impulses from one side, as well as the anachronistic rules of the super-ego and the psychic mechanisms and automatisms, the ideal of the ego conquers its liberty. It is free to the degree that it conceives of itself as it is, or moves, changes, and transforms itself in order to become what it thinks it is. It is an existential choice, an engagement. The ego-ideal is a creator; the super-ego is a copyist. The ego-ideal is a germinative image, corresponding to what I named (in *l'Anneau de Polycrate*) for lack of better term, *the angel of vocation*. Is it not this which sometimes pulls the strings behind the Neanderthalian super-ego and unconsciously gives rise to some defeats in order to better nourish a future success? Hayden has compared it to the idea of the statue which guides the sculptor during all his efforts to realize his work. Born of an influence exercised by people from the outside, the super-ego always keeps this insipid taste of obligation and duty. The ego-ideal is a child of love. It lives its freely adopted morality with exaltation. We pass from commandments to norms, from determination by others to auto-determination. The super-ego represents a closed morality. The super-ego is the past. The ego-ideal is the future. But the future is already sleeping in the past, and it never happens that the future completely rids itself of the heavy baggage of the past. That is why a super-ego imbibed in a neurotic family atmosphere can contaminate the highest value of the ego-ideal itself. Dom Jerome J. Hayden has already attempted, in a Thomistic context, an excellent distinction between the super-ego and the ego-ideal. For him the ego-ideal is

the mental type according to which the efficient cause produces its effect. Saint Thomas describes it thus: "Idea est forma, quam aliquis imitatur ex intentione agentis determinante sibi finem" (De Veritate, Q. 3, a 1.) From the subjective point of view, it is an intellectual act of the efficient cause, and in as much as it is an act of the intellect, it determines an inclination of the will. For this reason such a concept is called *ideo-motor* by nature because it bears with it the tendency towards its own realization. Objectively speaking, the ego-ideal plays the role of exemplary cause, whose influence is complex because it becomes at once efficient, final and formal causality.⁹

Psychoanalysis is distinguished from classical psychology and all other disciplines precisely by its dynamic vision. Everywhere else definitions have a taste of prison and death. Physiological temperament or character signs bear the mark of fatality. It is a static division in time and space. The other sciences give us as an account of man only the image of a butterfly pinned up in a collection. Psychoanalysis attempts to seize the butterfly in mid-flight and the caterpillar in its changes. It does not despair of any soul.

Indeed, where but in psychoanalytical circles would such a conversation

take place? "Don't you find Untel much better than he was six months ago? He could be given a post of responsibility . . ."

It seems to me too that Freud's emphasis on causality can be helped out by Adler's understanding of finality. The neurotic symptom represents a compromise between Jung's idea of motivating archetypes and Freud's defense mechanism and, quite unconsciously, is integrated towards a useful finality. In considering symptoms, Freudian thought, genetically oriented, puts the emphasis on a failing evolution, the check, the end that is not attained, while Adler immediately looks for its benefit and compensation.

The unconscious feeling of culpability and sin

AT THE present moment this is doubtless the greatest difficulty that psychoanalysis presents for a Catholic. Nevertheless, Freudian doctrine on the unconscious feeling of culpability is reduced purely and simply to a semantic problem. How can one have an *unconscious* feeling? How can one feel that which by definition is hidden from you? It is rather of "guilt behaviour" that one should speak. Is there even a question of guilt here?

I realized that the unconscious guilt-feeling was very badly named, and was part of a hazy idea, the day when some of my Catholic friends, who were not psychoanalysts but were well-disposed to listen to me, could not grasp, in spite of many explanations, that this pathological feeling of guilt had nothing in common with original sin.¹⁰

Could not this false culpability be a defense mechanism against something very old: the feeling of insecurity? We are not returning completely to the trauma of birth, but rather to an atmosphere of agony which hovers over the early days of life. In reality, this sense of insecurity, a blood relative of the trauma of birth, corresponds to a general evolution of psychoanalysis, which little by little has abandoned the doctrine of the original trauma in favor of a traumatic environment. Clinical cases of children have convinced the majority of practitioners today that a single shock—no matter how great—does not automatically lead to neuroticism, especially if the ego is strong, while passing the first years of childhood in a neurotic family milieu will lead to the sowing of several somatic or character difficulties. It is the story of the proverbial drop of water. . .

The feeling of insecurity seems directly attached to the condition of the nursing child, which perceives itself powerless, delivered up to all the dangers of a hostile world. The cutting of the umbilical cord leaves him in a state of pitiable fragility. The mother separates herself, and with her the source of life and security is separated. Who would not feel anguish? There is the chief event, the most unhappy of the human story. The sadnesses that will follow will only be pale reflections. What sad traces must it leave in the memory, this first passage from the maternal uterus to this place of innumerable failures, this clawed world where even in sucking air we begin by choking, and have to make painful efforts with our lungs. In the universe of the nursing child how many times is this original change repeated? It is then not uniquely the initial trauma

of birth, but *all* the new situations to which it will be necessary to adapt oneself which create a real insecurity in the life of the baby.

The psychoanalysts are not the only ones to note these observations. In order to verify my theories, I will cite examples borrowed from very varied sources. Mme. Maria Montessori gives four cases:

- a) A little girl who has an attack of convulsions because an umbrella was put on a table where it did not belong.
- b) A baby angry at the second nurse who gives him a bath while holding his head with her right hand and his feet with her left hand, whereas the first nurse does the opposite.
- c) A nursing child who gets sick because he is put to sleep in a bed instead of his familiar crib.
- d) A little girl who cries because her mother has changed her over-coat.¹¹

Mme. Montessori explains these things because of children's special sensibility to order. But this very "sensibility to order" needs to be explained. It is of the same family as ritual. We know to what a degree ritual appears to be a defense mechanism against the agony brought on by insecurity.

Certainly Mme. Montessori's last example is the most classic. I myself was present at an agonized attack accompanied by tears and loud cries for four hours from a little girl seven months old. Her mother, brunette the previous evening, suddenly came home that morning from the hair-dresser as a platinum blond.

We find this panic among the animals too, at the sudden change of a familiar being. In circuses and zoos, there is the same experience. The animal-tamers change, but the uniform remains the same. I have recounted¹² how, because of putting on a different costume, an animal-tamer was attacked by a lion, who was gentle enough but very timid.

Certainly the feeling of insecurity is more intense in man, because man's childhood is longer.

J. C. Flugel has also taken into consideration the neuroticisms peculiar to displaced persons and to many emigrants.¹³ Erich Fromm penetrates still further into the feeling of insecurity and defense mechanisms when he shows how men's agony in the face of liberty leads them either to put themselves under the orders of a dictator, or, in the democracies, to escape into "the conformism of the automatic".¹⁴ Even the blind obedience to fashion, even the every-day fact of wearing the styles decreed by the leading dress-designers, are defense-mechanisms against the feeling of insecurity.

It appears certain that man can bear liberty only with difficulty. It is on this point that Mme. Montessori's methods are worth re-examining. A totally free universe leaves more doors open to unknown peril, asks more risks, and forces us to *live dangerously*. Only those who are capable of living dangerously are ready for perfect democracy. But how many are capable of this? Man has achieved his growth when he is reconciled with insecurity and risk. But how many are capable of this reconciliation? This throws a new light on transition-periods like our own when insecurity reigns supreme and reactivates the first agonies of the nursing child.

Rather than expose oneself to so many dangers which arise from all sides, would it not be more worth-while to gather them into one, or accept only one,

which will be the intermediary? A single known danger is less agonizing than a hundred unknown perils. The child has soon understood this principle of economy in agony. He agrees to submit himself blindly to one person: mother, or a substitute for mother, on condition that she protect him against all the blows of the world. This unconscious pact is at the base of every resignation of liberty to the profit of an authority: mother, master, dictator.

It is necessary to point out that the moment when the child begins to organize his security, he is at the height of an animistic period. At this time danger possesses his personality. Fire burns because the child has disobeyed a requirement (unknown to him) of fire. We see how culpability installs itself at the very center of insecurity. The fundamental feeling is insecurity. Culpability grafts itself as a false causal relationship. This false culpability has nothing in common with original sin, no more than a religion based on the servile fear of hell or on the hope of material advantages obtained by prayer constitutes an authentic piety, although it may be the frame from which an authentic piety will develop.

THIS first unconscious feeling of culpability is based, therefore, on an animistic interpretation of the dangers which menace the baby. It is here a question of a false causal relationship which shares more with pagan superstition than with the Christian sense of sin.

Nevertheless even the blind obedience to the mother or to the substitute for the mother does not give the child a total guarantee against insecurity. The mother may stop loving him. The mother may leave him. Finally, the child may be—and generally is—deceived in his illusion of the absolute power of his parents, which is, indeed, one of the greatest causes of insecurity. Again he will face the universe alone—an enigma which becomes a danger every time it changes. It is certainly under the shock of this agony, confronted with the risk of losing the unique intermediary which protects him against exterior danger—changes that he implants the mother (or her substitute) within himself in order never to be separated from her again. Now he carries within himself this terrible and benevolent tyrant, as a charm against perils. The super-ego itself becomes in some way a defense mechanism against the feeling of insecurity. It is better to endure the slavery of a single entreaty, whose rules are known—always present, since one has incorporated it within oneself—than fear a hundred pleas, whose requirements are unknown. That automatism, that conformism, and that museum-like rigidity which has so surprised us in the super-ego is now better understood. The fact is that the super-ego has come into being as a defense mechanism against the agony of change. It is the only stable element in the midst of dynamic impulses, of “bovaryesques” tendencies, in a world in perpetual evolution. Against death—and change is also a death just as it is a birth—man wished to construct an immobile eternity in himself. In the psychic economy it is a buoy in the midst of that ocean which is liberty. Illegitimate children, even when they have not known the Oedipus-situation, even when they have not loved anyone, implant their social group within themselves, and set up a super-ego with the most inhuman counsellors, in order to defend themselves against the feeling of insecurity.

Still another aspect is cleared up if the super-ego is examined in the light of the feeling of insecurity. Every psychoanalyst has been embarrassed by this clinical fact: that very gentle parents may give a severe super-ego. Several explanations have been attempted: they have not been very convincing. Freud, for example, wrote that the "super-ego of the child is not really formed according to the model of the parents, but according to the model of the super-ego of the parents"⁵. This would mean that each time we were confronted with a very severe super-ego and very gentle parents that the child had the super-ego of a Jansenist ancestor. . . Why not think, as Flugel suggests, that a frustrated child could add some personal sadistic projections in the image of the parent whom he had assumed into his being?¹⁶ Indeed the super-ego is not only a simple absorption. The super-ego appears to us as an implanting of the parents + an implanting of the frustrations of the exterior world + the projection of a defense mechanism against these same frustrations. Let us examine this projection more attentively. Ernest Jones thinks that the real aggressivity of the parents is a negligible factor compared to its "exploitation" by the child in order to rationalize his fantastic agonies which, moreover, are themselves only the projection of his own aggressivity on the image of the parents.¹⁷ Flugel also insists on the alternating rhythm of implanting and projection, at the root of the super-ego.¹⁸

We have noted the most severe super-egos in the following three cases:

1. Even if they have been brought up with tenderness, illegitimate children have a sadistic super-ego in order to balance their feeling of insecurity, which is experienced with a more tragic intensity since it is affirmed by an objective foundation.
2. Children brought up on an exaggerated or badly understood Montessori method have developed an extremely rigid super-ego in order to battle against the agony of liberty. The extremely lenient parents have been precisely those who have engendered this severe super-ego. We know that a natural aggressiveness, when it becomes an unused force, if prevented from finding its expression, sooner or later turns against the subject.

I have already shown that complete family Montessori-ism seems to produce as many inhibitions as the most severe puritanical education.¹⁹ There is here a pedagogical paradox which is far from being resolved. In this dialectic the father or the mother ought to be resigned to fill the role of the antithesis. The responsibility of choice is too heavy for the child. And liberty is the greatest insecurity of all.

3. There is still a third case that has been brought to my attention, which presents this whole problem of the super-ego under a different aspect. I have had the good fortune of knowing the super-ego of the parents, grand-parents, and great-grand-parents: three generations of super-egos that were gentle, civilized, normal, without stiffness. The little girl has a rigorous, ascetic super-ego. What has taken place between the super-ego of the elders and the super-ego of the child? War, occupation, privations, agonies, a family which had to hide from the Gestapo. The first three years of the child were passed in an atmosphere of total insecurity.

The cruelty of interior defenses does not appear to be in direct relationship with the parent that has been absorbed, but with the perils, real or imaginary, of the outside world. The more intense the feeling of insecurity the more ter-

rible will be the super-ego. To protect oneself against pitiless gangsters, an alliance is concluded with a bandit that is even worse, but who will be able to defeat him. The power of the bandit's fists or machine gun is the exact measure of reassurance. Everything happens as if the ego constructed a super-ego whose wickedness is proportional to the fear that it has of the outside world; as if the ego and the super-ego had made a tacit agreement. In exchange for the total submission of the ego, the super-ego guarantees an eternal security. If the ego disobeys it will be punished with the greatest harshness and all kinds of disasters will have the right, even the duty, of descending on it. Only this feeling of insecurity explains the pathologically auto-punitive conduct of children and the concentration camps that adults accept from their dictator because he delivers them from this evil, from this cross-road of risks, from this terror—liberty.

Another consequence flows from this agreement between the super-ego and the ego. If by chance an exterior misfortune comes about, the ego does not question either the sovereign power of the super-ego, or even its fairness in the execution of clauses. It interprets, consequently, even misfortune as the merited punishment of an unknown failure. The ego always pleads guilty, giving birth to a vicious circle of guilt and self-punishment where not the least real *moral fault* ever enters.

I believe that I have been able to prove sufficiently that this feeling of insecurity—of which the unconscious feeling of culpability is only a variant—has nothing in common with the fault of moralists or with the sin of theologians. In its pathological manifestations it opposes even the birth of moral feeling. Here we uncover the whole difference between superstition and true religion. On the contrary, religion disapproves of superstition, considering it a survival of paganism. But is not the super-ego itself pagan?

At the Congress of Catholic Psychotherapists that I organized at l'Abbaye du Bec, Father Mailloux, O.P. of Montreal made an excellent distinction on this point. In agony there is a lack of decision. For morality there is remorse. The unconscious feeling of guilt is anterior to the act. It suggests the act simply in order to be caught in it,—like fear. It is a little like children who fight. Formerly we busied ourselves with the poor child who let himself be attacked. Now we have discovered that it is necessary to be especially concerned with the child who attacks. It is he who is the agonized sick child, and it is because he is afraid that he fights. He is the one who must be cured. The vague guilt ought not to be eliminated. But the feeling of guilt goes against that of remorse. The confessor often experiences the resistance of an unconscious sin. The sick or the scrupulous man seeks a real sin, but flees his responsibility, his state of sinner. In the confessional you will observe the difference between the normal sinner and the neurotic. The normal sinner says: "There it is, I have made a mistake; forgive me, I won't do it again." The sick man blames himself, is already beginning to destroy himself, but does not admit any real sin. He says, "I am a terrible sinner, I am unworthy, etc. . ." He denies a radical capacity in himself; from this follows the necessity of eliminating all feeling of guilt in order to aid the moral life. But the capacity for feeling oneself culpable ought to remain on condition of making it objective.²⁰

Utility of psychoanalysis

The clarifications given by psychoanalysis on the functioning and characteristics of the neurotic conscience permit us to understand better certain deformations of its religious attitude.

The first characteristic of the rational conscience is to be a faithful witness of its conduct. Maintaining an adequate contact with reality, every act that it inspires is, finally, only a response to its requirements. From this fact, their motivation presents a nuance of objectivity which does not permit misunderstanding. It is quite a different matter for the infantile conscience of the neurotic. Dominated by a sensualism often extremely primitive, it attains God, like every other reality, only under the veil of an extremely imprecise imagery which is submitted to the despotism of affective influences. By this it becomes impossible for us to understand the obsessions and the exalted mysticism of certain neurotics, as well as the rude myths and magic rites of uncivilized peoples. Unfortunately, some good people have pushed naiveté to the point of believing that true religion is reducible to such fantasies, whether primitive or delirious. We judge that religion is as far removed from these things as a musical symphony is from the noise of the street, an artistic painting from a vulgar daub, or an inspired poem from incoherent raving.²¹

At the present moment there is a difficult psychological situation in the midst of the Catholic world. On one hand theology addresses itself to our rational being and treats us as if we had achieved our psychic growth. On the other hand the child and the primitive—and often the neurotic—traces of which still linger on in many men and women, cling to those inferior forms of religion of which Father Mailloux has spoken and are even opposed to every integration of present-day scientific acquisitions with the traditional faith. The Catholic intellectual and the primitive Catholic are each right, and each wrong.

We are here at the heart of the problem. How cross the bridge between the affective mythology *from on high* and the abstractions *in advance* without losing en route the élan, the ardor and the affective unity?

In its first effect psychoanalysis aggravated this situation, at the same time giving a clear-sightedness and an auto-criticism of the mechanism of the projective illusion. Let us not forget that myth acts psychologically only if we believe in it. Every intellectual analysis of a myth annuls its dynamism. Doubtless it is for this reason that modern myths are presented under a scientific form with an "ism." The intelligence can destroy the work of the imagination. It respects its own constructions.

In a later stage, psychoanalytical reflection, more mature after having meditated on its clinical experiences of a half-century, reconstructs what it has destroyed. With the same pitiless scalpel it now attacks His Majesty the Intelligence, disputes his pretension to objectivity and shows what there is of the irrational in apparently rational affirmations. Psychoanalysis insists then on the necessity of accepting certain areas of the irrational, of preserving the freshness of the child. It explains how indispensable the élan is to us. It wants to integrate

affectivity itself in total knowledge. Thus it finally results in the *supra-intellectual emotion* of Bergson.²² It invites us to make the synthesis by a continuous process. The myth from *on high*, checked by reason, but nourished by the child and the primitive, ought to be progressively integrated with the myth of *in advance*, preferred by scientific abstraction, but not recognized by the child and the primitive. Only psychoanalysis which has gone beyond its youthful sickness can mobilize this affective adhesion, because it was the first to give a scientific base to the *psychic reality*. I think we are only at the beginning of psychoanalytical thought, that it is the key of a new knowledge of the universe and that it is a cause for hope.

We may say then of psychoanalysis what Bacon wrote formerly of science. A little psychoanalysis separates us from God; a great deal of psychoanalysis brings us closer to Him.

We know—and Freud himself admitted it—that the unconscious contains the best as well as the worst. The psychoanalyst who is in daily contact with the unconscious can help man win the battle between his instincts and his inspirations. He can make him free again to receive the best. But it is then up to the liberated man to know what he will do with his liberty. We have seen that liberty is a dangerous good. A preparation is necessary in order to be capable of supporting it. The average man is afraid to be free. The superior man is afraid of being as free as God wishes. Supernatural reality has requirements even more rigorous than natural reality. Man ought to reach this level, where the greatest of earthly conflicts takes place after having liquidated his infantile conflicts. It is not necessary to close the doors to Grace by a bad psychic start. The tasks of the confessor and the investigator of the unconscious are complementary. Their rapprochement will give the spiritual man a power such as he has never before known.

Translated by JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

¹ S. Ferenczi, "Observations cliniques de paranoïa et de paraphrénie"; *Revue française de psychanalyse*, 1932, tome V, no. 1.

² Freud, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*.

³ Nachmansohn, "Freud's Libidotheorie verglichen mit der Eroslehre Platon's", *Internat. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, IV, 1915; Pfister, *ibid.* VIII, 1921.

⁴ Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, p. 24.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁸ Diderot, *Le neveu de Rameau*.

⁹ Dom J. J. Hayden, O.S.B., "La formation intégrale du sens moral", *Psyché*, no. 30-31, avril-mai 1949, p. 347.

¹⁰ Cf. the discussion on the communication of R. P. Snoeck, S. J., "Y aura-t-il une place pour un sentiment de péché dans une psyché harmonisée par le travail du psychiatre?", *Psyché*, no. 30-1, p. 441, P. 443. The same misunderstanding hovered over the discussion of guilt at the International Congress of Mental Hygiene at London in 1948, cf. *Acts of Congress*.

¹¹ M. Montessori, *L'enfant* (Desclée de Brouwer), pps. 52, 63, 64, 53.

¹² M. Choisy, *Quand les bêtes sont amoureuses*, (Editions des Portiques, 1932).

¹³ J. C. Flugel, *Man, Morals and society*, 1945, pp. 55-6.

¹⁴ E. Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*, 1942.

¹⁵ Freud, *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, p. 94.

¹⁶ J. C. Flugel, *op. cit.* p. 36.

¹⁷ E. Jones, "The early Development of Female sexuality" *International Journal of Psychiatry* (1927), 8, p. 463. Cf. also Susan Isaacs, "Privation and Guilt", in the same journal, (1929), 10, p. 335.

¹⁸ J. C. Flugel, *op. cit.*, p. 116, and Chapter 13, "Projection of the super-ego".

¹⁹ M. Choisy, "Le problème de la punition", *Psyché*, no. 17.

²⁰ Actes du Congrès, (Suggestion of R.P. Noel Mailloux, O.P.), *Psyché*, no. 30-1, p. 442-3.

²¹ N. Mailloux, O.P., "Foi et psychopathologie", *Supplément de la vie spirituelle*, no. 7, Nov. 15, 1948.

²² Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*.

COMMUNICATION

The following brief essay came from one of our readers who had given serious thought to Berdyaev's "Christianity and anti-semitism" (cf. CROSS CURRENTS, Fall 1950), and the editors are glad to place this statement, not in opposition to Berdyaev's article, but alongside it. The author is a research-fellow in Theology at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York.

THE ENCOUNTER OF JUDAISM AND CHRISTENDOM

ARTHUR ALLEN COHEN

The discord of religions is as often created from the default of mutuality as from the direct encounter of alternate faiths. The relations of Judaism and Christianity have, in recent years, become singularly illustrative of this truth. In the past it was more easily possible for the Jew to withstand poignant encounter with the Christian experience. The contemporary development of a more comprehensive and sensitive Christian theological attitude vis-a-vis the Jew has rendered this inadequate. It is no longer possible to maintain that impeccable aloofness which it has been traditional for Judaism to display toward Christianity. The reawakening of subtle, non-coercive techniques of approach, illuminated most remarkably by Léon Bloy, Berdyaev, and Maritain, has suggested the conditions of the dialogue.

The negation of Jesus as Christ by His Palestinian contemporaries was not a conscious or explicit phenomenon. The Gospels, *prima facie*, are not to be rejected in their historical account of Jesus' relation to the Jews. Much, however, that they record of the Jews' reaction and antagonism moves beyond the scope of narrative into the less accessible region of theological conviction. It is difficult to believe that an extensive number of Jews knew of Jesus, much less formed an opinion of His works, or acclaimed the preposterous cruelty of His execution.¹ The history and its details are, however, of secondary importance. It is religiously pertinent that the Jew announce as an assertion of faith, not of history, that he has neither encountered, judged, nor denied the affirmed Messiah.

The history of Christian overture, apologetics—and, in its bitterest moments, violence—compelled, however, where no encounter compelled, the Jew to the confrontation of Christ. It was neither a confrontation of wish nor the compulsion of an inexorable destiny. It was rather the refraction of a potential mutuality that had never once found consummation. A possibility whereby to have decisively encountered and rejected Jesus Christ *was* offered. The life of Jesus, His Passion, His affirmed Resurrection gave ample basis to an experience. The presuppositions of experience, necessitating an experient as well as the objective reality, failed in this instance of fulfillment. It is a profound miscon-

ception therefore to speak of the rejection of Jesus. It is more bitter, but surely more veritable, to admit that Jesus was never known, never confronted, never met. He was never rejected by Israel.

The Jew, however, through his history of contact with Christendom, has come to fix an attitude which his ancestors never assumed. Post-Palestinian Judaism knew that a rejection of Jesus would have been at least intuitively justified. The rejection of Jesus was consummated in history, not in the *Kairos* of the Christ. What rejection there is, what inescapable contest and denial it has been the Jews' necessity to affirm, is the creation of time and not the working of the Eternal in time. This is not merely to admit that with the Christians' regrasping of that Eternal Moment, with the achieving of contemporaneity with the *Kairos*, and the true *Imitatio Christi* the Jew will feel what he has, thus far, never felt. The Jew as Jew will never, nor can he know Jesus as Christ. To accomplish such would be in fact to desist from his own reality.

It is not the Christian desire to convert the nominal Jew, the mere accident of birth. There is neither vindication nor glory in the receipt of a figment, an appearance. The contest is for the pious Jew, the believing Jew, upon whom rests the yoke of the Kingdom. It is he whom the Christian seeks. It is he who in his nature, who by his affirmation, who through that in which he stands cannot be touched. The eternal in time, the God-man is not merely an affront to pure monotheism as is too often thought. The problem is not a theological doctrine. There is no metaphysics of monotheism in Scripture; it is the discovery of medieval Jewish philosophy (which is perhaps a contradiction in terms) that Israel possesses a rationally defensible truth. Nothing is farther from the experience of the pious.² His reality is mediated only through the search and encounter with God. It is a vivid, indissoluble, historical dialogue to which he stands as partner. He cannot cease his relation with God at The Moment in history when it is asserted history is transformed, that the Dialogue is consummated, that the struggle for Redemption is realized. His faith is born with the Beginning and is consummated at the End. There is between only the repeated, anguished, and arduous struggle to meet again, to encounter, to renew as of old. It is this historical dialogue which most profoundly distinguishes the Jew in belief from the assertion of Christianity. It is for this reason, and for no single issue of theology, that he feels himself most powerfully estranged from the Gospel.

It is not my purpose to justify this position. It is one I believe and out of which my own faith has grown. There is however a function which this view of Judaism may afford in contrast to the one traditionally held by the sympathetic of Christian thinkers. It may indicate that the passion of Israel is a lonely passion, one that knows more of the endurance of suffering than that of vicarious sharing. It learns its attitude from what it encounters. As Moses formed his view of the Egyptian only when he saw a slave of his people beaten, so the Jew of history learns of his world in the perception of the anguish he must bear. The Christian has given witness in the terms of history to that to which a historical faith, taking deeply the flow and rush of events, must react. Judaism cannot react to Jesus for in its history there is no comparable archetype, eternally perfect, yet human, of corruptible flesh, yet resurrected. There is no static mark to which Judaism points. The Jew knows no center in time. There is

merely repeated reaching and encounter. He must view Christianity as Christianity is, for he has always viewed himself and God has viewed him as at each moment he is. Jacob was attacked, Moses was assaulted, he who profaned the Tabernacle with his touch was slain. At each moment God discloses His valuation of time, at every moment He proclaims, teaches, reproves, and has compassion. To one moment without change there is no recourse. As Israel knew a prefigured destiny before Sinai so it will know a fulfilled destiny after Sinai. Sinai structures, but does not fix. It legislated for time with the commandments of eternity. The Law is eternally the will of God, notwithstanding the innovations to be established by the Kingdom of God. It is useless therefore to contend that the Jew does not encounter Christ, but only sinning Christendom; that Christians are corruptible, but the Christ is unblemished. He can know no other reality than the history of the generations of man. As he judges himself for ever repentant to the sins of immediacy, he must weigh the enormities of others in the terms of immediacy.

I have spoken thus far of the religious Jew for whom the encounter with Christendom is an encounter of sorrow. He knows of Christ therefore refracted through the image of Christendom. I have sought to indicate that this is the decisive reality for the Jew, that any other is meaningless to the Jewish spirit. The last decades have however seen an alteration of view. Whereas the persecutions of Hitler are unutterable in the magnitude of their depravity, we cannot cultivate their memory and live.

The development of the scientific understanding of Judaism within the past two centuries brought in its wake the attempt of scholars to reconstruct the relations of Judaism and Christianity, to elicit again from weary history what truth it yet concealed. An extensive Jewish literature treating of Jesus, the Disciples, and Pauline Christianity matured and expanded. Judgments fell however into two neat, though by no means unforeseeable, categories. The scholars of orthodox persuasion, after careful, though often questionable, analysis deemed the doctrine of Jesus and the Primitive Church to be in its grandeur a perpetuation of Judaism and in its innovation undesirable. More liberal, yet decisively Jewish, thinkers saw in Christianity a legitimacy of right, a truth; yet one limited, essentially circumscribed by, and therefore resolvable to its Jewish constituents. With the exception of such figures as C. G. Montefiore there is no forthright sympathy, although there is praise of Jesus. Never, never, with the limited and somewhat ambiguous qualifications advanced by Buber and Rosenzweig, is the view that Christian theology has toward Jesus Christ deemed meaningful or demanding.

There are subtle and significant presuppositions for the reawakened Jewish interest in Christianity. The emancipation of the Jew and the relative decline of the temporal power of the Western Churches relaxed pressure. Jewish apologetics could for the first time appear in enlightened circles. It took however an enlightened form. While Moses Mendelsohn, the most outstanding intellectual spokesman of early Jewish secularization, was seeking the sophistication of his faith and the imparting of manners to Judaism, the great spiritualist revival of Eastern European Hasidism was at its height. It was the enlightenment which produced not only *Die Wissenschaft des Judentums* (The Science of Judaism) of

Leopold Zunz (1794-1886), but Reform Judaism. Both were compatible means of achieving "civilizing" ends. The air of enlightenment invigorated the *Leben-Jesu-Forschung* (Research in the Life of Jesus). The challenge of Christendom evoked no more than the passion of scholarship. Only when the faith that could encounter Christendom is sapped can the dispassion to examine arise. Whereas Orthodox Jews feel the weight of Christendom so deeply as to be incapable of uttering its founder's name, the enlightened have achieved such urbanity as to confront it with ease.

I have stated extremes, but not meaningless extremes. Between the exaggerations the truth is lodged concealed. It is profoundly clear that this academic encounter of Judaism and Christianity is not of meaning to either faith. Each successfully ignores the reality of the other. It vindicated demanding claims to the whole of man with the assembled materia of evidence, dates, history, and archeology. It vindicates nothing. The enlightenment has created tolerance, but, if one may risk an ambiguity, a non-existential tolerance, for the attitude of good will engendered was created by default, and not by passion. Nothing has been resolved. No encounter has taken place. Neither have Christians become Jews nor Jews become Christians in sufficient number to cause reflection. Scattered conversions do not make the meeting of faiths more than glancing or fortuitous. Direct, challenging meeting remains unknown.

I deeply seek the meeting of faith. I do not seek my conversion. I do however envision that profound encounter of the heart which is both vivifying to the spirit and witness to the recreating presence of God in history. The meeting to be a meeting must be forthright and without reserve. It must be, to use the phrase of one whose thought has deeply shaped my own, a meeting of the I and Thou. Each is capable of creating himself, of complementing his spiritual life, by witnessing the life of the spirit in another. It is not necessary to specify who shall say these eternal words first. Firstness and priority know no context when it is from the being that one man speaks to another. There is spontaneity and meeting.

It is in this light that one must affirm the meeting to transpire. Christianity cannot reprove Israel with the rejection of the Christ. Judaism cannot deny Christianity for the defection from the Torah. To speak of denial is to ask the question of rightness to the spirit, of priority, and self-legitimation. It is clear that there is discord. It is clear that the unity of anguished presence and the repose of love is infinitely more desirable than fractious and destructive pride. The Christian cannot therefore say the meeting must take place only through the confrontation of the Christ. Not only with the confrontation of the Christ is the I and the Thou spoken. To confront the Torah is to fulfill the wholeness of this mutuality. Israel is no mystery, as Maritain affirms. It is a mystery only in the sense that a dilemma, a riddle, or an enigma is unsolved. To speak of the mystery of Israel is to shut off Israel from penetration. Israel is not to be solved. She is to be loved and only from encounter can love flow. Christendom is not to be the Other One, the hated, the rejected, but the loved. Love is never the work of theological fiat. To make mere professions of love is not to enter the conditions of mutuality and meeting.

When the meeting transpires, for only through meeting can the rejection of Jesus be understood for what it is, an ontic difference, not a mere negation,

the Jew and Christian will exchange something more profound than doctrine, for they will find with all difference, a common life. Perhaps this reality is inconceivable. Perhaps doctrine, learned thought, theological necessity, the way of the Ecclesia forbid meeting. Perhaps it is all a fancy to be dispelled in the vindictiveness that it has been the lot of millenia to witness. If indeed it is Christians shall have surely denied the Christ, and Jews will have failed in their struggle to encounter the One.

¹ Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, Williams and Norgate, 1903. It is Herford's thesis that wherever the Hebrew term "min" (sectary) or "minuth" (sectarianism) is employed in the Rabbinic or Talmudic literature there is an explicit or veiled reference to Jesus, His ministry, or His following. In a literature of many thousands of pages he has been able to locate only one hundred and thirty-nine passages suggesting such contexts. Of these a pathetically small number are indisputable in their allusions to Christianity.

The literature concerning the precise designation of the term "min" is extensive. There is at least considerable doubt that the term is primarily anti-Christian. I subscribe rather to the view first elaborated by Friedlander that the term suggests repudiation of the heresies of gnosticism. Generally however the concept of heresy is never as specific in Rabbinic literature as it has subsequently become. It is used to condemn a variety of sins: metaphysical liberality, theological scepticism, moral iniquity, ritual laxity, inhumanity etc. All are in receipt of the description "heretic". In this context it is however significant that where a reference to the life of Jesus occurs the most basic details of His life are missing. It is not known specifically whether He was stoned or crucified. It is thought He was killed in Lydda, not Jerusalem. Such confusions indicate however that within a hundred years of his death acquaintance with minimal details of His life had passed. It is difficult to imagine consequently that during His life His influence was as profound as the Gospels suggest.

² It had been implied by Maimonides' formulation of the thirteen basic articles of the Jewish faith that one who did not subscribe could not henceforth be thought a Jew. Maimonides, however, did not understand adherence to be nominal; rather the Jew in accepting must of needs understand and reason his faith to unalterable intellectual foundations. This implication drew the vigorous and profound challenge of many of the most renowned and pious of European Rabbis who argued that piety, the fulfillment of the commandments, works, and love transcend the adequacy of any theological or metaphysical assertion. They denied in effect, that philosophic formulation could gain priority over the life of belief.

NOTES on other publications

THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE

1.

Church and State. It is no easy matter to sum up the response to the three encyclopedic volumes of Canon Stokes' *Church and State in the United States* (Harper's), which has already stimulated many important reviews, almost all of them highly favorable. Robert F. Drinan concludes a critical account of this work (in *THE GEORGETOWN LAW REVIEW*, Vol. 39, no. 1) as follows: "It is well for those who believe in God, the natural law and religious freedom that a man as religious and tolerant as Canon Stokes has written this treatise which will without doubt be referred to as the definitive work in the field. It is fortunate for the American nation that Canon Stokes has accepted as his principal postulate the truth that '*freedom of conscience or religious liberty is the basic freedom without which other civil and political freedoms and rights cannot survive*'. The forces of true religion and true freedom run parallel, Canon Stokes reminds us. His volumes offer vital proof of the truth of his assertion that religious liberty is the matrix of all other freedoms; he should be read, therefore, by everyone who desires to protect and perpetuate the traditional American freedoms."

Prof. DeWolfe Howe, writing in *THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW* (Vol. 64, 1950, pp. 170-175), after acknowledging the value of Dr. Stokes' study, feels that despite the exhaustive references, some of the critical questions have not really been asked. He wishes the author had not assumed that the concept of freedom is based on political conviction rather than religious principle. "Those who support the thesis that each man should be left free by government to follow the faith which his mind and his heart prefer, very generally, if not invariably, have in religion, abandoned the belief that an ultimate truth has been revealed for all and, as truth, is binding on all. The political conviction that religious liberty is of profound importance generally bespeaks at least a Protestant, and very frequently a skeptical, attitude towards the 'truths' of religion. Behind our constitutional provisions there may lie, therefore, an attitude towards religion, if not a religious faith itself, which is predominantly Protestant in spirit. Dr. Stokes in accepting the suggestion that the Protestant era in America came to an end with the adoption of the 1st Amendment (Vol. I, p. 553) disregards the fact that the Amendment itself in pronouncing a Protestant belief preserved that belief as a living part of our constitutional heritage. If this interpretation has merit, one is immediately confronted by the problem whether we are likely ever completely to convert the principle of tolerance into the principle of liberty. It is unlikely that the equality which results from liberty will be attained by a church which is committed, or seems to the bulk of the community to be committed, to the doctrine not only that all men are obligated to seek and follow the truth, but that the truth is to be found in its faith only. This is not because civil government as such is unwilling to perform the political promise contained in constitutions but because performance would entail the violation of religious presuppositions in which the promise is grounded. . . ."

"Dr. Stokes is in fact confronted by a dilemma which every churchman must seek to resolve. He must repudiate, on the one hand, the notion that the policy of dis-establishment was designed by rationalists as a means of breaking the hold which religious superstition had imposed on the hearts and minds of men. To support that interpretation of history would lend aid and comfort to skepticism. On the other hand, he is forced to avoid the suggestion that our state and federal constitutions are infused throughout with the presuppositions of Protestant Christianity. To accept that thesis would be to antagonize Catholics and non-Christians. The position which Dr. Stokes in the end assumes seems to be that Christian principle when sanctioned by government has somehow lost its religious quality and acquired a predominantly ethical character. It is hard to believe that the evasion of the problem will satisfy those who believe that religious truth has an absolute verity independent of the shifting standards of human behavior prescribed by political authority. The churchman's effort to show tolerance produces a watery mixture of a pallid faith and a tentative ethics. . . ."

Professor Howe concludes: "The heart of our constitutional problem will be reached only when scholars, statesmen and churchmen ask themselves whether the objective of freedom and separation is not so intimately related to an article of religious faith as to make the state a religious partisan when it seeks to attain that objective."

2.

It is unnecessary to underline the importance of Jacques Maritain's new book, *Man and the State* (Chicago). The oft-repeated—and superficially understood—claim that "the brotherhood of man is meaningless without the fatherhood of God" is here given a profoundly philosophical foundation. His chapters on "The Rights of Man", "The Democratic Charter", "Church and State", and "The Problem of World Government" should do much to clarify these relevant and pressing problems.

Paradoxically, Maritain's philosophical study has more practical value than Oscar Halecki's *Eugenio Pacelli, Pope of Peace* (Creative Age). Pius XII emphasizes the dignity of man as an adoptive son of God from whence his inalienable rights are ultimately derived. Some important documents seem to be omitted—especially the Pope's addresses to the Rota judges in 1945, 1946, and 1947 dealing with the nature of the Church, democracy, and totalitarianism. The bibliography is exceptionally weak and uncritical for such an important subject.

In a study sponsored by the Committee on Religious Tolerance—later related to the Federal (National) Council of the Churches of Christ in America—Professor James H. Hastings of the University of Chicago has studied "the contributions of Protestant and Roman Catholic religion to the origin and development of the political ethic we know today as liberal democracy" (*Democracy and the Church*, Westminster). Writing as an advocate of his position, Dr. Nichols finds that Puritan Protestantism provided the fertile soil for the nurture of liberal democracy, and that Catholicism, while occasionally exhibiting liberal phases, remained an apologist for autocratic government.

The Thomas More Society of London has produced two series of essays, edited by Richard O'Sullivan, both published by Basil Blackwell. *The King's*

Good Servant contains Jacques Maritain's paper, "La philosophie du droit", as well as other good contributions: "Law and Conscience" by Hilary Carpenter; "The Limits of Law and Legislation" by Ivo Thomas; "The Common Good in Law and Legislation" and "Law and Liberty" by Andrew Beck; "Punishment and Moral Responsibility" by D. J. B. Hawkins; and "Conscience and Courts" by Lewis Watt. The most notable paper of the second series, *Under God and the Law*, is Philip Hughes' "The Constitution of the Church". This volume also contains Andrew Beck's "Church and State in the West"; A. H. Armstrong's "Church and State in the East"; Richard Kehoe's "Law and the Spirit", and J. F. Rogers' "Law and Political Power".

Professor John Macmurray's series of lectures on the *Conditions of Freedom* (Faber) gives many valuable insights, and George Bernanos' *Tradition of Freedom* (Roy) continues the late novelist's fiery rhetoric against those who do not appreciate the priceless heritage of freedom. Canon Alan Richardson published a fine short study, *The Gospel and Modern Thought*, and an excellent essay "The Biblical Doctrine of Work" (THE FRONTIER, 21 Essex St., Strand, London W.C.2). FOI ET VIE (4th Q., 1950, 134 Blvd., Montparnasse, Paris 6) contained "La responsabilité de l'église", by Heinrich Vogel and Ch. Westphal.

3.

East and West. Max Pribilla attacks Barth's reticence to fight communism (STIMMEN DER ZEIT, Jan. 1951; "Die Kirche Zwischen Ost und West") and even believes it to be motivated by an anti-Catholic prejudice. He advocates inter-confessional meetings in order to evolve a common front. Charles Malik delivers an "Appeal to Asia" in the Spring 1951 issue of THOUGHT. This marked the twenty-fifth anniversary number of the review, which appeared in an attractive new format, and also contained "A Defense of Atlantic Solidarity" by Carlton Hayes, and "Can the President Send Troops Abroad?" by James D. Atkinson. Walter Dirks has been exploring the present international situation in a series of articles in the FRANKFURTER HEFTE, of which the first, "Was die Ehe bedroht", appeared in January. Dirks also contributed to the symposium in ESPRIT (Jan. 1951) against the German re-armament.

ESPRIT's March number, entitled "La paix possible," indicates a determination to work for time, and for any opportunities to effect a gradual transformation of the rigid oppositions which Russia and America now represent. Jean Lacroix ("Faire la Paix") points out that the making of peace is a continual work against injustice, and cannot be founded on fear. Those who wish to express an "active neutralism" have a triple task: clear refusal of a preventive war, refusal of the occasions of war—this would imply the making of peace by the French in Viet Nam, the recognition of Mao-Tse-Tung, and opposition to German re-armament—, and to pursue a revolutionary work in France, i.e. continually to transform the social and economic terrain on which ideologies are born and are opposed. "War is neither certain nor fatal. Those who believe it so are those who have already chosen their victim. There is only one ultimate source of war, namely, the fear that Russia be the aggressor. Starting with this fear, there are two possible policies. One consists, we are told, in reconstructing a European force in order not to have to use it: the policy of re-armament. One has to be ignorant both of history, Marxism and the world situation not to see that it

inevitably leads to war. The other is that of a limited but precise effort at agreement and comprehension in order to arrive at a compromise and allow a mutual respite. This second policy, the only one that is necessary and legitimate, also has its dangers. The delay itself will end in armed conflict if it is not a delay in order to realize a positive work. The peaceful co-existence of two blocs is not a vain formula, but it is a passing one: it has meaning only because it allows them the chance to transform themselves. The opportunity of the West—an opportunity which may be taken away from it at any minute—is that a certain tradition of liberty permits it still to make its own revolution—this revolution, which, in fact, it must *make* if it does not want to *undergo* it. Symbol perhaps of that which will take place, the two blocs can here influence one another reciprocally and slowly evolve or they can pursue an inexpiable war . . ." The issue also contains "De la paix à la coexistence" by J. M. Domenach and Paul Fraisse; "Deux systèmes économiques" by Henri Bartoli; "La révolution et la paix" by J. W. Lapierre, "Pour la coexistence pacifique" by Paul Ricoeur, etc.

4.

Social and political backgrounds. SCHWEIZER RUNDSCHAU's special number on Man, the State, and economics (Nov.-Dec. 1950) contained Jakob David's careful argument in behalf of workers' right to co-responsibility within industry. Using the analogy of a democratic government, he shows that labor would choose its ablest representatives to work with management in co-determination of industrial problems. Both reason and the Christian conscience demand that labor be given more than material participation in their work (profit-sharing). In the same issue John Hennig discusses the relation of the liturgy to the state and economics. He shows the close relation of popular language to the liturgy, insisting that it should be—as it was intended—prayer and worship arising from the type of life and work of the worshipping community. For this reason in our time there are liturgical prayers for railroads, airplanes, etc., reaching out to sanctify all the works of men, without implying that all their results are necessarily good. In STIMMEN DER ZEIT (Aug. 1950) Oswald von Nell-Breuning indicates the limits and limitations of co-determination, claiming that it can only be a temporary aid and a bridge to corporative organizations.

A UNESCO publication (No. 426, "Contemporary Political Science: a Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching, Columbia) throws light on the development of political science all over the world, and is filled with valuable up-to-date information. Will Rink ("Gesundheit, Krankheit, Heiligkeit", NEUES ABENDLAND, July 1950) sees sickness not only as guilty disorder, but also as a redeeming higher order: sickness can be understood as a symptom of true healing. Oskar Simmel discusses the Moral Re-Armament Movement in STIMMEN DER ZEIT, Aug. 1950. Originating in a Protestant experience of community, it has left the Christian environment, has become "esthetic" and sentimental, and runs the danger of "collectivization". Martin Brugarola gives (FOMENTO SOCIALE, Sept. 1950) an account of cooperative housing and community projects in Spain. Example: 7000 shoe-factory workers built 1800 homes aided by parish credit-unions. Heinrich Weinstock shows the dialectic between freedom and equality in any democracy, and pleads for the formation of an elite as the great need of the day (DIE SAMMLUNG, Aug. 1950). G. Allo discusses last year's Semaine Sociale at Nantes

(*LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE*, Oct. 1950), and N. Grogat defends one of the decisions at that meeting—the preference for family-type farms (*REVUE DE L'ACTION POPULAIRE*, Sept-Oct. 1950). In "Ethical Relativity and Political Theory" (*BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, March 1951), Morris Ginsberg distinguishes two kinds of ethical relativism: sociological—as in Durkheim, and psychological—as in Lord Russell. Neither is logically implied in totalitarianism, or democracy, but they are more congenial to totalitarianism. These relativisms are an insufficient base for democracy. We need *axiomata media* for transition from ultimate ends to details of life. Waldemar Gurian studies "Louis Veuillot" in the *CATHOLIC HISTORICAL REVIEW*, Jan. 1951, and his essay develops into a more general study of the post-revolution bourgeois French-Catholic attitude towards society. Henry Steele Morrison gives the "Faith of an Historian" (*AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, Jan. 1951). "After his main object of describing events 'simply as they happened', his task is to understand the motives and objects of individuals and groups, even those he personally dislikes, and to point out mistakes as well as achievements, even by those that he loves. In a word, he must preserve *balance* . . . A man (must not become) the prisoner of his 'frame of reference'". Nikolaus Monzel contributes "Die Soziologie und die Theologen" (*HOCHLAND*, March 1949), and the *AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW* (March 1951) has articles on "The Sociology of Religion in France Today" by Eva J. Ross, and "Variations in the Pastoral Role in France" by Bertra Mugrauer. *THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS* conducted a symposium on the character of the concept of law in Chinese culture (Jan. 1951), "Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West". It illuminates the fundamental differences in attitude towards law—in China *droit* took precedence over positive law; the West's clear distinction between natural and positive law does not apply. The symposium is continued in the Spring edition. C. A. Coulson discusses the place of science as a cohesive force in modern society (*DUBLIN REVIEW*, 1st Q., 1951). The *Economie et Humanisme* group have published the first number of *CAHIERS D'ECONOMIE HUMAIN*, "Paysans d'hier, agriculteurs de demain".

Harcourt Brace has brought out Hannah Arendt's study of totalitarianism, and Rutgers has published Robert F. Byrne's *Anti-semitism in Modern France*.

5.

Philosophy. Macmillan has published Berdyaev's autobiography, *Dream and Reality*. S. Junbauer gives a good brief account of developments in German philosophy, especially on Heidegger and Jaspers in relation to the problem of history, in "German philosophy and the power of history" (*REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS*, Spring 1951). Regnery has made available in this country the first volume of Marcel's Gifford lectures, *The Mystery of Being*, and Vrin published M. D. Chenu's study of St. Thomas. Viktor Engelhardt gives a good introduction to Heidegger, Jaspers, Rilke and Kierkegaard in *DIE NEUE ORDNUNG* (Aug. 1950), and Johannes Messner studies the problem of the natural law in the modern world (*HOCHLAND*, Aug. 1950). The complete works of Johann George Hamann are being published (Verlag Heider Wien); two volumes have appeared.

The second volume of M. F. Sciacca's study of St. Augustine's thought will appear towards the end of this year (Morcelliana). Two excellent books on existentialism have been issued recently by the brilliant young Italian philosopher Luigi Pareyson. *Studi sull'esistenzialismo* (Sansoni, 1950) studies its historical origins and contemporary developments and gives a critical analysis of its principal forms; a long section is devoted to German existentialism and particularly to the "dialectic of crisis" of Karl Barth. *Esistenza e Persona* (Taylor, Torino 1950) contains pertinent discussion of time and eternity, person and society, and a suggestive chapter on the central role of personal "iniziativa" viewed as the deepest condition and main-spring of the historical process and the primary pre-supposition for the transcendental destiny of man.

FILOSOFIA, a journal newly-founded by August Guzzo, presented some excellent articles in its first year of publication: Enrico de Negri's study of Hegelian dialectics (Jan. 1950), Guzzo's essay on moral problems in his synoptic view of "La persona umana" (July 1950), and L. Pareyson's studies on art, "Arte e conoscenza" (April 1950), and "Contemplazione e bellezza" (July 1950).

6.

Literature. The death of André Gide called forth many tributes, and should stimulate some important critical evaluations of his work and place in French literature. The well-presented Gide-Claudél correspondance (Gallimard) is of special importance as a document of the attempt to convert Gide. YALE FRENCH STUDIES (No. 7) is devoted to Gide, and LA TABLE RONDE has announced a special number to discuss him.

Mention should also be made of M. Koriakov's article on Soviet literature (THOUGHT, Spring 1951) and Martin Turnell's study of *The Novel in France* (New Directions). Pierre Schneider has an intelligent essay on Barbey d'Aurévilly, whom he discovers to be existentialist (TEMPS MODERNES, March 1951). CRITIQUE's February issue contained J. J. Mayoux's "Le portrait d'un hérétique: D. H. Lawrence." A posthumous novel of George Bernanos has been published by Plon, *Les Enfants Humiliés*.

7.

Psyché. Readers prompted by Mme. Choisy's article to look further may be glad to know the address of her review: 19 rue Monsieur, Paris 7. The openness of the review is evidenced by the publication of the important two-part article by the distinguished psychologist, Agostino Gemelli ("Le psychologue devant les problèmes de la psychiatrie", Jan. and Feb. 1951), who is a severe critic of psychoanalysis. Both the medical and philosophical contributions of psychoanalysis are analyzed in a collective volume, *Reflexions sur la psychoanalyse* (Bloud & Gay), with contributions by J. Lhermitte, Dr. J. Boutonier, M. Nedoncelle, etc. The latter's article, "Ce que la morale ou la religion peuvent apporter à la psychoanalyse" has many valuable insights. Also noted: Viktor E. V. Gebattel's essay on depth-psychology (STUDIUM GENERALE, May 1950); Serge Maiwald's study of Protestantism and depth-psychology (UNIVERSITAS, Dec. 1950); Charles Durand's "Christian faith and psychiatry" (THE STUDENT WORLD, 2nd Q., 1951); and J. W. D. Smith's "Study of Sin and Salvation in terms of Jung's Psychology" (SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Spring 1951). Henri Ey throws many out-

moded theories overboard with his *Etudes psychiatriques: historique, methodologie, psychopathologie générale* (Desclée).

HISTORY AND CHRISTIANITY

1.

Jew and Christian. Readers of Arthur Cohen's essay in this issue may also be interested in the discussion of American Judaism in COMMENTARY, prompted by David Daiches' "American Judaism: A Personal View" (February), and continued in succeeding issues by Leo S. Baeck and Milton Konvitz. Attention should also be called to the REVUE DE LA PENSÉE JUIVE (24, rue Copernic, Paris); the current number contains a response to Claudel by Edmond Fleg, and a symposium on Jewish humor. It is not too late to mention L. Poliakov's "The Vatican and the 'Jewish Question'" (COMMENTARY, December 1950). Poliakov pays genuine tribute to the record of the Vatican and western European Catholics for helping thousands of Jews escape the Nazi gas chambers, but reads the attitude of the Vatican in regard to the measures of segregation and discrimination of the years 1939 and 1945 as motivated by the belief that Jews must be preserved as testimonials to the eventual triumph of Christ: thus the Church may fight for their right to life, but may allow them to be set apart and humiliated. Poliakov gives particular attention to the report of Ambassador Bérard to Petain in regard to the Vichy anti-Semitic laws.

Mention should also be made of *Beiträge zur christlichen Betrachtung der Judenfrage* (ed. Gertrud Luckner, Freiburg 1, Br., Werthmanplatz 4, Germany, 1951), containing articles by Karl Thieme, Wilhelm Neuss, F. M. Muller-Claudius, Paul Démann and Linus Bopp. John Osterreicher, remembered for his 1947 discussion of "Pro Perfidis Judaeis" in the Good Friday liturgy in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, has published *Seeds of Hope*, "five sermons on the mystery of Israel" (Pio Decimo Press, Box 53, Baden Station, St. Louis 15, Mo.). Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy writes on Jewish anti-semitism in academic life (FRANKFURTER HEFTE, Jan. 1951). Karl Stern's *Pillar of Fire* (Harcourt Brace) is not only unique among accounts of conversions for the quality of its writing but a valuable record of a genuine spiritual journey from secularized Judaism to Christianity.

2.

"*Divided Christendom*". This is the title of the most important Catholic study in English of the problem of reunion. Published in 1939 and long unavailable, (the original French of Yves Congar is out-of-print) some copies are apparently again obtainable from Geoffrey Bles, London. Despite Père Congar's later work (notably *Vrai et fausse réforme dans l'église*, in Cerf's *Unam Sanctam* series), this remains an important source-book. The late Professor S. S. Frank puts us in his debt by editing an excellent *Solovyev Anthology*, (Scribner's) especially as Solovyev's work contains much profound ecumenical insight.

No help is given to the cause of Christian unity by glossing over doctrinal difficulties, and it is good that the genuine anxieties of the overwhelming majority of Protestant Christendom in regard to the proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption have been given clear and brotherly expression. Prof. T. F.

Torrance summarizes an important little book, *Evangelisches Gutachten zur Dogmatisierung der leiblichen Himmelfahrt Mariens* (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München 1950) in the *SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY* (March 1951). Pasteur Thurian, after recognizing the ecumenical tact with which *Munificentissimus Deus* was composed and the worldly imprudence of the declaration at this time, and rejecting the insinuation that the dogma was declared to discourage the ecumenical cause—he underlines the message of hope to the modern world contained in the relation of the dogma to that of the resurrection of the body—, is nevertheless concerned that this emphasis on Mary, Mediatrix of grace, may diminish the role of Christ as unique mediator. He sees a vicious circle in the justification of a dogma in the fact of its being proclaimed, feeling this to be a further—though perhaps inevitable—development of the doctrine of papal infallibility. This year's first number of the important German Protestant review *UNTERWEGS* (Berlin-Dahlem, Ehrenbergstrasse 27) has an article by Karl Gerhard Steck on Protestantism and the holy year. He gives a critical analysis of recent developments within the Catholic Church, and sums up the main difficulty with Catholicism for himself and other Protestants as the submission of human reason in precisely the most important areas of thought. Also to be noted: Karl Barth's "The Real Church" (*SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY*, Dec. 1950); the special issue of *THE STUDENT WORLD* (Winter 1950-51) on the position of the Christian in the universities in Asia; and Pierre Burgelin's "Psychologie protestante et psychologie catholique" (*FOI ET VIE*, Feb. 1951).

Otto Karrer's "Von ökumenischer Haltung und Hoffnung" (*HOCHLAND*, Oct. 1950) explains that ecumenical unity is not so much the work of church-politicians or theologians, but of those who believe and love. Protestantism grew out of a *positive* desire of reformers. Now the Mystical Body of Christ has been cut apart by political powers. Canon Law is not the only nor the first way to look at the Church: the Mystical Body of Christ includes more than the visible followers of Peter. Ecumenicity can only be carried by a small minority from both sides for a long time to come. Catholics too have to find the way: we must contribute to unity and not play a self-righteous role awaiting for the *return* of the others. "The closer we are to our common Lord, the closer we will be to one another." *IRENIKON*'s latest number contains Dom Lambert Beauduin's study of the Vatican council and the unity of the Church. A. Chavassee considers the Vatican council's conception of Papal infallibility; P. Michelson studies Pauline teaching on membership in the Church; M. Villain explains how there can be saints outside the visible unity of the Church. Oscar Simmel describes the Berneucher circle in Germany and the Communauté de Cluny (*STIMMEN DER ZEIT*, Oct. 1950).

3.

Historical studies. The Abingdon-Cokesbury award has been given to the outstanding church historian Dr. Roland Bainton for his recent *Here I Stand*. A well-presented volume, it is also the finest biography of Luther in English and ably presents the story of his achievement as leader of the Reform movement of the 16th century. The first volume of Philip Hughes' *The Reformation in England* (*The King's Proceedings*, Longmans') presents the background of the reform in England under Henry VIII. He concludes that the English clergy

of the period were woefully deficient in theology and that Henry VIII was not only a schismatic but a heretic. Dr. Charles E. Smith has done a commendable study of *Innocent III, Church Defender* (Louisiana State), emphasizing his statesmanship in secular matters as well as in church affairs. Albert C. Shannon's *The Popes and Heresy in the 13th Century* (Villanova) gives us a useful account of how the popes of the period viewed heresy. They were more meticulous about canonical due process than some papal legates. Justice was frequently tempered with mercy but the use of coercive inquisitorial methods was a tragic mistake of churchmen. On the basis of new and unpublished material, Fergal McGrath gives us a thorough study of *Newman's University, Idea and Reality* (Longmans'). Steven Runciman has published the first volume of his *History of the Crusades* (Cambridge), an excellent study of militant Christianity during the Middle ages. Christopher Dawson discusses "Byzantium and the Christian East" (DUBLIN REVIEW 1st Q., 1951), and Oxford has brought out Ronald Knox's *Enthusiasm*.

4.

The Place of the Laity. A most important theological study of the priesthood of the faithful has been published by Paul Dabin, *La sacerdoce royale des fidèles dans la tradition ancienne et moderne* (Brussels, Les éditions universelles, SA, 53 rue Royale); it is discussed by Msgr. H. Francis Davis in the DOWNSIDE REVIEW (Winter 1950-1). Rudolf Muller-erb traces the mistaken development of the priest-church and relates the historic necessity of educating the laity to religious maturity (THEOLOGISCHE QUARTALSCHRIFT, No. 2, 1950); August Zechmeister's contribution to DER BRENNER (No. 17, 1948) is another example of the Catholic layman's search for his proper place within the Church. Also noted: R. Aubert, "De partibus laicorum in Ecclesia", and "Quelques études récentes sur la place du laïcat dans l'Eglise" (COLLECT MECHLIN, Jan. 1949 and Nov. 1948); H. Mogeuet, "Le double témoignage du laïc et du religieux" (ETUDES, Dec. 1947); E. Schwartzbauer, "Der Laie in der Kirche" (THEOL. PRAK-QUARTALSCHRIFT, heft 1 & 2, 1949); Y. Congar and F. Varillon, *Sacerdoce et laïcat dans l'église* (Editions du Vitrail); and Y. Congar, the first chapter of his forthcoming book, *Jalons d'une théologie du laïcat* (LA VIE SPIRITUELLE, Supplément No. 15, Nov. 15, 1950).

5.

Theological Perspectives. We are glad to correct an error in the notes of our last issue: Oscar Cullmann's *Christ and Time* is available from an American publisher, Westminster. Karl Löwith's "Christentum und Geschichte" appeared in MERKUR (No. 12, 1950). August Brunner asks "Ist das Christentum eine Religion?", and studies the belief in God among primitive people (STIMMEN DER ZEIT (Oct. and Nov. 1950); E. Guerrero discusses the secular state as the Christian ideal (RAZON Y FE, Nov. 1950); R. H. Danbey gives "A Preface to Paul Tillich" (CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, April 1950); and J. Jalaverri gives cautious approval to the "new theology" of Lyons-Fourvière (UNIVERSITAS, July 1950). A. Perbal ("L'Ethnologie et les missionnaires", RHYTHMES DU MONDE, No. 3, 1950) explains the importance for the missionary to penetrate the ideas, customs and beliefs of the people to whom he is to present the Christian revelation in a profound and lasting manner. In the preceding number of the same

review A. M. Henry explains that the monks of today want to "declericalize" monasticism in order to bring it back to the spirit of its origins. Manual work was then assigned not to the lay-brothers alone, but was divided among all monks according to their respective capacities, and was even a part of the prayer in common. Without making any sacrifice to the strict and indispensable enclosure, is it not profitable to envisage a new type of religious, the "monk-worker"? Henry van Straelen's *Through Eastern Eyes* has been brought out by Grailville (Loveland, Ohio). In MUENCHENER THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT (4th Q., 1950) Richard Egenter pleads for a moral theology which will show how the general principles are to be applied to particular cases, not only recognizing that each of these is unique, but that the response must emerge from a Christian mind fully aware of the strange and terrible demands of the Lord of light. In HOCHLAND (April 1951) Phillipp Dessauer's "Die Gottesvorstellung des Atheismus" investigates the idea of God in atheism, and warns against confusing a judgment against atheism with judging atheists. In the same issue, Victor-Emil von Gebattel's "Anthropologie der Angst" discusses the reasons for the increased existence of fear in Western man. Bruce has brought out a handsome two-volume translation of Ferdinand Prat's study, *Jesus Christ*.

6.

Ecclesiology. The Rahner article may suggest further reading in the extensive recent Catholic literature on the Church; another starting-point might have been Ida Görres' "Letter on the Church" (DUBLIN REVIEW, 1st Q., 1950). She published another of these "Letters" in FRANKFURTER HEFTE (July 1950), and the series will be brought out as a book. Yves Congar's previously-mentioned study of reform in the Church is extremely valuable for its suggestions of related readings. Congar's article in THE THOMIST (Oct. 1939), "A Thomist Ecclesiology," is still relevant. The whole *Unam Sanctam* series is important, though Cerfaux's study of the Church in the theology of St. Paul will seem too technical for the ordinary reader. Yves Montcheuil's *Aspects de l'Eglise*, and Leclercq's *La vie du Christ dans son Eglise* are more easily appreciated. Scheeben's monograph appears in full in his *Mysteries of Christianity* (Herder), but the French edition has a valuable introduction to the speculative theological work of Scheeben. Vonier's contribution appeared in English originally under the title *The Spirit and the Bride* (Newman). Montcheuil's *Melanges Théologiques* (Aubier) contains an excellent essay, "Le rôle du chrétien dans l'Eglise." Two surveys of recent ecclesiology are, "La théologie fondamentale depuis 1945" (L'ANNEE THEOLOGIQUE, Fasc. II, 1950), by Henri Holstein, and P. Nicolas' article in REVUE THOMISTE (1946). This new ecclesiology considers Moehler the forerunner of the revival (*L'unité dans l'Eglise*), and is also indebted to the earlier studies which pioneered in the dogmatic approach to the De Ecclesia tract: Clerissac's *Le Mystère dans l'Eglise*, and work of Dom Grea and Sertillanges. Mersch's *The Whole Christ* (Bruce 1937) had already surveyed tradition with regard to the doctrine of the Mystical Body.

7.

Humani Generis. Catholic commentaries on last summer's encyclical continue to appear: by P. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, in RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA SCHOLA-

STICA (Feb. 1951); by Cyril Vollert, in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES (March 1951); and by Hugo Rahner, in SCHWEIZER RUNDSCHAU (Dec. 1950). The January NOUVELLE REVUE THEOLOGIQUE contains the first of a series of articles promised on this subject, by P. Taymans, S. J. According to the DOWNSIDE REVIEW, the latter study "should do much to reassure those who regard the document as a check to theological development. But it cannot be said that he has thrown light on all the passages which they have found obscure. For example, the precise nature of the assent claimed by the Encyclicals generally and by this one in particular, might have been usefully discussed. And it seems time that somebody said, not in complaint but in mere recognition of a fact, that the Holy Father's charitable care to avoid stigmatizing individuals carries with it inevitably the use of general, allusive language which makes it hard sometimes to be sure that one is complying with his instructions, steering a middle course between disregard of them on the one hand and scrupulosity on the other. It is surely right and healthy that such difficulties should be candidly avowed, and it would be deplorable if they were to be regarded by those who do not share them as signs of disaffection. That would be to evince a 'party-line' spirit which is clean contrary to the genius of Catholicism."

Reviewing three recent books (in the DOWNSIDE REVIEW, Winter 1951) of Catholic scriptural study (J. Coppens, *Les harmonies des deux testaments*, Casterman; H. de Lubac, *Histoire et esprit. L'intelligence de l'Ecriture d'après Origène*, Aubier; J. Daniélou, *Sacramentum futuri. Etudes sur les origènes de la typologie biblique*, Beauchesne), Dom Ralph Russell makes an important distinction in regard to "'Humani Generis' and the Spiritual Sense of Scripture". He explains that the encyclical is not "directed against the 'spiritual sense' of Scripture, or the revival of interest in it, but against abuses which have accompanied this revival. The Encyclical *Divino Afflante* did an outstanding work for Catholic Biblical scholarship by giving the highest approval to the efforts of scholars to understand the literary forms used in the East, and thereby to solve many difficulties in the Bible. It showed that what is technically called the 'sensus litteralis' (which is not the 'literal sense' of English idiom, but the sense intended by the author, be it historic, poetic, metaphorical, or that of some ancient literary 'genre') must be sought first. It is this sense which possesses inerrancy, and upon it any other sense must rest. To elucidate it must be the primary duty of Biblical scholarship and Biblical initiation.

"But by maintaining the primacy of the literal sense, we do not reject a 'spiritual' sense. The timely warnings of *Humani Generis* are intended to safeguard genuine theological thought, foster it by showing up aberrations and preserve it from the lazy-minded or the innovators who seek to avoid the duties imposed by the Papal pronouncements and to pass over the work of centuries. But there is another kind of lazy-mindedness which tries to justify by official pronouncements its own failure to study new problems or to investigate the sources. We should be careful, then, lest we suppose that because the literal and historic sense is fundamental to the Bible, no other sense is contained in it. This would be to contradict the whole history of Catholic exegesis . . ."

8.

Other reviews. MAISON-DIEU is perhaps the outstanding liturgical review; its current number (No. 22) is devoted to symbolism. Along with L'ART SACRE, LA VIE SPIRITUELLE, and LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE, they are published by Editions du Cerf (29 Bd. Latour-Mabourg, Paris 7). The February number of L'ART SACRE was given over to the Church of Assy; good illustrations of the church are in the Spring LITURGICAL ARTS.

DIE HERDER-KORRESPONDENZ (Verlag Herder & Co., Freiburg in Breisgau, Germany) is an invaluable reference source for current religious, political, and social questions. Correspondants on the political-social scene are uneven, but the review does cover activities in the Catholic world; is interested in all ecumenical news; gives verbatim the current pronouncements of the Pope, etc. A valuable periodical bibliography concludes each issue.

WORT UND WAHRHEIT (Wien I, In der Burg, Saulenstiege, Austria) is a monthly founded in 1945 and dedicated to furthering Christian thinking on current problems. International in range, articles during the past year included: Ida Görres' "Gesetzlichkeit und Weltverachtung"; Béla Menczer's "Propheten und Leviathan"; Hans Asmussen's "Ganzheit und Mitte des Glaubens"; Karl Rahner's "Gespräche ueber den 'Zaun' und das 'neue' Dogma"; Philipp Des-sauer's "Politik und Politiker"; Karl Pflegger's discussion of Julian Green's *Moirai*; Hans Sedlmayr's "Kierkegaard ueber Picasso"; Hans Egon Holthausen's essay on Eliot's poetry; Sigismund van Radecki's "Nachruf auf die Bettler"; Gaston Bardet's "Die Sackgasse der Technik"; Wakter Warnach's "Père Bruckberger"; Jean Abelé's "Die Explosion des Uratoms"; Karl Herczeg's "Revision des Marshall-Plans"; Curt Hohoff's "Gottfried Benn"; Heinrich Schlier's "Das Ende der Zeiten"; and Louis de Broglie's "Jenseits der Physik". A discussion of the situation of Europe today featured the January issue—participants included F. Copleston, D. Dubarle, C. Hollis, E. Waugh, D. de Rougemont, etc. Paul Chauchard discussed cybernetics and Ida Görres tried to show that the thesis of Simone de Beauvoir's *Le deuxième sexe* is atheistic. In the February issue one finds Roland Rainer's constructive "Städte fuer Menschen"; and Friedrich Hansen-Löve's discussion of 'crisis-literature'—Sorokin, Guénon, Feldkeller, Gebser, etc. Jean Abelé's "Das Geheimnis des Lichtes" and Curt Hohoff's "Eine verlorene Generation?" appeared in March, and Karl Löwith's "Skepsis und Glaube" in April.

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